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Abstract 
Giving an account of ourselves to others is an essential part of our social nature. But 
contrary to what it may seem, when we tell something about ourselves, we are not just 
communicating with others, we enter a complex process of self-formation where what is 
told will eventually constitute who we are seen to be by society. Visibility depends on 
others believing that what we are telling them is true. However, what society considers to 
be truth limits what we can tell about ourselves, forcing us into leaving something unsaid. 
Being unable to fully account for ourselves is thus equivalent to failing to be entirely 
visible to others. The act of giving an account is thereby revealed as a game of exertion of 
forces played between the subject being held accountable and the other who demands an 
account so that agreement is reached about who we are truly seen to be. Therefore, giving 
an account of ourselves allows for the link between truth and subjectivity to be recognised.  
Considering accounting as a practice founded on the act of giving an account, the first 
purpose guiding this thesis consists in understanding the importance accounting has in 
establishing the above mentioned link. Yet, how we account for ourselves bears on the way 
we feel and are held accountable, which is tantamount to affirming that accountability 
reflects our subjectivity. Through this reflex, the meaning of the former becomes 
dependent on the way truth relates to subjects. The second objective of this essay is to 
study how accountability’s meaning derives from the link between us as subjects and truth. 
Within extant literature, case studies have regularly been employed in the research 
concerning accountability. Following such trend, and supported by Foucault’s studies 
about the technologies of the self, this essay investigates the role Portugal’s leading actor 
in the water sector, Águas de Portugal (AdP), has been playing so far in the process of 
reshuffling the sector from 2007 to 2012. Because AdP was the main focus of that 
reorganisation, the company was subject to a whole game of forces exerted on its identity 
by means of its own accounts.  
The conclusions reached here reveal accounting as a truth-extracting and truth-assimilating 
process subjects undertake in order to achieve meaningfulness. To account is to tell the 
truth. On the other hand, the interdependence between truth and the subject emerges when 
the latter gives an account. And because accountability is reflective of our subjectivity, its 
meaning will necessarily depend on the meaning given to truth. 
Keywords: account; accountability; subjectivity; truth; belief 
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Resumo 
Sermos capazes de prestar contas sobre nós próprios é essencial à nossa natureza social. 
Mas ao contrário do que nos possa parecer, quando dizemos algo de nós não nos limitamos 
somente a comunicar com os outros. Entramos sim num processo de autoformação, em que 
o que é dito acaba por constituir o modo como somos vistos pela sociedade. Tal 
visibilidade depende da crença dos outros em que o que nós dizemos é verdadeiro. Porém, 
o que a sociedade considera como verdade é limitativo do que podemos afirmar sobre nós 
próprios, pelo que algo fica forçosamente por dizer. Ao não sermos capazes de prestar 
contas integrais sobre nós, não nos é possível ser completamente visíveis ao olhar dos 
outros. O ato de prestar contas é revelado como um jogo de forças reciprocamente 
empregues entre quem é accountable e quem exige contas e cujo objetivo consiste num 
entendimento acerca de quem somos verdadeiramente. Então, o ato de prestar contas sobre 
nós permite o reconhecimento da existência da ligação entre a verdade e a subjetividade. 
Considerando a contabilidade como uma prática baseada no ato de prestar contas, o 
primeiro objetivo deste estudo consiste em compreender a importância da contabilidade no 
estabelecimento da ligação acima mencionada. Todavia, a maneira como prestamos contas 
sobre nós está relacionada com o modo como nos consideramos accountable, o que 
equivale a afirmar que a accountability reflete a nossa subjetividade. Através deste reflexo, 
o seu significado torna-se dependente do modo como a verdade se relaciona com os 
sujeitos. O segundo objetivo desta investigação prende-se então com a determinação do 
significado de accountability através da ligação entre a verdade e nós, como sujeitos. 
Os estudos de caso têm sido regularmente utilizados na pesquisa referente à accountability. 
Seguindo esta corrente, e com recurso aos estudos de Foucault sobre as tecnologias do ser, 
nesta dissertação investiga-se o papel que o interveniente principal no setor das águas em 
Portugal, a Águas de Portugal (AdP), tem desempenhado no processo de reestruturação do 
setor entre 2007 e 2012. Uma vez que a AdP foi o foco desta reorganização, a empresa foi 
sujeita a todo um jogo de forças exercido sobre a sua identidade através das suas contas. 
As conclusões deste estudo revelam a contabilidade como um processo em que a verdade é 
simultaneamente extraída e assimilada pelos sujeitos de modo a poderem adquirir 
significância. Prestar contas é dizer a verdade. Por outro lado, a interdependência entre a 
verdade e o sujeito emerge quando este presta contas. E como a accountability reflete a 
nossa subjetividade, o seu significado necessariamente depende do da verdade. 
Palavras-chave: conta; accountability; subjetividade; verdade; crença 
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1. Introduction 
“When I tell the truth about myself, I consult not only my “self”, but the way in which 
that self is produced or producible, the position from which the demand to tell the 
truth proceeds, the effects that telling the truth will have in consequence, as well as the 
price that must be paid. (...) To tell the truth about oneself involves us in quarrels 
about the formation of the self and the social status of truth” (Butler, 2005, p. 132). 
Throughout our entire life, we spend most of our time engaging with others via the 
accounts we give of ourselves, even if we are not always conscious of this endowment. It 
bears on our social condition, with justifications about our conduct being demanded due to 
the fact that we willy-nilly maintain relationships with others. We are thus led into giving 
reasons for our conduct because others have previously asked for them to be given. This 
sense of “giving and demanding of reasons for conduct” (Roberts & Scapens, 1985, p. 447) 
is quoted in contemporary literature as being identical to accountability. This rather 
simplistic notion fails to capture, inter alia, the reason why we give something of ourselves 
to others in the shape of an account. 
When someone, a subject, tells something about himself, about his conduct, the other 
will judge if what has been communicated is verisimilar (see Bruner, 1991). This 
judgement may, at first sight, seem straightforward; either he accepts what has been told or 
he does not. This reveals that the subject is not entirely free to express himself, as the other 
is capable of conditioning what he is able to tell about himself. What the other, as listener, 
seeks from the teller is a proper answer concerning what he is holding the teller 
accountable for. What is told must have the capability of being accepted by the other; were 
it otherwise, the other simply would ignore it. Thus, when we give an account of ourselves 
to others, those others, by accepting what we are telling about ourselves, are indeed 
rendering the content of our accounts true. Giving an account of ourselves is then synonym 
for telling the truth about ourselves. What exactly is the truth that is being told by 
ourselves about our own selves is the problem. Imperfect beings as we are, there is always 
something of ourselves unable to be told as it is unknown to ourselves: this is what Butler 
(2005) describes as the social subject’s natural opaqueness. What we know about our true 
identity is conditioned from the very beginning we start accounting for ourselves. But what 
we account for is essential for making us visible to others. 
The role of truth in establishing our subjectivity is essential for understanding why 
we must account for ourselves. Because what we say is attuned to what truth imposes upon 
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our ability to tell others something about ourselves, accounting can be considered a 
practice of attuning conducts to the regime of truth. This regime, as Foucault describes it, 
is “a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation 
and operation of statements” (2001a, p.132). However, accounts are not merely passive 
conductors of the voice of truth. As Butler states, “the account is an act – situated within a 
larger practice of acts – that one performs for, to, even on an other, an allocutory deed, an 
acting for, and in the face of, the other” (2005, p. 130, emphasis in original). Focusing on 
the highlighted term, when the subject tells something of himself to others, what actions 
those others will undertake will have as their ground what was previously told to them. 
Because we account considering what we are being held accountable for, 
accountability is expressive of towards what and whom we feel ourselves answerable to. 
That answer is to be given in the shape of an account. As an expression of that 
commitment, accountability has the capability of revealing something about ourselves 
through the answer it enables. Accountability can be seen as account-ability, the ability to 
account for ourselves. But because we are exteriorising what we are telling about 
ourselves, such activity is what exposes us to the judgement of the other mentioned above. 
The other being refractive of the social gaze (Roberts, 1996), we become exposed to the 
effect of social norms guiding who we can be seen to be. Considering these as synonyms 
of what is held to be socially true, truth as power is revealed through this normative setting. 
Being linked to the subject’s existence (Schweiker, 1993), this exposure that accountability 
guides the subject into allows for a relationship between truth and subjectivity to be 
perceived. This bears on the subject being social, and it is because he is social that truth (as 
synonym of what is socially considered to be right) is seen as linked to the subject, to his 
subjectivity. But as it is sustained by the act of giving an account, exposing subjectivity to 
truth endows accountability with an inherent elusiveness, making it difficult to understand 
what exactly this concept is. This is due to the opaqueness of subjects already mentioned.  
What motivates this dissertation consists then in studying the relationship that can 
exist between subjectivity and truth in order to understand the reasons motivating or 
compelling the subject into giving an account of himself. Alongside this purpose, it is 
expected that the role of accounts in reflecting the power of truth will become clearer so as 
to enhance the understanding of the way truth manages to be established as an effective 
regime conditioning conduct. But because giving an account results from the subject 
feeling and being held accountable towards something and someone, how accountability is 
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affected by such relationship between the subject and truth is something that necessarily 
needs to be explored. As already stated, accountability is linked to the subject’s existence 
(Schweiker, 1993). 
This dissertation searches to explore what is considered to be a new approach 
regarding the way both accounting and accountability can be reified, i.e., to investigate the 
role of accounting in processes of constitution of subjectivity by focusing on the power 
truth purports to have and exert upon them. This is sustained upon the principle that giving 
an account is an activity capable of linking subjects to truth. And because this activity is 
dependent on the subject being held accountable to something or someone, our perception 
of what accountability can be is seemingly affected by the way such relationship ensues. 
Therefore, and in order to pursue the proposed objectives, this study is based upon 
providing an answer to the following research questions: 
a) What is the importance of accounts in enabling the link between the subject and 
truth? 
b) In what way is accountability expressive of and defined by the connection 
between subjectivity and truth? 
Because case studies consist in a recurrent approach in exploring the ways distinct 
forces are able to mould the specific framework within which accounts are rendered, the 
projected work is to be developed under the framework sustaining explanatory case 
studies, as they seek “to explain how and why some event(s) occurred” (Yin, 2003, p. 69). 
As this is essentially a hermeneutical study over published texts, it requires the analysis of 
a wide set of sources. But such is sustained upon the importance of written accounts in 
enabling processes of constitution of subjectivity to be studied. In particular, what is 
considered important by distinct parties tends to be different due to the interpretation 
activity reading accounts calls forth. Therefore, this work follows a participant’s 
perspective typical of a qualitative and interpretative approach.  
After a new strategic plan for the water sector set by the Portuguese government for 
the period comprising 2007 to 2013 was issued, this area has been subject to a continuous 
and turbulent process of change under the auspices of the concept of sustainability. With 
the sector being considered unsustainable, a whole series of moves were performed during 
2007 to 2012, the period in analysis, in order to orientate it towards what is perceived as 
sustainability. With its leading role in coordinating water supply, Águas de Portugal 
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represents the central focus of such moves, making it liable to the full exposure of 
discourse’s enabling and constraining powers. Though a corporation, it is indeed a moral 
agent acting within society (see Schweiker, 1993). Therefore, studying how AdP’s 
subjectivity is affected through the accounts it renders is expected to provide the starting 
questions with adequate answers. 
With the development of this thesis, a better understanding about the role of 
accounting in connecting subjectivity to truth is expected to be reached. This is intended to 
provide future research with a new perspective over the significance of the practice of 
accounting as essential for subjectivity to ensue. Accounting is then expected to be reified 
as the act of giving an account of oneself. As the activity of giving an account is essential 
for subjects to be accountable, observing this practice from another angle will contribute to 
clarify how the constitution of subjectivity is relevant regarding the social meaning of 
accountability, helping to retrieve it from the shallowness of many simplistic notions it is 
stuck to and thereby revealing the complexity of such concept. 
The structure of this work comprises four other chapters as follows: The literature 
revision is organised into three sections, each inter-related to the others. In the first section, 
and after characterising the subject as an opaque and exposed being from whom an account 
is demanded, a discussion of the nature of the act of giving an account as essentially 
narrative ensues, with the implications it has in exposing the subject to the action of social 
norms. It is due to their opacity and exposure that subjects are able to experience a 
doubleness of their self: as an agent and as an accountant, with the two not being self-
identical. The second section presents the leading arguments supporting this thesis, and 
centres round the analysis of the work of Foucault around the techniques of the self and 
how they relate to truth. This allows for the relationship between subjectivity and truth to 
be linked to the act of giving an account, defining accountability as dependent of truth’s 
meaning. And in the third section the role of truth in constituting subjectivity is furthered 
by exploring the way narrative and computational accounting contribute to making the 
subject visible. This culminates in the disclosure of the power belief has upon 
accountability and regimes of truth, essential for the enactment of subjectivity. 
The following chapter defines the kind of methodology sustaining this study. First, 
the inherent methodological and epistemological perspectives guiding it are presented. At 
this point, the objective is to explain the relevance of the methodological presuppositions 
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that were chosen in answering the starting questions being placed, especially when 
accountability and accounting are explored within a perspective that calls for a specific 
kind of approach in detriment of others. This is due to the position the investigator takes 
when conducting this research. Afterwards, there is an explanation about the research 
method used to conduct this case study. This concerns also the reasons leading to its 
choice. There is also a reference to how are the relevant data going to be collected. Finally, 
the theoretical framework supporting the development of the research is given its general 
outline by referring to the relevant ideas and authors that contribute to structuring it.  
The fourth part of this research concerns the development of the case study over AdP 
and is also divided into three sections. The first of these describes all the process that 
conducted to the setting characterising the water sector before the enactment of its new 
strategy in 2007. As this is a hermeneutical study focused, inter alia, on the importance of 
the act of giving an account in linking the subject to truth, there is the need to make a 
survey over the period prior to the publishing of the strategy known as PEAASAR II. This 
will provide the necessary grounds to interpret the discursive stance taking place after 
PEAASAR II was issued. In the second section, the importance of PEAASAR II in 
structuring a new discursive regime of sustainability is brought to the fore, with this 
concept acquiring the status of truth and thereby capable of conditioning the meaning of 
subjects and the actions they perform. However, this power can only be exerted if accounts 
are rendered. This dependence of truth on accounts is the common thread sustaining the 
third section, where the process ensuing during the period comprising PEAASAR II (2007 
– 2013) is focused in order to understand the game of forces this relationship between 
accounts and truth, and consequently with subjects, represents. Here, AdP is endowed with 
the leading role because of the importance it has in allowing the prevailing discourse of 
sustainability to be a regime of truth. 
This dissertation culminates with the presentation of the main conclusions and of the 
limitations that restricted the scope of this study. And together with this, there is a 
reference to the contributions this research purports to give regarding our understanding of 
accountability and accounting, providing some clues for future research. 
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2. Literature Review 
The present chapter is organised into three inter-related sections, as earlier 
mentioned. The first section comprises the literature review around the importance of the 
act of giving an account in the constitution of subjectivity, stressing the role of narrative in 
the entire process. In the second section, a review over Foucault’s work around the 
techniques of the self and how they relate to truth is performed in order to disclose the 
relationship between subjectivity, truth and accountability. Finally, in the last section the 
reviews undertaken in the previous sections are furthered by emphasising the power belief 
possesses over the link subjects have to truth. 
 
2.1. Narrative and the constitution of subjectivity 
Among the paraphernalia of extant definitions in the literature that try to label 
accountability, one that has captured my attention the most is presented in Munro & 
Hatherly (1993, p. 369) as “the willingness and ability to explain and justify one’s acts to 
self and others”, a concept basilar to society itself. Specifically, there prevail two major 
ideas which are central, rather fundamental, to studying accountability as a social 
phenomenon in its essence: namely, accountability requires the existence of a self and 
other(s) as a basis for its foundation, both willing to (meaningfully) communicate. 
However, an inquiry into what sparks such willingness and sustains such ability reveals a 
subtleness so befitting accountability that it shows how foolish any attempt to render it a 
definitive, all-encompassing notion may seem. This recognition of its imperfect yet elusive 
nature enhances, oddly enough, our understanding of it (Sinclair, 1995; Messner, 2009). 
We must always bear in mind that due to it being inherent to us, imperfect selves, 
accountability is endowed with its imperfect nature. Even if it may not seem so, 
accountability is so much dependent on us to exist as we ourselves are dependent on it for 
our existence. This bears on the fact that it is sustained on the essential relationship self 
and the other must necessarily have, as it is through such bondage that the self emerges as 
one in society
1
. What motivates such an encounter and in what way(s) it can take place will 
justify accountability’s basic motive as being that of existence itself (Schweiker, 1993), 
                                        
1
 And because we are intrinsically social, the other is confirmed as a subject due to the address self enables it 
to perform. As discussed later, the communicative nature of the act of giving an account reveals the 
interdependence between self and the other as far as meaningfulness goes.  
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bringing to the fore what is accounting’s role in enabling the subject into personhood. The 
relationship between these two seemingly akin words is dependent on reifying accounting 
as a practice capable of enabling self in giving an account of itself. 
Giving an account is something intrinsic to us as social beings. Willy-nilly, we 
continuously enrol in accounts of our living to others with whom a certain relationship is 
kept, whether being one of friendship, professional or other (Willmott, 1996). And since all 
of us can or must account to each other in some way, we are thereby subject to both giving 
and receiving accounts. It may sound somewhat contradictory to the accountability’s 
notion presented above, as it draws on the willingness to account to others, but it is by 
coupling this feeling to the array of features grounding the act of giving an account that 
such activity, and concomitantly accountability, becomes primary to processes of self-
constitution within the community. Referring only to one’s eagerness to account somehow 
constrains accountability’s meaning as it seemingly makes it dependent upon whether the 
subject is keen on giving an account of itself
2
. In consonance with what is to be later 
discussed, the sheer act of refusing to give an account is indeed tantamount to rendering an 
account (Messner, 2009). Still, this serves as a stepladder for claiming that by referring 
only to the willingness to account much is to be said concerning the activity of account-
giving in itself, in turn concealing its fundamental role in shaping and framing self from 
whatever definition of accountability being construed. Prior to any willingness to account, 
there is a primary will, rather a thrust for self to unveil itself to the world by answering to a 
primordial injunction cast upon it. This call for self is bound to be its inaugural moment of 
recognition.  
Search for recognition is intrinsic to our living, as it makes both us and our actions 
meaningful in the world (Willmott, 1996). Rendering meaning is, however, always a 
dyadic process between two parties, implying that what sense is endowed upon our own 
selves is performed by someone different from us in a first stance. For that to happen, one 
must reach out for that disparate other, its existence being our gateway to significance. 
Addressing the other in the form of an account enables for such connection to ensue. 
Giving an account of ourselves may thereby be seen as reflective of our social subjectivity 
in the community as it translates the (inter)dependency between us as selves and others 
                                        
2
 One cannot properly speak of self’s own account or its account, as these are not of its sole authorship, 
something which is to be argued for later on. This is why one must talk here of an account of itself merely as 
identifying its teller, allowing it to be known. 
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regarding our meaningfulness, due to a binding feature accounts allow. As Schweiker 
(1993, p. 234) claims, “giving an account is providing reasons for character and conduct, 
ones held to be understandable to others and thereby rendering a life intelligible and 
meaningful”. 
Coupling willingness to the achievement of meaning by self shifts the focus on the 
activity of account-giving in itself (namely, an act by which we justify our conduct before 
others) to why the account is given, what is behind the giving of such justifications and 
what motivates and motivated them. But self’s willingness alone does not enable its 
intelligibility to ensue because the link to the other is not yet established. For 
meaningfulness to occur, the other must also be keen on addressing self. Self is to be 
endowed with selfhood if it sparks in the other a disposition, rather a desire to know, to 
discover who is the one provoking such feelings of curiosity or uneasiness that lead into a 
will for knowledge. Communication is then essential for binding this duality of desire, 
enabling the other’s address to be directed to the self by means of a query, in turn initiating 
the process of self-constitution. This draws on Butler’s arguments (2005) that asking self 
“who are you” is central to processes of self-formation, as it assumes the prior existence of 
and dependence on the other as a sine qua non condition for the emergence of self. The 
inquiry is not necessarily judicial, as she argues when referring to Nietzsche’s championed 
ideas of accounts being rendered out of fear of punishment, for the other’s eagerness for 
knowledge does not arise due to a prior aggression by self but as a result of an intentional 
but harmless move capable of retrieving self from anonymity into society. Communication 
still seems somewhat unilateral here, mainly performed by self through answering the 
other’s call for identifying itself. Yet, it leads us into asserting the importance of the ability 
to communicate as essential to the act of giving an account due to the binding feature it 
allows. One can then refer to the account-ability, the ability to account for, inherent to the 
act of giving an account as something natural to the activity itself, being accounts a means 
of communication; which is not unexpected, considering the etymology of the family of 
words to which accountability belongs.  
Deriving from the Latin computare, it implies both the ability for narrating and 
computing (Kamuf, 2007). Whilst communication does not seem obvious or rather 
seemingly inexistent regarding the latter, the former calls for its existence because 
narrating, an essentially communicative act, necessarily needs two parties to ensue. On the 
other hand, considering computation as an exercise of power upon subjects and their 
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conduct in order to render them visible to others (see Miller, 1992), the communicative 
side of “computational” accountability is revealed, for such calculation and reckoning are 
to be given to the other in the shape of an account if self is to be endowed with meaning. 
Like narrative, it concerns the ability of addressing the other in order to reply to its call, 
which in turn renders us as account-able beings by answering it. We are not accountable, 
or account-able (i.e., beings with the ability to account deriving from and befitting to a 
communicative dyadic), just because we account, since the meaning of such an act in 
isolation could mislead us into merely communicating loose information about ourselves. 
To account is less to talk than to tell, since the former, whilst included in the latter, can be 
simply an expression resulting from haphazardly communicating something; telling, on the 
other hand, implies both the figure of the other and the sense of reporting something 
intended to be meaningful (Boland & Schultze, 1996), i.e., which bears on our wish of 
being intelligible to others within a community. Whilst being interdependent, narrative 
precedes computation (Boland & Schultze, 1996) because it concerns the emergence of the 
self as a social subject and what meaning computation is awarded is established within the 
possibilities narrative has allowed the subject’s selfhood into. Thus the focus of this 
chapter is on narrative qualities of accountability, leaving aside for the moment its 
computational face we are so keen on (See Kamuf, 2007). 
Being addressed by the other leads self into a feeling of commitment regarding its 
inquirer whose call it must answer. What was primarily a desire for intelligibility turns into 
a duty self is imposed, that of having to give an account, as it is now an answerable subject 
before the other on whom expectations were created regarding what self tells about itself 
(Shearer, 2002). By calling for outer attention, self places itself and is simultaneously 
placed in a position of exposure, first to the individual other’s demand to account, which, 
and second, is reflective of a general obligation, bestowed upon self as a social being, to 
account for itself. The individual other is then reflexive of what may be understood as a 
“generalized other” (Roberts, 1991), with its expectations for an account refractive of the 
prevailing ethos within society. However, it is by replying to the other’s call that self, 
through its accounts, is given the possibility for meaningfulness, i.e., can be considered a 
subject. This is so as the act of giving an account presupposes at least two subjects: a teller 
and a listener. The former only addresses the latter because it has been required and 
therefore allowed to do so. The other is regarded as prior to what sense self can have of 
itself, as it is through the former’s call that the latter’s intelligibility can be endowed; 
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otherwise it will remain in anonymity. Therefore, the other is placed in a higher position 
than self regarding the act of giving an account considering that it is posited as an existence 
prior to that of self and to whom accounts have to be given. Self can account for itself only 
when being first addressed through a query. For self to stand before the other, the other 
must exist before self. Interdependence arises not merely due to the other’s demand for 
account, but because that other is lead to an eagerness to know self, with such 
‘materialising’ in its demand for account. What motivates its willingness into querying is 
however unknown and unknowable to both the other and self, even if being unconsciously 
a move performed by the latter, who cannot be conceived as intelligible since it has not 
been addressed. As such force cannot emerge within the communicative dyadic the act of 
giving an account calls forth, the other is granted a position of seeming superiority by 
holding the power of inquiry, to which self must unwillingly answer through its account. 
This obligation of the answering self to give an account of itself to the demanding other is 
constitutive of the moral responsibility of self to give an expected account. More than 
account-able, self is now able to feel accountable, even if in a compulsory tone, towards 
the question directed by the other. Accountability can then be conceived as essentially a 
moral responsibility felt by self to answer the other’s demand for an expected account. And 
it is the exposure to the other that founds such sense
3
. Yet it is through being exposed that 
self is hold accountable and thereby rendered intelligible. This justifies why accountability 
as moral responsibility to account is a fundamental duty. Self is hold as an accountable 
being even if decides not to account at all, as the demand to account is always prior to such 
refusal, and denying to account is identical to an account being rendered, as it tells 
something about self (Messner, 2009).  
It is this precedence of the other over self that allows morality into accountability, 
both preventing self from giving an account out of egotistical, self-centred motives and 
denying it an apparent total independence from the other, whether individual or 
generalised, it could aspire for (see Roberts, 1996). Shearer (2002) has argued that the 
egocentric self arises due to a temporal and causal structure that postulates desire prior to 
                                        
3
 Albeit the boundary between accountability and responsibility remains tenuous, given their frequent 
interminglement (see Cummings & Anton, 1990; Lindkvist & Llewellyn, 2003; Kamuf, 2007a), these can be 
treated as distinguished notions when considering the moment they arise and the temporal structure they are 
enmeshed in. As Schweiker (1993, p. 246) claims: “[w]e do not assume anything about the being of the actor 
prior to giving an account in order to ascribe responsibility”. In fact, accountability can be so harmful to 
responsibility so as to deny it (see McKernan, 2012). Such claims do not intend to break their 
interdependence, though. But queries about responsibility and its distinction from accountability cannot be 
further explored here. 
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value. Since it is the desire of self that attributes what value the other may have, self will 
only move to the encounter of the other if it is beneficial to itself. The other is then 
commodified as it is conceived as a means to attain self-interested goals, resulting in a 
denial of the others’ subjectivity. One can argue that the other is here posterior to self as it 
arises only as a consequence of self’s desire. However, and in line with what was 
previously stated, self’s desire is to spark in the other a will to knowledge, a curiosity 
leading to the query inaugurating self’s recognition. This desire only arises because self 
already accepts the other as existent, with a value of its own and independent of any desire 
casted upon it. The other is a subject prior to self and the cause of self’s craving for 
attention, unable to be reduced to an act of appropriation for self’s own satisfaction. For 
“desire, following as it does as a consequence of value rather than its garantor, cannot 
possibly succeed completely in appropriating the other to its own ends, because it is 
the object/other in itself, in its autonomy from the desiring subject, that gives rise to 
the desire in the first place. In other words, if one desires something (the “other”) 
merely because the other has value in itself, then the other cannot be reduced to a mere 
object to be appropriated in the service of the desiring subject’s wishes, because such 
an objectification and appropriation would undermine the very foundation on which 
the desire is based.” (Shearer, 2002, p. 553 – 554, emphasis in original) 
For the act of giving an account to be a moral one, the other must be treated as the 
end in itself, an equal respect between subjects must be shown (Schweiker, 1993). 
However, it is this equality of respect that reaffirms self’s unequal nature regarding the 
other, to whom it must account out of the moral responsibility self is made to feel. Denying 
such difference would “negate [the] other’s uniqueness, the very thing that self needs in 
order to be self” (Macintosh, Shearer & Riccaboni, 2009, p. 754). 
The dichotomy value/desire does not explain by itself the full scope of morality in 
accountability, as their link is established when there is contact, i.e., communication, 
between self and the other. Moral responsibility, embedding a quest for meaningfulness, 
shapes such communication into an act of telling constitutive of the account self renders 
about itself. By the fact of being the addressee, the other is unveiled its social origin and 
nature, refractive of the norms that limit what intelligible constitution subjects are allowed 
(Butler, 2005). Roberts (1996, p. 43) has compiled such assemblage of norms in the phrase 
“normative order of the wider society” (emphasis added). Playing a game of semantics 
reveals the ambiguous character of the highlighted term, as it can be conceived, e.g., as a 
command, a rule to be followed or a state of neatness, of normality, the opposite of 
disorder. When judges repeatedly call for order in court, they are making simultaneous 
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usage of this double meaning. The other’s sociality, because it is founded on moral 
precepts, reflects upon self the imposition such norms have on the accounts it must give. 
For no account can happen outside a structure of language defining how communication is 
to follow if it is to reach ashore. Subjects are therefore being ordered to account in an 
orderly fashion befitting the relevant social order, with the account losing its meaning 
otherwise. The address of the other not only imposes a moral responsibility to answer, but 
it also lays the normative ground upon which the account can be given. Self is accountable 
not merely regarding the other or others addressing it, but its accountability is dependent 
on what morality allows self into account. And the other as addressee is what imposes 
morality upon self as a structure of address, being self’s exclusive gateway to 
meaningfulness. 
“If I am held accountable through a framework of morality, that framework is first 
addressed to me, first starts to act upon me, through the address and query of the other. 
Indeed, I come to know that framework through no other way. If I give an account of 
myself in response to such a query, I am implicated in a relation to the other before 
whom and to whom I speak. Thus, I come into being as a reflexive subject in the 
context of establishing a narrative account of myself when I am spoken to by someone 
and prompted to address myself to the one who addresses me.” (Butler, 2005, p. 15) 
Returning to the intrinsic value of the other, one may argue that the other’s value is 
grounded less on its individuality as other than on its refractive qualities of the normative 
social gaze, the ruler of recognition (Butler, 2005). Meaning, to hold itself as intelligible, 
needs to be founded on a social order, translatable into what is generally taken to be right 
and/or not, i.e., on morality. The other, through its face and gaze, is for self the 
embodiment of such moral, the “generalized other” Roberts (1991) alludes to or the other 
qua Other Shearer (2002) draws on. Considering the latter, with its Levinasian vein, one 
can argue that if the desire of self is oriented towards the value of the social other, such 
desire must also be felt about the moral behind the other’s subjectivity, as it founds and 
structures its (the other’s) earlier existence. Therefore, morality is also prior to self, with 
desire arising as a consequence of its natural value embedded on the subjectivity of the 
other. Moral value is not due to an affection self may feel for the other, but derives from 
the value the other encompasses concerning the origin of self’s desire, since it is the end 
motivating self to account. And it is because self values the other that it is compelled into 
answering its injunction, the act of giving an account being the recognition of the 
legitimacy of that demand. But in turn, by giving an account self is also legitimated as it is 
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capable of addressing the other’s call; self is an account-able subject being held 
accountable.  
If the address of the other inaugurates morality into self, it exposes it to the exertion 
of moral power (see Schweiker, 1993), with such being translatable into a set of norms of 
conduct. Yet, norms alone do not warrant for power to be exerted. It is through the other’s 
demand to account that they can operate upon self. How they are to be perceived is due to 
their postulation as discourse
4
. This moral discourse is of a normative nature, as it shapes 
and conditions the way we act, in turn affecting the way we hold ourselves accountable. 
Because the reply to the other is to be given according to the moral framework casted upon 
us, for it consists of what is considered to be understandable, what is allowed into 
tellability must be becoming to such structure; expressing in other terms, not befitting that 
framework, breaks communication between both subjects, hampering the attainment of 
intelligibility. What self is capable of telling about itself is limited from the very beginning 
of the activity of giving an account, for morality via discourse has already constrained the 
shape of the channels conveying self’s message to the other. Merely asking self “who are 
you” is in its essence restrictive, since it originates always from a framework prior to self 
and acts upon its account-ability, in turn structuring self’s sense of accountability as moral 
responsibility to account, for this is linked to the legitimacy of self within a community of 
others; it then expresses how ethical the claim for self to account for itself can be, since the 
accounts are not and cannot be merely out of self’s authorship, if the one being held 
accountable is to be endowed with legitimacy as a social subject (see, e.g., Messner, 2009). 
Considering that self’s meaningfulness is dependent upon a dyadic communicative 
relationship to the other through the accounts given, giving an account can then be said to 
be a constitutive act of selfhood, with morality shaping self’s acknowledgement of itself 
through the other’s initial question. Self depends on the moral structure sustaining the 
scene of address to emerge, but this does not mean that self is a whole product of the 
norms; these only establish a limited but enabling field of action, otherwise self would 
become an automaton with whatever subjectivity possible being denied. Whilst 
constrained, self’s tell-ability has not been reduced to a single dictatorial way of 
expression. Indeed, by limiting what can be told, morality prompts for self’s inventiveness 
in shaping itself within the framework it calls forth. This inventive genius of self that 
                                        
4
 “How they are to be perceived” reveals moral norms’ blurred nature due to every subject’s natural opacity, 
whether this is self or the other, which subjects them to interpretation. 
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Butler (2005) refers to is a consequence of internalisation of morality, being reified as “a 
challenge” self accepts from the moment it gives an account. Asking “who are you” opens 
self to such challenge, impelling a questioning about what it can tell about itself. While 
restrictive, morality paradoxically potentiates the subject’s self-crafting powers by 
inaugurating its reflexivity, with the act of giving an account being performed only after an 
act of self-constitution has ensued. But because such act must arise within a specific 
framework, thereby impeding something about self to be told, it also inaugurates self’s 
opacity and its inability for fully knowing itself. Inventiveness bears directly on this 
obscurity, unable to be told.  
Opacity arises as a natural consequence of the moral exposure self is subject to. 
Being exposed to the operation of norms renders the subject visible through the specific 
lens of what morality, as discourse, prevails in society. Indeed, as Butler emphasises 
(2005), it is by being addressed that self is supplied with the language capable of replying 
to the other. Exposure is therefore enabling of communication, but only to a certain degree, 
the one allowed by the scene of address. What one considers to be its own language was 
undeniably imposed by the other, by the language structuring its inquiry by which one 
must answer if it is to be understood; it is therefore not ours at all. This implies that what a 
subject can tell about itself is founded upon what was not his own from the very beginning, 
for only by being asked to account can one become a subject. Being a subject is inevitably 
bound to being subject to something, a form of power that translates subjectivity as being 
necessarily out of subjection (Foucault, 2001b). The subject must then be given the means 
to narrate himself if it is to aspire to meaningfulness. But this also subjects self into 
answering within the structure previously cast upon it, meaning that self’s tellability is not 
exclusively its own. This need of structure, this quality of being subject to normativeness, 
is essential for narrative to happen, since it is “centrally concerned with cultural 
legitimacy” (Bruner, 1991, p. 15). Giving an account of ourselves, by the fact of being an 
act intended to grant us meaning, therefore “demarcates membership in a linguistic and 
moral community” (Schweiker, 1993, p. 244) by rendering us subjects to their canonical 
discourse. Opacity is here founded upon what self cannot allow itself into speakability if it 
is to maintain membership. Being a member means that what I consider to be my accounts 
are never mine in the first place; they are not out of my sole perspective (if that exists) but 
must follow what direction the appeal posed by the other compels, the social other 
recognised as refractive of social gaze. How self is visible depends on what perspective the 
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norms allow, with both self and the other being their (dependent) subjects. And perspective 
rules what accounts can be given, setting its scene. Following Butler (2005), the sociality 
of norms makes them indifferent and impersonal regarding the subject, interrupting self’s 
sole authorship of its accounts. That justifies self’s dispossession of its perspective due to 
the operation of norms “that condition what will and will not be a recognisable account, 
exemplified in the fact that I [the subject] am used by the norm precisely to the degree that 
I use it”(Butler, 2005, p. 36). 
Being the condition of self’s emergence as a reflective being, norms must necessarily 
precede self. As Butler (2005) asserts, through their internalisation they constitute part of 
self, but are unable to be narrated by what accounts self gives. Their temporality is 
different from that of the individual subject. What self tells of itself bears on its living 
experience, arising always belatedly regarding the norms that found its meaningfulness. 
Being so, they are unable to be captured by self’s narrative. Even if they are part of self, 
they cannot be recollected due to their impersonality and the inevitability of self not being 
capable of witnessing its own constitutive moment (Butler, 2005). Because they constitute 
selfhood, they dispose self of its perspective not due to outside exposure, but from the very 
moment self reflectively constitutes itself. Yet, one must stress that whilst constituting self, 
they are not self, for reducing selfhood to them would deny whatever singularity self could 
aspire to by means of its inventiveness
5
. They are unknown and un-know-able to self, but 
still essential for its individuality to be enacted. Self must be exposed to the operation of 
norms in order to be rendered meaning, but what is exposed to the other is its uniqueness 
as a subject, not its normative sameness, unable to be narrated. The indifferent and 
impersonal norms which render us our commonness and social nature, which deprive us of 
the ownership of our accounts, paradoxically are what sustain the singularity of subjects to 
emerge within exposure, therefore enabling recognition. For self to bind to the other, and 
vice-versa, a unity out of diversity must ensue (Butler, 2005). Giving an account is an act 
founded upon such difference, justifying existence (Schweiker, 1993). Otherwise 
subjectivity would not hold sway. Narrative, whilst not being crafted exclusively by self, 
nevertheless sustains its individual subjectivity. And again narrative itself stresses this 
inability of self fully narrating itself for it is too a cause of self’s opacity. 
                                        
5
 Drawing on Foucault (1997c), such reduction of self to the normative discourse is impossible even if 
considering that discourse, as truth, can be superimposed with the subject’s will. If self were to be an 
impersonal embodiment of norms, how could, for example, meditation over those same norms ensue?  
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Bruner (1991) asserts that both our experience and memory are structured mainly in 
narrative form. Narrative, originating from subjects, is subject to convention and constraint 
imposed by the cultural background where it takes place. This is similar to what has been 
discussed so far, but Bruner refers to a “narrative necessity” sustaining narrative itself and 
also governing its acceptability. This necessity to narrate may be out of the need to 
communicate associated to meaningfulness, sustaining the claim that communication 
adopts narrative form not only due to the act of telling it consists in, but because what it 
purports to tell (namely, the tale of self) is already in the form of narrative. By organising 
ourselves with recourse to narrative, we expose our living experience to what constructions 
it enables. Because narrative presupposes what canonical discourse there prevails for it to 
be understandable, self-constitution will be in its essence selective, with self unable to 
recollect what was not told by itself in the past. This means that when self narrates itself, it 
must always forego something of its experience not allowed by the prevailing discourse 
into tellability, which eventually will become unable to be recollected by narrative, 
therefore opaque even to the narrating subject. It therefore becomes unknowable, even if 
intrinsically being part of it. This mediatisation of self’s narrative reflects self’s own 
inability to fully know itself, for self constitutes itself through narrative. In a sense, self is 
continuously reconstituting itself in every account it gives, preventing a return to the scene 
of address where it was inaugurated, such setting in turn unable to be narrated (Butler, 
2005). We must bear in mind that “narratives are about people acting in a setting” (Bruner, 
1991, p. 7), not about the setting itself.  
Self’s knowledge of itself is incomplete as it is grounded upon conditioned narrative, 
bearing on regimental canons that precede self’s accounts and yet are what endow its 
legitimacy. It is by being operated within such canons that self’s narrative is able to reach 
the audience to which the account is given, or rather must be given, for the sake of self’s 
meaningfulness. This offering the teller must perform reinforces its inability from 
reclaiming the account as its own, but still does not cease to be a narrative account of 
himself. It is by dispossessing self of unique authorship through an act of giving (an 
account) that the account is completed, confirming the interrelationship self and the other 
have for the sake of intelligibility. Thence, “it is only in dispossession that I can and do 
give any account of myself” (Butler, 2005, p. 37). 
Because self performs its reconstruction every moment it accounts for itself, giving 
an account of oneself is a “performative and non-narrative act, yet functioning as the 
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fulcrum for narrative itself” (Butler, 2005, p. 66). The query the other launches sets the 
challenge, in the form of a demand, for self to account for itself in order to emerge as a 
meaningful subject. This occurs within a scene of address cast by the inquiry, which 
frames the answer self must give. Self is exposed by the query to the effects of the query 
itself, to the order that brings self into social order, denying self its sole authorship by 
limitation of what it can tell about itself. What remains untold will constitute its opacity, 
the inability to narrate something that is and remains unknown and unable to be known, 
un-know-able, to the subject and yet undeniably constitutes it. It is because self is subject 
to the effects of exposure and opacity morality prompts that giving an account of oneself 
represents a challenge, one of self-inventiveness deriving from the reflexivity the duty to 
answer leads the subject into. Constituting itself in dispossession is tantamount to an 
estrangement that self is lead to feel regarding its own self, whom it wants to account for. 
Schweiker (1993) refers to this estrangement as an otherness self feels regarding itself, 
resulting in a “doubleness” of identity between the one acting and the one giving an 
account of the actor, enacting it. When giving an account of itself, self is constituting its 
singularity regarding others within the same setting, each being a different member in 
community. But singularity derives from the narrative constituting self as a subject and 
narrative is about subjects acting within a same setting. It therefore concerns their activity, 
their capability of being able to act, i.e., of agents. So accounts purport to constitute self 
into meaningfulness by narrating its social experience reflected in its activity in society. 
And because they are a reply to a prior query, inquiring into what one does reveals who 
one is (seen to be), there being “a linking between what one does and who one is” 
(Schweiker, 1993, p. 241, ft. 9). Subjectivity derives from the singularity of self and its 
inter-relation with others. And for singularity to prevail, it must be out of action, of self as 
agent in society; otherwise it would be an automaton of social norms. Subjectivity can be 
said to be active, as it is linked to self’s activity, but also ethical, as those actions are bound 
to affect others because they are performed within the moral gaze of a community. 
Due to self’s constitution out of conditioned narrative, the agent is not fully known 
and knowable to the subject accounting, resulting in them not being self-identical. What 
moral responsibility there is to account is always regarding self as agent; yet it is 
performed by itself as accountant. This asymmetry of self is what inaugurates the figure of 
the accountant, one diverse from that of the agent. The accountant is then the one being 
entrusted the duty to render the account, the one telling a tale which is neither its own nor 
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about itself. There are then at least three parties necessary for the account to ensue: the 
accountant (who gives the account), the agent (about whom the account is given) and the 
other (to whom the account is given). Self, as accountant, is what allows the inter-relation 
of itself as agent with a community of others, of those whose understanding over the 
grounds that found self’s actions is to be based upon what accounts are given to them. As 
previously argued, it is the capability of answering the other’s call through an account that 
legitimates self by granting its meaningfulness. Whilst performed by the accountant, 
accounts relate to what actions self as agent carried out. Thus, whilst “the process of 
legitimisation concerns the moral evaluation of action” (Richardson, 1987, p. 343) through 
the moral gaze of community, it also means that being a legitimate subject within a 
community is inherent to our self-identification as accountable. As Llewellyn (1999, p. 
224) argues, “agents understand their experience through narratives”, reinforcing the claim 
that our living experience, whilst expressed in actions, is constituted within and 
internalised by means of narrative. Agency, expressive of the agent, bears on the practice 
of accounting, expressive of the accountant. 
Both exposure and opacity will act into shaping what account is given, meaning that 
the tale the accountant tells is a reconstruction of the agent within what can and cannot be 
told, i.e., can and cannot be narrated. Narrative does not enable self with its complete tale, 
but then again it never purported to render it (Bruner, 1991). Its purpose is to allow for the 
subject to continuously emerge as one narrated within a relevant but framed setting. Self’s 
identity can be said to be a discursive one for it results from discourse-conditioned telling. 
Being narrative borne out of narrative, accounts must thereby be forcefully and naturally 
incomplete. Because the ultimate end of the accountant is to endow the agent with 
intelligibility, what meaning is granted to self is subject to what hindsight the accountant 
has on the agent’s conduct, the agent being constituted by and within an exposure and 
opacity unable to be accounted for. Therefore, being constituted by narrative means that 
the primordial act of knowledge of self endured by itself as accountant is grounded upon 
self’s interpretation of itself as agent. In a way, self as accountant is what consolidates the 
link between what we do and who we are (seen to be), yet maintaining self agent and the 
other apart from direct contact. The accountant both enables and hinders the knowledge of 
self agent by a community of others. Or rather, it will shape self agent into visibility, into 
being rendered knowledgeable, therefore meaningful regarding the setting and the 
audience demanding for subjects to account. By interpreting self and communicating such 
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interpretation to the other, the accountant is in fact constructing self and beginning a 
circular process of self-(re)construction. Giving an account, because it is communicative, is 
also (and must be) a constructive act of self’s reality as a subject (Hines, 1988). This means 
that active subjectivity is not only a result of the agent’s activity within the social reality 
where it belongs, but and especially bears on the agent’s capability of acting into that 
social reality by acting upon his own singular reality. But for this subjective reality to hold 
sway, it must endure and be subject to the rules that sustain what Foucault considers to be 
the games of truth, where self and the other are both pawns and kings. 
 
2.2. Truth games 
Referring to the scene of address where accounts are rendered enables us with the 
understanding that both “self and the other are, ultimately speaking, members of one 
created order” (Schweiker, 1993, p. 245), such order translated into the effects social gaze 
has upon the constitution of subjectivity. In turn, this normative gaze is perceived through 
its manifestation into structuring discourses establishing the framework, the setting where 
emergence of selfhood can take place through the accounts given
6
. This stresses the 
constitutive role of norms. However, the last part of the above quotation alludes to the 
passive nature of the order sustaining meaningful subjectivity, implying that such order is 
not constant and everlasting, but itself dependent on the giving of accounts for its influence 
to emerge. This is somehow related to what Cohen (1968, in Roberts & Scapens, 1985) 
describes as the social paradox: even if conditioning communication, normative order 
holds sway only if communication occurs. Being manifested through prevailing discourses, 
norms depend on discursive practices for manifesting themselves. This paradoxical 
interdependence so fundamental to the act of giving an account will constitute the 
stepladder for furthering our understanding of the constitutive qualities of accounts and 
their fundamental relation to truth.  
Hitherto we have stressed the power effects normative discourse prompts upon our 
self-constitutive endeavour through reflexivity. What accounts emerge from such effort are 
                                        
6
 Whilst not implying that accounts are the sole means for rendering the subject knowable, ultimately they 
tend to acquire such unique quality due to temporality and their expression as written works, i.e., as texts. 
While holding “agents responsible for what they are and what they do in ways that texts escape evaluation” 
(Schweiker, 1993, p. 235, fn. 2), what interpretations arise are always regarding what texts were previously 
composed, the latter being the starting point for and of the former.  
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in turn revealing of our singularity towards others, befitting to our social subjectivity. 
Foucault (2001b, p. 331), when referring to the struggle inherent to power relations in 
enabling knowledge, refers that  
“...the main objective of these struggles is to attack (...) a technique, a form of power 
(...) that applies itself to immediate everyday life [which] constitutes the individual, 
marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of 
truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize in him. It is a form 
of power that makes the individuals subjects.” (emphasis added; also quoted in Butler, 
2005, p. 123) 
This “law of truth” Foucault alludes to bears on the previously mentioned discursive 
regimes besetting what accounts can be given, constituting the framework of the 
accountant’s tellability. Considering truth as “a system of ordered procedures for the 
production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements” (Foucault, 
2001a, p.132), one can conclude that what was hitherto referred to as normative discourse 
is indeed the embodiment of what is (rather became) socially accepted as being true. But 
what is considered to be true is open to interpretation, as it is presented to the subject 
through the addressing of the other, always already opaque in its nature. Moreover, if 
norms are part of the subject, their action as a regimental discourse has already limited the 
individual’s inquiry into himself by obscuring what he had to foreclose into narration. This 
reflexive endeavour marks truth’s power effects inherent to the production of the subject, 
whose essence was earlier described as arising out of subjection to (a form of) power. 
Thus, it is by conceiving truth not merely as an isolated, static system but as power linked 
to power in a circular relation that Foucault refers to truth as a dynamic “regime” 
conditioning the meaningfulness of subjects so as to grant them membership within a 
community where it prevails. When self is exposed to the constraining effects of discourse, 
self is indeed exposed to what the “regime of truth” induces it into or prevents it from 
telling about itself. This constraining effect is itself an expression of power which warrants 
truth to be produced and sustained. Because truth qua truth is what warrants its state of 
power, regimens of truth can be claimed as “legitimated forms of contemporary discourse” 
(Miller & O’Leary, 1987, p. 238). Whilst ruling legitimisation of subjects, the allusion to 
contemporariness in the previous quotation foresees the provisional nature of truth itself 
due to the blurriness of norms and the interpretation they prompt. But paradoxically 
enough, truth, being power, needs for such openness to exist as “power is exercised only 
over free subjects, and only insofar as they are “free”” (Foucault, 2001b, p. 342). This 
freedom of the subject is something we shall return to later on. 
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Returning to the struggles inherent to power relations, Foucault (2001b) defines, 
among others, two basic features common to every struggle linked to power: a) they 
consist in the questioning of the relations between knowledge and power (“the regime of 
knowledge”), and b) they concern the primordial inquiry into selfhood by “revolving 
around the question: Who are we?” (Foucault, 2001b, p. 331), who is every individual in 
its singularity. These features are intrinsically bound to, almost fusing with, each other, as 
they verse around the knowledge of the individuality of the subject, contrary to the 
“verifiable” knowledge logical-scientific regimes purport to render by determining the 
nature of the subject (see also Bruner, 1991). How such regimes structure the subject is not 
the point here, rather what matters is that determining who the subject is to be disregards 
the inventiveness the subject is prompted into by the regime of truth where it must account 
for itself. And such inventiveness is essential for its singularity to ensue, one regarded as 
true since it is founded within truth. As stated earlier, norms alone cannot be considered 
power. They are vested into power only when the other addresses its demanding appeal 
towards self to account for itself so as to identify itself; identifying itself in order to be 
known. But the subject can only be known within the limits cast by the regime of truth. 
The circular relationship between power and knowledge turns our moral responsibility for 
giving an account of ourselves into the exercise, the duty of telling the truth about 
ourselves so as to constitute ourselves, our self, “as an object of knowledge both for other 
people and for oneself” (Foucault, 2007a, p. 151). The same power that grants self its 
subjectivity is the one endowing self with its objective nature. But it also means that the 
other is not necessarily an individual other physically different from self, but that self and 
the other can eventually be the same, implying that when self tells the truth, it can do so 
also to itself. Nevertheless, for self to account for itself, to tell the truth about itself, it must 
necessarily know itself. The purpose of acquiring and rendering such knowledge and the 
relationship it has towards truth will disclose the intimate dependency existing between 
truth and the act of giving an account, with such an act eventually not performed merely 
towards the enactment of the subject’s meaningfulness; ultimately, it deals with the 
meaningfulness of truth itself, disclosing the political side of the accountant. Drawing 
primordially on Foucault’s studies about the genealogy of the subject will provide the 
necessary ground for such claims. 
Foucault (2007a) argues that what unites truth to the subject is sustained upon a 
complex web of techniques regarding the exertion of power. Centring round the formation 
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of the subject, stressing the exercise of power upon self by others may induce what 
understanding one may arrive to regarding the constitution of the self into being focused on 
what is named techniques of domination, ones characterised by coercing the subject into 
interiorizing norms defining of his behaviour, such techniques founding upon imposition 
and submission to external force. The exercise of power is to Foucault much more 
complicated than one monolithic structure acting from outside upon the subject. Whilst one 
has argued that the other’s address enables self with its framework for reply, self does not 
automatically answer according to the prescriptions the other has conveyed, otherwise it 
would be submissive. Being opaque, the figure of the other prevents the power effect of 
norms from fully capturing the subject. Moreover, focusing on coercive power alone 
obscures another type of techniques essential to the understanding of the relation of truth 
with the subject as they are themselves expressive of (a form of) power: techniques of the 
self. For “power consists in complex relations: these relations involve a set of rational 
techniques, and the efficiency of those techniques is due to a subtle integration of coercion-
techniques and self-techniques” (Foucault, 2007a, p. 155). Techniques or technologies of 
the self are what enable self into addressing itself through reflexivity in order to know 
itself, such array of techniques being performed by individuals on their own selves so as to 
continuously constitute themselves towards a “certain state of perfection, of happiness, of 
purity, of supernatural power, and so on” (Foucault, 2007a, p. 154). These practices are 
subject to transformation as they depend upon what relationship the subject has to truth, 
what the objective of the subject is regarding truth. 
Considering regimens of truth as regimens of knowledge may induce us into 
believing that the main obligation of the social subject is to know himself for the sake of 
exposing oneself to the other’s judgement so as to be granted membership within a 
community. One knows oneself in order to be able to justify himself before others or 
convince them of the righteousness of his acts. This is enabled through the act of giving an 
account of oneself, as hitherto discussed. Either way, this knowledge the subject is made 
into rendering has as a purpose gaining acceptability from the other, with the individual 
thereby being attributed its character of member. Accountability has more or less been 
viewed through such lens. Yet, as Foucault argues (1997c), “knowing oneself” by 
publishing ourselves to the outer world is not necessarily an abstract principle guiding life, 
but can be reified as a constant practice of “taking care of oneself”, with the former 
appearing as a consequence of the latter. Such care is not necessarily driven by necessity of 
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membership, but can consist in an inward move made by the subject, who eventually 
aspires for aloofness, being such action a denial of the mentioned need. This move cannot 
be merely out of external domination, but discloses the type of actions self exerts upon 
himself: techniques of the self. However, such link is itself subject to the passage of time 
and its transformative effects, which eventually gave prominence to the act of “knowing 
oneself” within Western societies by conceiving the care of self as mainly immoral. 
Nevertheless, “taking care of the self” cannot be disregarded for both practices depend 
upon each other to ensue, regardless of how they are conceived or prioritised. And what 
immorality there may loom behind the care nurtured for self is only in the face of what is 
contemporarily reified as morality. As we will see, how one “knows oneself” and the 
purpose sustaining such endeavour reveals the perspective-game contemporariness endows 
truth with. 
Foucault argues that because taking care of self consists in knowing oneself, such 
care is related not to the acquisition of wealth and reputation, as he stresses when alluding 
to what Socrates vehemently forwards when acclaiming himself as “the teacher of self-
concern” (1997a, p. 93), but to the inner yet virtuous endeavour one must perform within 
oneself in order to care for oneself. Such endeavour implies an act of knowing both oneself 
and his identity within society in order to be able to care for oneself, such care being a 
pedagogical act, one enlightening the subject with the precepts of life. More than self-
awareness, knowledge here is basically an act of self-constitution. Foucault considers this 
constitutive act in the following quote regarding Plato’s Alcibiades: 
“Socrates asks Alcibiades about his personal capacities and the nature of his ambition. 
Does he know the meaning of the rule of law, of justice or concord? Alcibiades clearly 
knows nothing. Socrates calls upon him to compare his education with that of the 
Persian and Spartan kings, his rivals. Spartan and Persian princes have teachers in 
wisdom, justice, temperance, and courage. By comparison, Alcibiades’ education is 
like that of an old, ignorant slave: he does not know these things, so he can’t apply 
himself to knowledge. But, says Socrates, it is not too late. To help him gain the upper 
hand – to acquire tekhne – Alcibiades must apply himself, he must take care of 
himself. But Alcibiades does not know to what he must apply himself. What is this 
knowledge he seeks?” (1997c, p. 230) 
The last two sentences introduce the role of truth in constituting the subject when 
considering truth as the embodiment of precepts governing life, i.e., norms. This draws on 
the analogy to mirrors Foucault (1997c) makes use of and the contemplation of oneself in 
them. Contemplation and what knowledge it conveys are not however in order to discover 
and disclose self, but for self to “discover rules to serve as a basis for just behaviour and 
27 
 
political action” (1997c, p. 231). Taking care of oneself involves a practice of examination 
of oneself regarding what is considered wise, right, that is, true. Mirroring oneself in truth 
is not here performed with the purpose of discovering oneself, but of transforming the 
individual by his own means towards what is seen as good; truth as transformative rather 
than expositive. Self-examination is here carried out for pedagogical reasons, deriving 
from a pursuit for knowledge capable of enabling the subject into taking care of himself. In 
short, knowledge is from self to itself. 
Self-knowledge as the means for taking care of self eventually gives place to self-
concern. Concern with oneself differs from knowing oneself in several issues, particularly 
regarding the motives and the temporal hiatus comprising the practice of taking care of 
self: knowing oneself is reified as a practice performed in youth in order to prepare oneself 
for political life. In contrast, concerning with oneself is conceived as a way of life 
independent of politics. Referring to the practice of knowing oneself implies that the act of 
attending to others happens only belatedly regarding the effort of self into knowing itself. 
Foucault (1997a, p. 96) alludes to such belatedness when he argues that “Alcibiades 
realised that he must take care of himself if he meant to attend to others”. One must be 
aware of his own (deficit of) knowledge if he is to enable himself into attending to others. 
This bears on the motive grounding here the care for self being that of preparation for 
political life, a consequence of its pedagogical accent. That is why Socrates refers to 
Alcibiades’ rivals in knowledge, as by knowing themselves better they can better attend to 
others. With the concern with oneself the focus is not on pedagogical knowledge in order 
to take care of self, but on a healing function the care one nurtures for oneself should have. 
The examination one is prompted into is likened to a medical or therapeutic act the subject 
performs on himself, with the pedagogical role behind self-knowledge in order to take care 
of oneself fading. This implies that different techniques were performed on the self. 
Knowing oneself involves an inner dialogue with the self, so as to cultivate self; in turn, 
concern with oneself takes on a different array of technologies which can even deny such 
dialogue in favour of listening. Whilst different in structure, they reveal similar traces 
regarding their attitude towards truth. Even if taking care of oneself is out of concern for 
oneself, one still needs to know oneself in order for that care to be performed. With the 
concern for oneself tantamount to taking care of self, the act of self-knowledge is moved to 
a consequential state, as it involves the practice of the examination, whilst not effacing the 
need of the subject for knowing himself. Foucault somewhat refers to this when saying that  
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“(...) one must bear in mind that the rule of having to know oneself was regularly 
associated with the theme of care of the self. Through all the culture of antiquity it is 
easy to find evidence of the importance given to “concern with oneself” and its 
connection with the theme of self-knowledge.” (1997a, p. 93)  
What is important to stress here is the purpose behind the will to knowledge which 
moves self-knowledge into a consequential state. In order to understand how the subject 
conceives the role of truth in such a setting, one must therefore focus on the similarities 
between these two kinds of technologies of the self. There are two major points to be 
considered, with the second arising as a result of the first. 
Within both perspectives one needs the guidance of a master in order to take care of 
self. This may not seem so obvious regarding the act of knowing oneself, but because there 
subsists a dialectical relationship between the self and the divine mirror it must 
contemplate, one can see the mirror as the preceptor of the subject in his quest for 
knowledge. Contemplating himself in the mirror leads the subject into transforming 
himself according to the guidance provided by the reflex, as this is taken to be divine. One 
is not doing an inquest on oneself to discover the truth within oneself in order to present it 
to an outside arbiter, one is teaching oneself to be righteous, superimposing upon himself 
the teachings that can be drawn from contemplation. He is therefore not merely 
discovering the truth about himself, but learning how to reach for the divine truth. The 
mirror allows self to be its own teacher in the knowledge of truth. 
The superimposition of truth is to Foucault more evident when moving to the 
Hellenistic and imperial Roman periods, where “concern with oneself” as a permanent 
duty throughout one’s entire life draws “knowing oneself” back into a consequential state, 
one complementary of the practice of concerning with oneself in order to take care of self. 
Foucault refers to several Stoic techniques relating to the concern with the self in exploring 
the effects technologies of the self have upon the subject formation. These techniques have 
a marked medical nature, with self-cultivation having a permanent healing function. “One 
must become the doctor of oneself.” (Foucault, 1997c, p. 235) Concern with oneself was a 
practice undertaken with the objective of training and equipping the subject with the 
“necessary tools” for facing the effort of living, to enable him to confront life. These are 
conceived as “discourses: logoi, understood as true discourses and rational discourses” 
(Foucault, 1997a, p. 99). One of the techniques developed concerns the art of listening, 
where dialogue was denied in favour of listening to the master in order to acquire 
(rhetorical) truth. This would enable the disciple to distinguish what is truth and what is 
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falsehood. Verbalisation is unilateral, only on the side of the master and never of the 
student (Foucault, 2007a). Meditation over the master’s teaching would ensue only 
afterwards, with self listening to itself in a self-examination act. Truth is thereby not 
something hidden and able to be discovered in oneself but lies in the teachings of the 
master. Its assimilation by the subject brings forth the practice of memorisation as inherent 
to self-examination. The practice of examination for the sake of memorisation is stressed 
by Foucault when referring to Seneca’s examinations of conscience. These are not 
performed in order to judge himself, but to administer himself regarding what he knows to 
be the rules of good conduct. His purpose is not one out of punishment, but of recalling the 
rules previously memorised which have been forgotten within daily conduct, of 
reactivating its fundamental rules. Self-reflexion or examination also serves to measure 
“the distance which separates what has been done from what should have been done” 
(Foucault, 2007a, p. 160), but such measurement is different from what nowadays 
motivates the practice of examination (see Hoskins, 1996). The vigilant self in Seneca is 
different from the supervising self modern examination may induce the subject into.  
What Foucault argues one can observe in these practices of examination is that self 
discloses itself to itself in order to approach what is taken to be true, being the true 
discourses sustaining virtue. With Seneca and other Stoics, the subject maintains its 
medical occupation not only by addressing to himself, but by addressing to others to whom 
relationships are maintained through letters or talks. The disclosure is carried out of a 
search for advice and guidance leading to the (re)learning of rhetorical truth. The subject 
tells the truth about himself, but what he tells is not the truth about his inner characteristics 
as if deciphering himself; he tells the truth about his conduct, the living he leads, being 
which he is really subjecting to examination. For Foucault (1997b) conduct should not be 
understood merely as related to action, but to the true precepts, translated into moral 
precepts as true discourses, founding it as they bear on his life through the memorisation 
they prompt. What conduct is being subject to examination is thus moral conduct
7
, 
expressive of the care self devotes to itself. By giving an account of his conduct he is 
explaining “how far he is in his way of living from the true principles that he knows” 
(Foucault, 2007a, p. 165), thereby searching for counsel in order to recall that truth he 
                                        
7
 Moral conduct cannot be confused with moral character, the latter suggesting that self acts as its own judge 
through a process of inquiry into itself, purporting to decipher its true identity. Moral conduct bears here on 
the process of successfully activating the true rules of conduct, with the subject reproaching himself not for 
faults, but for mistakes tantamount to his lack of success. Errors are then “of strategy, not of moral character” 
(Foucault, 1997c, p. 237). 
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already knows but has forgotten. Speaking of oneself, whether to oneself or to others, has 
the same objective: acquire and assimilate the truth in order to be prepared for life. Truth 
appears then as a force vested in discourse and manifesting by reactivation of what has 
been taught and memorised. The force of rhetoric in establishing truth is revealed by the 
will of the subject in acquiring it by embedding it within itself. 
Returning to self-knowledge, even if different conceptions of truth and memory 
bring forward different methods of self-examination (Foucault, 1997c), truth is 
nevertheless something regarded as perfection willing the subject into acquiring it. Its force 
is revealed by the success of the appeal it addresses to the subject into considering it as 
Truth
8
. That appeal is embodied in the discourse of the master. The acquisition of truth is 
identical to the superimposition of truth upon the subject, to the subjectivation of truth. 
Following Foucault (2007a), when the subject performs an examination into himself and 
calls upon memorisation and counsel to reactivate truth, he reveals the victorious force of 
truth upon his surface for it has emerged embodied into a subject constituted through such 
force, such power. That is why one can speak not of personification, but of subjectivation, 
as this word reflects the full meaning of subjection to a power called truth. But one must 
remember that such subjection is not coercive; on the contrary, concern with oneself was 
indeed a way of living in order to take care of self, with subjection here referring not to 
coercion, but to persuasion and rhetoric enabling truth qua Truth. This links truth to will. It 
may seem odd, but because the acquisition of truth was seen as equipping the subject with 
a truth it did not know, the ultimate objective of learning truth was to render the subject 
with autonomy over guiding himself throughout his life. Subjection strives to make the 
subject independent. This implies that the relationship with the master is always 
provisional, even if aiming for a complete achievement of life, something Seneca and other 
Stoics championed. Truth is something to be memorised and recalled when necessary 
given the circumstances, implying its continuous practice. This reaffirms the force of truth 
and moves us into considering the second point. 
Because the subject walks the path of truth in order to attain autonomy, assimilating 
truth by memorisation of true discourses which are meant to be converted into rules of 
conduct enables the subject with the necessary equipment to face life. Truth, being 
                                        
8
 When the word “truth” is capitalised, it refers to the moment when truth, as discourse, becomes one with the 
subject, has effectively made him subject to its ruling. Speaking of truth without capitalising the word is 
tantamount to address to its specificity, separated from the subject, whereas Truth is the paramount and 
unquestionable principle embedded in the subject and guiding his way of life. 
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assimilated, transforms the subject into a constant practitioner of truth; it is then 
“subjectified”. We must not forget that, whether by a turning back on oneself for 
pedagogical motives or by listening to others and to oneself in order to concern with 
oneself, the purpose of these techniques of the self is to unite truth and the subject. But 
truth here “is not reached by an analytical exploration of what is supposed to be real in the 
individual but by rhetorical explanation of what is good for anyone who wants to reach the 
life of a sage” (Foucault, 2007a, p. 163). It may sound farfetched, but the divine mirror 
Foucault alludes to when commenting on Alcibiades can be likened to a metamorphosis of 
what is rhetorically true and can thereby be considered self’s preceptor. This is so because 
the process of self-knowledge, contrary to self-concern, is limited to youth and preparation 
to (adult) political life. Otherwise Socrates would have referred to the education of Spartan 
or Persian sovereigns when addressing Alcibiades, but he mentioned the upbringing of 
“princes”, the would-be kings. The objective then is to make Alcibiades a sage, one 
capable of attending to others because he took care of himself. Kings are the true rivals of 
Alcibiades because they have taken care of themselves and therefore are able to attend to 
others, which make them sages. This sage quality is also the purpose of the concern with 
oneself because the purpose of the teachings of the master is to grant the subject with 
autonomy, with mastery over oneself. Thence, whether in different forms, taking care of 
self relates to the social superiority of those taking care of themselves as they can be 
considered sages who have mastered truth into themselves by elaborating or having 
elaborated their relationship to truth (see Butler, 2005). It is because there are sages that 
the examination is a practice where “self (...) is not considered as a field of subjective data 
which have to be interpreted” (Foucault, 2007a, p. 160), but is one identical to an exercise 
the subject performs on himself for the correction of what is conceived as his pedagogical 
gap regarding the Platonic reification of self-care and what is considered for those such as 
Seneca not as a flaw, but as a mistake, a momentary detour of the subject from the 
righteous path of truth he already knows and is willing to practice (see Foucault, 2007a). 
Being a sage therefore implies not only acquiring and assimilating truth, but ultimately 
transforming it into permanent precepts guiding life. The latter warrants truth’s power, as 
above mentioned, but also reinforces the sage’s status towards others, those others who are 
willing to practice truth: the disciples. The master is himself a sage as he is regarded as a 
“master of truth and justice, (...) the spokesman of the universal” (Foucault, 2001a, p. 126). 
To become a sage is tantamount to be able to attend to others, inaugurating truth in them 
for themselves to become sages. But because the subject attends others in order to take care 
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of himself, he is eventually attending to himself, which makes the process of taking care of 
oneself a reciprocal one, “for men learn while they teach” (Foucault, 1997b, p. 215). 
Thence, reaching the life of the sage as the ultimate objective of taking care of self 
reinforces the continuous power of truth over oneself and others as a game where the form 
of the will is meant to become one with truth (see Foucault, 2007a). In this truth-game, a 
strategic one played upon the will of free subjects through persuasion and rhetoric, truth is 
warranted its power status as a process of constitution and intensification of subjectivity, 
prolonging and renewing itself as Truth through the practice it prompts.  
I want to return here to the earlier quote of Foucault concerning Plato’s Alcibiades so 
as to complement it with a final sentence. When confronted with Socrates’ arguments 
Alcibiades realises that he “does not know to what he must apply himself. What is this 
knowledge he seeks? He is embarrassed and confused.” (1997c, p. 230, emphasis added). 
What is the importance of this embarrassment within the techniques we have seen so far? 
For the ancient world, Alcibiades embarrassment is not clearly something remaining 
hidden and needing to be revealed or exposed. Embarrassment here is merely a volatile 
status meant to rouse the subject and motivate him into his quest for truth. It is thus the 
starting point for the process of taking care of oneself as it bears on the recognition by the 
subject of his lack of pedagogy or strength since the force of truth is not yet one with him, 
with his self. The aim of knowing one’s ignorance is to allow someone to take care of 
himself, such knowledge being private. But while ignorance was for Plato’s followers the 
findings deriving from a process of self-discovery, one intended to prompt the self into 
taking care of itself, it was regarded in the later Hellenistic and imperial Roman period as a 
natural feature of the subject since initially he is necessarily a disciple. This bears on the 
fact that disciples, being neophytes, are reified as ignorant, with incomplete knowledge 
(see Bruner, 1991). One does not need to discover himself as ignorant and be embarrassed 
by that because it is natural for the subject to be ignorant, as the knowledge of truth is not 
an inborn feature of his; he must acquire and assimilate it. Being naturally ignorant is what 
prompts the subject into concerning with himself, but it does not disregard the fact that the 
subject knows himself as ignorant. It is because subjects know that they are initially 
ignorant that “knowing oneself becomes the object of the quest of concern for oneself” 
(Foucault, 1997c, p. 231). One can see that in Alcibiades. But because the subject knows 
himself to be ignorant does not imply he is to be criticised for that. Whether by reflex or 
words, one (the master) does not reproach the other (the disciple) for being ignorant. It is 
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because the master knows that the disciple is essentially ignorant of the Truth that he 
bestows him with the true discourses, the ones which will constitute him through the force 
of truth, intending to make him autonomous. Truth is then to be subjectivised as one with 
the subject’s will. 
Considered in the Classical Antiquity as the beginning of self-concern, this 
embarrassment, rather its recognition, became the end sustaining the process of self-
knowledge inherent to the new techniques of the self connected with the rise of 
Christianity. Embarrassment is in Christianity considered not as a momentary status linked 
to ignorance and allowing for its continuous suppression through acquisition and 
assimilation of truth, but as a status revealing the truth about the subject as he really is: 
faulty. The tone is set not on what ensues after being embarrassed, but on the 
embarrassment itself and what lies beneath. The reification of embarrassment here lets 
perceive a change in what orientates the relationship of the subject to truth. There are 
several differences to be considered, particularly on the nature of self-examination. 
Foucault (1997c; 2007a) draws on Seneca’s De Ira and a passage therein to clarify that the 
examination self undertook of itself for reasons of self-concern was less a of juridical 
rather than of an administrative one. The aim of this examination technique was not to 
apply punishment due to past errors being deciphered, but to look back on them so as to 
adjust his future conduct by reactivating its precepts. The purpose of the examination is 
then to move (again) a step closer to truth, one that was assimilated and is to be practiced 
as it constitutes self. The focus is not only on the past, but on the future that lies ahead and 
is to be faced (even if the past is what provides the tools for walking ahead); and that is the 
role of truth, vested as true discourses: to render autonomy to the subject by enabling him 
with the right equipment in order to confront life. Memorising and recalling such 
discourses empowers the subject with mastery over himself. With the rise of Christianity, 
the relationship between truth and subjectivity changes from a rhetorical exercise of 
persuasion and memorisation into an interpretative art of decipherment and discovery. 
Similar to what was considered to be the care of the self in the ancient philosophy, 
Christianity can also be considered as both “a basic obligation and a set of carefully 
worked-out procedures” (Foucault, 1997a, p. 95). The kind of duty it imposes is however 
radically different from the Classical techniques of the self, in turn changing the notion of 
truth. 
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Foucault (1997c; 2007b) refers to the confessional nature of Christianity as 
something deriving out of its ultimate purpose of leading the subject into salvation. 
Granting, rather assuring, salvation is what founds Christianity as a religion. But for the 
subject to be saved, he is imposed with what Foucault terms “the obligation of truth”. This 
obligation reveals itself in two ways: the first is related to faith and belief in certain 
writings and dogmas hold as “permanent truth” and to the showings of himself as a 
believer the subject was compelled to. Being a believer did not suffice; the subject had to 
show himself as one. The second form of truth obligation Foucault alludes to, whilst 
different from the former, is linked to self-knowledge but also depends on the disclosure of 
the subject. This bears on the kind of visibility that Christianity forces the subject into, one 
tantamount to his outward publicity. Each believer is obliged to explore himself in order to 
know who he is by deciphering his innermost secrets in the form of faults, temptations or 
desires and revealing them to others in the community, the community of believers 
(Foucault, 1997c; 2007b). These compelling revelations to the community expose the 
importance of membership in Christianity and the self-publicity Christian technologies of 
the self force the subject into. But contrary to what could already be envisaged as self-
examination and confession in Classical Antiquity, these techniques consist in a different 
truth-game, one obliging the subject “to bear witness against himself” (Foucault, 2007b, p. 
171, emphasis added), for it focused on his salvation. And salvation requires self-
purification by self-knowledge in a circular process. This justifies its character of power, of 
“pastoral power”. The subject no longer willingly knows himself regarding truth, he must 
know himself for his truth to be produced, his individual truth. And this is impossible 
without self-knowledge. The faith and belief obligations are bound to the duty of self-
knowledge and inherent publicity of his subjectivity. And it is this forceful publicity that 
marks the difference not only between Classical Antiquity’s techniques of the self and the 
ones arising with Christianity, but, which is relevant for this study, opens truth up to what 
was previously described as the social paradox: being constitutive of the subject, it is 
constituted due to the emergence of that same subject. 
When referring to the obligation of every Christian to disclose himself through 
decipherment of his inner truth, Foucault refers to two major forms of achieving it. These 
are sustained and drawn upon the institutions that allow them their qualities of technique: 
the first being grounded on penitential rites and the second on monastic life. Contrary to 
Classical Antiquity’s techniques of the self, which were centred on the autonomy of the 
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subject, being more intense in the concern for oneself as it was a way of living away from 
politics, they stress the role of the community and the characteristic of belonging to one, 
with the consequent visibility they force the subject into as such belongingness brings to 
the fore the importance of membership for subjectivity. This visibility is also a constant 
regarding the notion of confession within the ancient world tradition, but its aim is not a 
compelling one, one forcing the subject to speak against himself; rather, it was one meant 
to bring the subject closer to truth by assimilating it. The subject willing showed himself as 
an opening to the other’s counsel for being closer to truth, to be examined so as to recall 
what could have been forgotten regarding the assimilated true discourses (Foucault, 
1997b). In short, the subject was not publicising himself, for the knowledge intended was 
meant to be private. But “what was private for the Stoics was public for the Christians” 
(Foucault, 1997c, p. 244). Visibility regarding Christianity bears directly on the purity 
given by the exposure to the divine light, that of faith, capable of revealing the true self as 
a consequence of the self-knowledge it endows (Foucault, 1997c; 2007b). For Foucault, 
this can be observed whether in penance or in monastic life. Regarding the first, he refers 
to the inherent obligations of truth as consisting of what was known as exomologesis, such 
word generally referring to the recognition of fact. Such techniques were related with 
penitential rites the believer had to fulfil so as to avoid expulsion from the community of 
believers. Penance was not an act, but a status for it revealed the believer’s identity of 
penitent by forcing him to show himself, to publish himself as such (Foucault, 2007b). But 
he needs to endure the status of penitent in order to reveal his truthful nature of sinner, for 
only by recognising himself as a sinner and becoming a penitent can the believer achieve 
salvation. Penance can be compared to a way of life in the same way self-concern was (see 
Foucault, 2007b). But its foundations are completely diverse. Being salvation-oriented, 
Christianity is a form of power dealing “with a production of truth – the truth of the 
individual himself” (Foucault, 2001b, p. 333) for this is how salvation can be achieved. 
Thereby, “the acts by which he [the believer] punishes himself are indistinguishable from 
the acts by which he reveals himself: self-punishment and the voluntary expression of self 
are bound together” (Foucault, 1997c, p. 244). 
Returning to the subject’s publicity, Foucault (1997c) argues one may find here 
similarities to the Classical Antiquity’s medical or pedagogical model, where showing 
oneself was meant bring oneself closer to the truth the subject had assimilated and was 
willing to practice. With exomologesis, however, the purpose was rather to erase that sinful 
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past, with the knowledge the subject gained upon himself implying the refusal of that same 
self. But for sin to be rubbed out, the sinner had to be revealed. This meant that what was 
intended was a revelation of the truth about oneself for the consequent renunciation of that 
same truth, which renders the expression “bearing witness against himself” its full 
meaning; “self-revelation is at the same time self-destruction” (Foucault, 1997c, p. 245). 
The concern here is therefore not with telling the truth about your sins, but with presenting 
“the true sinful being of the sinner” (Foucault, 1997c, p. 244) to the community of 
believers due to the importance of compulsory visibility and membership these techniques 
call forth. By renouncing himself, the believer can be reintegrated within the community.  
Whilst disclosing oneself as a sinner through the technique of exomologesis can be 
considered a form of confession of one’s true (sinful) nature, when turning to monastic 
communities Foucault refers to another type of confession consisting in a completely 
different technique, addressed to as exagoreusis. Like the former Stoic techniques of the 
self, it is founded upon a master-disciple relationship and bears on self-examination. The 
principles behind exagoreusis are however quite distinct, somewhat opposite, from those 
of earlier Classical techniques; they are sustained upon the importance of complete and 
permanent obedience and contemplation (Foucault, 2007b), both being dependent upon 
one another. This bears again on the salvation-purposes of Christianity as a religion or 
rather as a “pastoral power” (Foucault, 2001b). Obedience was absolute in exagoreusis, 
with the subject constituting himself not due to a posterior autonomy it could aspire to, but 
by submitting all aspects of his life to the gaze of the master; the subject is then forever and 
utterly dependent upon the master, in comparison to the Stoic ideal of autonomy pursued 
by disciples. The meaning of being a master itself is here completely different from that of 
the Classical reification, for even masters must here endure the permanent denial and 
sacrifice of their own will (Foucault, 2007b). This notion of sacrifice, already found in 
exomologesis through rituals of penitence and the consequent privations it imposed, is 
pervasive within Christianity due to being a specific form of power: pastoral. Whilst being 
a power that commands, it represents a kind of power ready to sacrifice itself in order for 
its community [of believers] to be saved, salvation being its utmost purpose (Foucault, 
2001b). 
Together with obedience, there was the permanent obligation of contemplation of 
what was considered the supreme, divine good. This may sound tantamount to the analogy 
of the divine mirror found in Alcibiades, but with exagoreusis it is not actions, qualities or 
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deeds being subject to scrutiny, but thoughts, representing an inward turning of the subject 
by exploring his inner depths in order to locate the evil dwelling therein. Foucault (2007b), 
by reference to John Cassian’s works, argues that the purpose is here not to discover if the 
thought or rather the idea sustaining it is true or right regarding external canons of truth, 
such as rules, but to discover the origin of the thought, what remains hidden therein as its 
inner impurity. He gives there the example of fasting, considered as a good thing regarding 
monastic behavioural canons. But if that fasting prompts feelings of competition between 
those who fast in order to see who can longer subject himself to fasting, the thought of 
fasting is itself impure in its origin, embedding evil. Knowing the substance of his thought 
is essential for the believer to gain access to the divine good and is constitutive of a process 
of constant self-examination for the subject to subject himself to continuous contemplation. 
In short, it is an act of self-interpretation regarding discrimination, and because it concerns 
a practice of self-discovery by turning inwards, it consists in a hermeneutical endeavour of 
interpreting oneself. Returning to Alcibiades’ pedagogical mirror, such technique 
represented a finite process intended to guide him until political adulthood. Contrariwise, 
and by being coupled to continuous obedience, contemplation represents here a permanent 
exercise of constitution through self-decipherment of thoughts and consequent 
discrimination of those that lead towards the supreme good from those that divert the 
believer from its contemplation. 
Foucault (1997c; 2007b) argues that such interpretation and its discriminative intent 
can only be achieved when verbalisation of thoughts to the master ensue, for he possesses 
greater wisdom and experience due to his seniority, enabling the rendering of better advice. 
One could find here a parallel to the Stoic master earlier alluded to, but there are two major 
differences which dramatically change the meaning of the master-disciple relationship in 
monastic context. The first relates to the previously mentioned permanent duty of 
obedience of the latter regarding the former, the master being less a preceptor than a 
controller, a seigneur
9
 of the disciple among all aspects of his life; the relationship is one 
of permanent dependency. The second, whilst being a consequence of the first, is 
nevertheless much more important as it reveals how truth and the subject are linked 
regarding this technique. Contrary to the Classical practice, verbalisation did not need to 
occur on the side of the master. For truth to manifest itself, it was essential that such 
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 This is the term employed in the English original (2007b), which reinforces the status of ownership the 
master retains regarding the disciple due to the latter’s duty of permanent obedience. 
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verbalisation came from the disciple, the one undertaking a self-seeking process of hidden 
evils diverting him from divine good. Here, self-examination was not to correct oneself, 
but to denounce oneself. To denounce the impurity, the evil lying hidden within the subject 
is tantamount to an act of confession, and “the fact that the thought has been expressed will 
have an effect of discrimination” (Foucault, 1997c, p. 248). Again following Cassian, 
Foucault (1997c; 2007b) stresses that verbalising what is felt to be shameful thoughts is 
tantamount to forcing out those same thoughts in order to expose them to the divine light, 
represented by the master, where their impurity is revealed and allowing for discrimination 
to ensue. It is with confession as a verbal act that truth emerges and unites itself to the 
subject, being “confession a mark of truth” (Foucault, 1997c, p. 248). There is not then an 
inward assimilation of truth, but an outward manifestation of truth. 
Different techniques as they are, the focus here is on the similarities between 
exomologesis and exagoreusis: they both force the subject into revealing the truth about 
himself and that same act implies renouncing to that same self disclosed by the subject. 
This is what Foucault (1997c; 2007b) argues regarding these techniques. But more 
importantly, by the fact of their consisting in the exteriorisation of the inner truth of the 
self, these techniques change the notion of self-knowledge by discovering the individual as 
a new object of knowledge. One can say that the vector guiding the effects of the power 
truth is changed from an inward direction focused on assimilation of external truth, where 
truth could be considered an input regarding subjectivity, to an outward one stressing the 
discovery and denouncing of inner truth, stressing truth feature of output. And such 
transformation is due to the fact that “knowledge follows the advances of power, 
discovering new objects of knowledge over all the surfaces on which power is exercised” 
(Foucault, 1977, p. 204). Those advances of power, their effects, are induced by what is 
considered to be truth, what each community holds as regime of truth, as “the type of 
discourse it accepts and makes function as true” (Foucault, 2001a, p. 131). 
What was then the purpose of addressing these techniques of the self regarding 
Classical Antiquity and Christianity and what can their relationship be to the act of giving 
an account, and thereby to accountability? Namely, by narrating himself the subject is 
ultimately giving truth its power nature by publishing it in his accounts. And the act of 
account-giving being basilar to accountability, being held accountable expresses the unity 
and reciprocal dependency of the subject and truth through the regime of knowledge truth 
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imposes upon him. Accountability and truth thus share a close relationship given by the 
narrative act of giving an account.  
Regarding the techniques of the self hitherto referred to and their relationship to 
truth, we can see that both truth and narrative are dependent upon a moment of crisis for 
manifesting themselves. This draws on Bruner’s conclusions about the problem of 
legitimacy surrounding narrative. As hitherto discussed, narrative needs a structure as its 
necessary background, a body of normativeness sustaining it. However, what makes 
narrative worth telling is a breach of those same norms that determine what is culturally 
expected from the subject, the main actor within his self-story, for “when conventional 
expectation is breached, Trouble ensues. And it is Trouble that provides the engine of 
drama” (Bruner, 1991, p. 16). Returning to technologies of the self, both examination and 
confession occur because something caused the subject’s suspicion about himself, 
something that diverted him from what he perceived to be the “right path”. Truth arises in 
those moments of doubt and unrest that the subject feels, rather makes himself feel like by 
acting upon himself. It is then in trouble, in a moment of crisis endured both by the subject 
and by the norm, that truth can appear and manifest itself, whether by being assimilated 
and remembered or discovered and denounced. And through its manifestation it (re)gains 
its status of power. And being power, it must be productive, it must produce something. 
For “power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of knowledge and rituals of 
truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this 
production” (Foucault, 1977, p. 194). By producing the subject and the knowledge 
associated, truth is eventually producing itself by continuously reaffirming itself by 
recourse to and within the narrative that originates such subjectivity. Regimens of truth, 
being power, are regimens of knowledge. And because the subject is always linked to a 
specific regimen of truth, the technologies he makes work upon himself also give rise to a 
specific kind of knowledge, and thereby a specific kind of (true) self (see Foucault, 1997c). 
For “all the practices by which the subject is defined and transformed are accompanied by 
the formation of certain types of knowledge” (Foucault, 2007a, p. 151). 
We need to return here to the previously alluded quotation of Schweiker (1993, p. 
245) when he states that “self and the other are, ultimately speaking, members of one 
created order”. However, and in line with what has hitherto been argued, that same order is 
being created by the exertion of forces inherent to the act of giving an account, with such 
forces flowing and acting within the regime of truth. Giving an account is a synonym of 
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telling the truth. And because truth is told to someone, moral power is not unilaterally, but 
indeed mutually, exerted (Schweiker, 1993), even if from self to itself, for power needs this 
duality of exercise to be itself power and constitute itself as a regime.  
“If power relations weigh upon me as I tell the truth and if, in telling the truth, I am 
bringing the weight of power to bear upon others, I am not simply communicating the 
truth when I am telling the truth. I am also putting power to work in discourse, using 
it, distributing it, becoming the site for its relay and replication. I am speaking, and my 
speech conveys what I take to be true. But my speaking is also a kind of doing, an 
action that takes place within the field of power and that also constitutes an act of 
power.” (Butler, 2005, p. 125) 
Giving an account, being an act where truth is told, is then an act of power, one 
where meaning is created: the meaning of the subject and consequently the meaning of 
truth. Because meaning is never given, but created or produced (Boland, 1993), it is valid 
only within the boundaries of the regime giving it substance, where it is taken to be true. 
Meaning is thereby a result of a perspective game moulding it, arising from the exercise of 
(a specific) power vested as truth; the knowledge it conveys is subjected to that same 
prevailing perspective, which means that “all knowledge is a matter of perspective” 
(Morgan, 1988, p. 477). Games of truth are thus games of perspective played upon and by 
subjects, where meaning is at stake. This is why subjects are both pawns and kings in truth 
games. Returning to the previous comments over Alcibiades’ embarrassment, this allows 
us to state that truth, being knowledge, is always perspective-grounded. And because truth 
acquires its status of power among subjects and their subjectivity through their narrative 
act of giving an account, it is natural that narrative shares this capability of constituting 
meaning (see Bruner, 1991). In addition, meaning expresses itself through the visibility the 
subject exposes himself to when giving an account, it is what turns him into a subject 
called and able to account, i.e., an accountable subject. This is similar to the manifestation 
of sins within Christian’s technologies of the self, where the meaning of the truth arises in 
the moment it is verbalised. But because the subject is seen, known to be, a sinner, the 
knowledge flowing from his accounts impedes the rise of other meanings, as they do not 
befit truth as perspective. Truth is also a way of seeing, of rendering the subject visible 
within its powerful lens, but “a way of seeing is also “way of not seeing”” (Hines, 1988, p. 
258), which reinforces the partial nature of knowledge itself and the constraining role of 
truth regarding meaningfulness. Accounts, by rendering truth in the shape of knowledge, 
are transforming truth by reinforcing it, since being true to truth is a precondition for self’s 
existence in society. Discourse is thereby sustained and renewed by prompting the subject 
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into pursuing and manifesting truth. What is meaningful is bound to allow (new) meaning 
to the symbols represented by words in discourse, as meaningfulness is equivalent to being 
true. What is true is meaningful, the contrary being also right. For self to be bestowed 
meaning, it needs to acknowledge what truth allows into speakability, into account-ability, 
that being the condition ruling its subjectivity in society (see Butler, 2005). As its motive is 
that of rendering intelligibility to the subject’s existence, accountability is expressive of the 
assimilation and confession of the truth the subject is lead into performing when giving an 
account of himself. For truth governs subjectivity, and thereby is creative of meaning. 
Accounting, consisting in the practice of giving an account, can then be addressed as 
basilar to both truth-assimilating and truth-extracting practices where not only the 
meaningfulness of the subject as agent, but ultimately of truth itself, is at stake. Because 
they fuel truth with their accounts, accountants can be addressed as “agents in their own 
right” (Roberts & Jones, 2009, p. 865). They are both practitioners and publishers of truth. 
This “agency” renders their accountability, rather than their accounting, central to 
questions of power. For meaning is dependent on how the subject perceives himself as 
accountable, which will shape his accounts. In turn, this also reveals what relationship the 
subject has to (what is taken to be) truth. This expresses subjectivity’s dependence on the 
perspective of truth. 
Being related to the creation of meaning for its meaning to emerge, how could 
accountability not continue to be forever elusive when it is dependent on a circular process 
behind the power of truth? Regarding the pursuit of meaningfulness, this circularity 
explains why “visibility is a trap” (Foucault, 1977, p. 200) where accountability is 
‘caught’. For visibility is about constructing meaning (Munro, 1993), one around the 
singularity of the individual being visible through the particular lens of an encompassing 
regime of truth. Assimilating sameness, the subject speaks out his uniqueness, but one that 
needs to be, rather forcefully is, true; it must be so in order to be meaningful. Going 
backwards, the individual is seen for what he tells
10
, and what he tells is what makes him 
accountable because he is eventually answering back to the call of truth. Being accountable 
is tantamount to telling the truth. By making the subject talk in its terms, truth captures and 
entraps the meaning of accountability within its circular regime for (re)emerging and 
renewing itself as power, as being visible is equivalent to being accountable. Truth makes 
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 This notion draws also upon Munro’s comments (1993, p. 266) about what he labels as Foucault’s joke, 
that ““seeing” is saying. Something is shown by saying”. 
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accountability “the endlessly repeated moment of subjection” (Roberts, 2009, p. 959), even 
if truth needs accountability in as much as accountability needs truth.  
 
2.3. The power of belief 
Being all extant accounting text (Cooper & Puxty, 1994), giving an account as 
constitutive of the practice of accounting is thereby generally associated to the activity of 
writing. The relationship of writing with the act of giving an account of oneself goes back 
far in history indeed. Already in the Hellenistic period “taking care of the self became 
linked to constant writing activity, [with] the self [being] something to write about, a theme 
or object (subject) of writing activity” (Foucault, 1997c, p. 232). This does not mean that 
the act of giving an account, being narrative, must be conceived as essentially writing, for 
narrative is related to both oral and written transmission of our living experience (Bruner, 
1991). Writing, however, is markedly associated with authorship, whereas with oral 
transmission such quality is usually diluted due to the intervention of several subjects 
throughout time. And it is because we have become so attached to the illusion that one 
should focus on correctly interpreting the author’s intentions, on correctly interpreting 
what is written (Cooper & Puxty, 1994) that talking about writing as an activity linked to 
interpretation helps to disclose the importance of written accounts in giving truth its power 
nature. Giving an account is concerned with creating meaning, not finding it. But in order 
to understand writing, it is useful to turn briefly to some of Foucault’s (1997b) 
considerations about the role of self-writing. 
Whilst focused upon the early roman imperial period, Foucault’s arguments over the 
role of writing in manifesting the subject are very much befitting to the activity of self-
writing throughout different periods in history, something we can infer from the reading of 
several of his works (e.g., Foucault, 1977; 2001b). For Foucault, writing deals with 
visibility of the self by and to the other, as it consists (not only, but also) in 
correspondence. When the subject writes about himself, he intends to present himself 
before others to whom he addresses. What information he gives about himself reveals who 
the writer his, allowing the gaze of the other to reach him even if not physically. It is the 
purpose of exposing oneself to the gaze of the other that reveals the meaning of truth and 
the relationship it has with subjectivity; exposure and the consequent visibility are 
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generator of (specific) knowledge, a process where the subject is both objectivised and 
subjectivised. 
Whilst not being new to what has been hitherto discussed, focusing on writing allows 
us to explore the traditional bias within Western thinking that the purpose of writing, rather 
self-writing, is to clearly communicate who the author is by communicating what is or 
goes inside him, what are (or were) his intentions, the goodness or badness of writing 
being judged accordingly (Cooper & Puxty, 1994). The importance of written texts for 
accountability is nowadays prominent especially when concerning corporate agents, for 
how they are hold accountable is very much dependent on what is written about them; and 
thus the importance of the accountant. However, focusing on what the correct 
interpretation should be gives prominence to the author in detriment of the reader by 
reducing the latter’s possibilities for interpretation. This may arise because we are taught 
to read in a way that prompts us into truly interpreting the author (Cooper & Puxty, 1994). 
This fixation on the truth of the self-written self constricts the formation of meaning, both 
of the subject himself and of truth
11
. We must not forget that regimes of truth, whilst 
limitative, are flexible for they allow the inventiveness of subjects. And such as the 
accountant in his quality of writer reinvents the agent, so does the reader, which allows 
him with his single perspective about who the self-writer is. However, single perspectives 
are not sole perspectives, as accounts reveal the subject’s singularity by preventing him 
from feeling an aloofness regarding others, for they are interdependent; they are united in 
diversity. Writing, dealing with visibility, is essentially social, expressive of social 
conduct, and thereby socially determined (see Munro, 1993), which means that invention 
and reinvention are limited by the structure of tellability ruled by truth, for whilst “there is 
no truth as such, (...) there is such a thing as stretching it too far” (Hines, 1988, p. 256). 
Because our knowledge is determined by the regime of truth founding it, the 
obsession about truly knowing the subject may arise out of the way knowledge of the 
subject has been conceived in Western society, as essentially scientific and rational (see 
Bruner, 1991; Foucault, 2007a, regarding Heidegger). We tend therefore to conceive truth 
as verifiable, which implies being able to be fully disclosed to the one verifying it. But, as 
earlier argued, the subject is essentially constituted by his self-narrative, from which self-
writing is an integral part. When the subject writes about himself he is being his self 
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 Paradoxically enough, this gives truth strength to impose itself as power through diminishing the scope of 
what can be legitimated as true. 
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narrator. And narrative’s feature of hermeneutic composability presented by Bruner (1991) 
can partly explain why this bias regarding the full knowledge of the subject may take 
place, as this is linked to interpretation.  
The reader, whilst being naturally an interpreter, tends to consider narrative as 
originating from an omniscient narrator, such feature making the former judge the latter’s 
accounts accordingly (Bruner, 1991). If the narrator is omniscient, he must also be so 
regarding himself when telling his self-story. This mesmerises the reader with the need for 
correctly interpreting the knowledge conveyed by the tale being narrated, for whatever he 
tells us is considered as topic-relevant and the reader “most often assign(s) an 
interpretation to it in order to make it so” (Bruner, 1991, p. 10). Indeed, self’s story can be 
so persuasive as to elude the other in neediness of interpretation: what is told is necessarily 
hold as true, bereft of all suspicion. Bruner (1991) characterises this needlessness of 
interpretation as due to ‘narrative seduction’ proper of great storytellers or ‘narrative 
banalization’ befitting of conventional stories, both of which render a story so self-evident 
that the effort of interpreting it is set aside. Either way, this seemingly eases the need for 
interpretation, even if truth manifests itself in moments of distress. 
Another feature sustaining the pervasiveness of verifiable truth bears on the distance 
self and the other are subject to. Because the subject is known through being visible, the 
more distant self is from the other the harder it becomes for the other to know self
12
, 
causing feelings of anxiety on whether the information is being correctly interpreted 
(Roberts & Scapens, 1985), i.e., if our reading is being true to what is written. This is not 
just because of the bias around the omniscience of the narrator, but due to the freedom 
subjects possess while subjects; it is something inherent to their subjectivity (Bruner, 1991; 
Schweiker, 1993; Foucault, 2001b). And it is because subjects are ‘relatively’ free that the 
possibility of choice is endowed to them as agents (Bruner, 1991). Indeed, it is due to 
freedom that actions within social context need to have a political or legitimate meaning 
expressing the intentions apparently embodied in them so as to hold sway (Burchell, Club, 
Hopwood, Hughes & Nahapiet, 1980); it is part of the strategic game of power linked to 
truth (Foucault, 2001b).  
                                        
12
 The contrary is also true. Whilst distance makes harder for both self and the other to know each other, as 
they are both exposed and opaque subjects, it is important here to stress the knowledge of self the other is 
able of “obtaining” in order to understand why truth is regarded as being less verisimilar than verifiable. 
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Giving an account thus bears on the choices the free agent makes regarding its 
actions and on the ones the accountant performs concerning its interpretations, even if 
sustained upon a forcefully incomplete knowledge of the agent. Whilst constrained, the 
interpretations the accountant performs are a result of choices he makes through 
discernment. Why should I tell something in this way and not otherwise, when I can or I 
am allowed to? Those choices, being a synonym of power, reflect a political choice 
capable of affecting our lived experience, as Francis argues (1992), since they shape that 
same experience. “It is precisely because value choices underlie accounting practices 
(though often invisibly so) that accounting is a political as well as a moral practice” 
(Francis, 1992, p. 7). But it is due to this capability of choice deriving from his freedom 
that the activity of interpreting the subject may be even more difficult to the interpreter, as 
he searches to know ‘someone’ already opaque. Choice, whilst entailing intention, verses 
around action, around the free subject as agent. And Bruner (1991) argues that, when 
referring to the apparent intention entailed in actions such can only be inferred by the 
hindsight of the interpreter, thereby existing a “loose link between intentional states and 
subsequent action” (Bruner, 1991, p. 7). One must not forget that agency, being founded 
upon action, is visible through what is told, or been accounted for, regarding those actions. 
Visibility is founded less on acts of doing than on acts of telling. Going backwards, choice, 
whilst confirming the subject’s opaqueness, reveals the self-inventiveness of the subject 
and renders the accountant’s moral agency within social contexts, the accountant being a 
“practitioner of politics and communication” (Nelson, 1993, p. 220). Still, this too serves 
the purposes of truth as it warrants its force through the active word of the accountant. 
Drawing on Foucault, being a practitioner of politics necessarily means being a practitioner 
of the politics of truth because “the accountant is called upon to produce a quite specific 
discourse in some quite particular context” (Francis, 1992, p. 9). Whilst purposeful, 
actions’ mere search for legitimacy within social contexts necessarily bears on enabling 
(the prevailing) truth to emerge and reinforce itself as power. 
Being part of the subject’s opaqueness, choice impedes narrative from providing 
causal, thereby verifiable, explanations. What is considered as narrative truth “is judged by 
its verisimilitude rather than its verifiability” (Bruner, 1991, p.13). Whilst grounded upon 
dispossession in order to become the subject’s self-story, narrative is also about 
compromise between the teller/writer and the listener/reader, for when he is dispossessed 
of his ‘own’ narrative he is delivering something unable to be reduced to sameness; the 
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contrary would make dispossession commensurate to anonymity, thereby denying 
meaning. Even if sharing a similar social background, the social subjects’ mutual 
uniqueness and inherent freedom makes the interpretative act of giving an account one 
requiring this compromise for communication, and therefore meaning, to ensue. This once 
again bears on what Bruner (1991) classifies as hermeneutic composability, for it concerns 
the negotiation of how a story shall be told and taken. Compromise within verisimilitude is 
however harder to achieve than within verifiability, something bearing on Western 
traditional conception of knowledge, which finds its grounds upon the importance given to 
the authorship of texts (Cooper & Puxty, 1994) or on the omniscient knowledge the 
narrator is believed to have (Bruner, 1991). Paradoxically enough, this may fool us into 
rendering the subject as “the object of information, never a subject in communication” 
(Foucault, 1977, p. 200).  
Such reification of knowledge has conceived truth into being verifiable rather than 
verisimilar. Being a regime of truth, a regime of knowledge deals with the way we learn 
how to learn (see Hoskins, 1996). And if actual regimes of knowledge are prone to 
practices grounding upon such verifiability, truth is bound to be considered objective. And 
writing, as already argued, contributes to such status. 
“We still learn under the regime of writing, examining and grading, and we still 
continue to be known in our truth via these practices. Accordingly, there is a ‘regime 
of truth’ at work here, to which we have to be committed. We are calculable, and yet 
also calculating selves, even while we recognize the systematic weaknesses, not to say 
untruths, that the regime produces.” (Hoskin, 1996, p. 277, emphasis added) 
Because narrative has been associated with subjectivity (not in the sense of rendering 
self its quality of subject, but regarding the quality of being subjective, a ‘product’ of 
individual hindsight and testimony, reflective of a certain perspective), computational 
accountability – together with computational accounting – has been moved into a higher 
status within public discourse, for it is generally coupled with objectiveness or proof, i.e., 
with what seemingly allows for verification to ensue (Kamuf, 2007). Even if dependent 
upon narrative and thereby it is always belated regarding the enactment of meaning, this is 
a reason sustaining why calculation has been acquiring an independence regarding 
narrative. For  
“‘Numbers do not lie’, ‘read the numbers’, the numbers tell the story’, which is to say, 
the story of no story to tell; numbers, we believe, do not narrate, interpret, invent, or 
make up the figures – unless they do sometimes, which is why one is well-advised to 
run the numbers again, check and double-check them. Verification is always possible, 
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at least in theory. Another more patently ironic dictum advises: ‘Put your faith in 
numbers’, in other words, in that which presumably makes no claim on faith or belief, 
except, of course, the belief that numbers, counting, or quantification triumphs over 
belief” (Kamuf, 2007, p. 252, emphasis added). 
This quote summarises what is to follow, allowing for the role of belief within the 
relationship between subjectivity and regimes of truth to be disclosed. Drawing upon 
verifiability, calculability and subjectivity have been bounded due to the appeal of 
accountancy’s promise of easing the effort of knowing the subject. Like narrative, 
computation makes possible to render the subject visible, even if physically distant (Miller, 
1992). But because computation purports to make the self visible “against a pre-
determined set of categories” (Roberts, 2009, p. 966), it also introduces something new to 
the process of knowledge of the individual: measurement, taken to be objective. In turn, 
measures, being transformed into targets, not only purport to describe the subject but also 
and especially to prescribe courses of action. It then reduces the capability of choice 
deriving from the natural freedom of subject. When considered as a computational 
practice, accounting “seeks to bring the actions of “free” individuals into accord with 
specific objectives by enclosing them within a calculative fence” (Miller, 1992, p. 66, 
emphasis in original). Measures as targets purport to report what truly is, in a dispassionate 
and objective fashion (Hoskins, 1996), with the inherent knowledge they allow being more 
precise and certain, therefore more rational, than subjective reasoning (see Miller, 1992). 
Because calculation based on measures as targets structures the visibility of the subject 
upon ‘routines’ of comparability and examination, what legitimacy the subject may aspire 
to is framed into calculative practices, rendering the subject as a “calculating self” (Miller, 
1992). The very word “calculating” suggests the objectiveness the subject is endowed with, 
his meaningfulness being dependent upon objects such as costs or cash flows, which are 
taken to be real, therefore true. By being calculating, self is transformed into a knowledge-
object inside a calculable space.  
Accuracy and comparability, being sustained upon targets, transform the practice of 
examination into a surveillance exercise enforced upon self for the sake of knowledge. As 
hitherto discussed, examination within technologies of the self was an exercise expressive 
of the relationship the subject had to truth. Whether by assimilation of outer discourses or 
denouncement of inner faults, truth governing subjectivity emerged as power through the 
accounts provided by examination. Surveillance, sustained on numerical objectives 
previously set, restricts the practice of examination to the observance of the conduct of the 
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individual against pre-defined objectives. Because measures are what allow the truth of the 
subject to emerge, who the subject is seen to be is then reduced to one of two possibilities: 
that of laudable success from achieving targets or that of failure through non-compliance; 
and failure can be complete because it carries the danger of non-identity (Hoskins, 1996).  
Going back to the other’s calling for an account, the answer the subject (eventually) 
gives is translated into calculative data ready to be accumulated and compared, which 
restricts accountability to its computational side, the subject being translated into a single 
figure, the utmost objective of calculative techniques (Miller, 1992). Single figures, 
contrary to narrative, purport to be universally understandable, as they are “apart from 
disputes and political interests, and endowed with a legitimacy that seems difficult to 
contest or dispute” (Miller, 1992, p. 68). Being numbers, they are believed to “speak for 
themselves” (Kamuf, 2007, p. 252) which eases the communicational tensions prone to 
arise when the negotiation of meaning through narrative occurs. Connecting their neutrality 
to the objectiveness of targets, computation ‘enables’ accountability to be tantamount to 
transparency, for measures as targets reflect, “either directly or through the comparisons 
[they make] possible, an ideal of what the self should be” (Roberts, 2009, p. 965). With 
transparency comes the ultimate promise regarding visibility, that of enabling a full 
knowledge of self, for transparency as accountability purports “to cast light upon what 
would otherwise remain obscure or invisible, (...) in order to provide the basis for 
confidence for distant others” (Roberts, 2009, p. 957). And due to the belief we put in 
computation and this inherent transparency, every failure is to be remedied with new 
calculative regimes (Miller, 1992) or more transparency (Roberts, 2009). 
Our obsession with verifiability shifts the meaning of Foucault’s expression, 
“visibility is a trap” (1977, p. 200). Indeed, insisting on the opposition between narrative 
and computation and giving prevalence to the latter has the opposite effect of obscuring the 
link between the subject and truth due to the accounts given. Yet, numbers do play their 
role in constituting the subject by becoming part of the vocabulary used in the story being 
told, or rather, accounted for (see, e.g., Craig & Amernic, 2006; 2008; Odgen, 1995; 1997; 
Puxty, 1997). But this is due to the refractive qualities of the prevailing discourse, which 
allow the meaning of truth to flow through them. Being sustained upon context, numbers, 
accounting numbers rather, reveal a far greater complexity than that of mere expressions of 
reckoning (Vollmer, 2007). Themselves a form of writing constitutive of the practice of 
accounting, they are essentially social, and thereby have limited transparency over that 
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same social context shaping them. That is why they are imprecise. Were they accurate, 
they would hardly be reified as communication, because too much precision harms 
communication (Hayes, 1983). By the fact of being social, numbers are subject to all the 
constraints imposed upon self when constituting itself. This also implies that narrative, 
being the basis of self-formation, must precede computation, making the latter dependent 
on the former in order to be meaningful. Numbers are thus born out of narrative (Boland & 
Schultze, 1996) and, like narrative, must be coupled to the setting encircling them. When 
stripped of context, “numbers may then in fact, as in theatrical comedy, just be ridiculous” 
(Vollmer, 2007, p. 594), with their meaninglessness emerging and rendering it impossible 
to grant the subject with intelligibility. Carnegie & West (2005) address this senselessness 
of numbers when questioning the application of profit-seeking oriented monetary valuation 
to non-financial public sector resources.  
Like narrative, numbers are themselves subject to the negotiation of meaning, which 
prevent them from being truer than narrative. And when negotiation fails, what was 
intended to be told simply is not; it just remains meaningless. We can talk about 
accountability being lost (see Hänninen, 1995). And this brings forth an even more 
important feature, one from which negotiation derives. By the fact of being essentially 
narrative (even when supported by computation), in order to hold sway, accounts must 
resonate with audiences so as to allow for knowledge (Arrington & Schweiker, 1992; 
Llewellyn, 1999), even if taken by every single other in a peculiar fashion. Audiences 
reflect the activity of hearing, which is the natural reaction to the subject showing himself 
by the act of saying. This reflects the essential character of communication within 
visibility. Even if the subject accounts for himself due to a previous call the other casted 
upon him, it is by what he tells about himself (even if mainly in written form) that such 
‘data’ are activated (see Munro, 1993). 
It is the blurriness of normative discourse that prompts the activity of interpretation. 
And because it is self who seeks the enactment of its intelligibility, it must be self the one 
performing a persuasive act of convincing others that it is indeed telling the truth about 
itself. An account is an act of persuasion, one intending to make self befitting to the regime 
of truth through it telling being accepted as legitimate by the audience. This is tantamount 
to say that the audience believes self, for self is speaking the truth. Belief is thus the motion 
force behind truth, what truly gives truth its force. For it sustains the dyadic relationship 
between self and the other through the inherent trust it embodies. Believing arises out of a 
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primordial necessity to believe, rather make others believe, in the confession self is giving 
of itself. Being then essential to the act of giving an account to ensue, it is itself 
performative, something paradoxical to the rationality sustaining our common belief in the 
objectiveness of verifiable truth (see Kamuf, 2007). Our mesmerising belief in the 
neutrality of accounting numbers is a clear evidence of its ironic power. Belief, being 
essential to truth to ensure its legacy of power, becomes “the conditioning limit on every 
possible encounter with another, every act of testimony given or received” (Kamuf, 2007, 
p. 260). Going backwards, accountability, deriving from account, can be endowed one 
further meaning, essential for the narrative and computational ones to ensue: bearing on 
belief, giving an account is a synonym of trust and confidence on what is being accounted 
for. As Schweiker (1993) claims, giving an account expresses a fiduciary duty the agent 
has entrusted the accountant of faithfully representing him with. Such trust, far from being 
a formalised contract, is affective and sustained by a moral fidelity of self to itself deriving 
from a higher moral responsibility of accounting to the other. What the subject confesses 
about himself discloses such trust relationship, as accounts are always bound to be 
incomplete.  
This need for belief and confession is very similar to what was disclosed as 
Christian’s technologies of the self, since the confession made by self is towards a public 
audience, such exposure revealing who the self is regarding what the regime of truth 
allows it to be. The uniqueness of self must be commensurate to truth. But contrary to the 
manifestations of truth being followed by negation of that truth through renunciation, what 
is nowadays confessed is regarding how the subject desires to be acknowledged according 
to what is perceived to be true, with himself then bearing witness in his own favour. This 
brings confession to the persuasive field of truth as rhetoric. But it also reveals that the 
subject must assimilate truth in order to positively speak out the truth about himself, in 
order to be believed. The publicity of the subject is then preceded by an assimilation of 
(what is taken to be) the truth composing the regimental discourse, as this governs what 
subjectivity can aspire to be. And due to this assimilation, the subject, when telling the 
truth about himself, is allowing the regime to flow and renew itself through acceptance of 
the accounts given, for this means that truth has been extracted. The dyadic relationship the 
subject must have to the audience reveals the double-effect of the regime of truth: 
resonation expresses the limitations truth imposes on tellability; but interpretation makes 
the regime’s flexibility to emerge, as it allows for the (re)invention of meaning. It is 
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because of belief that truth must necessarily be conceived to be verisimilar, as it bears on 
incomplete accounts. What is regarded as truthful among society affects the meaning of its 
composing elements, with concepts being redefined according to what meanings are 
allowed within its regimental authority. This affects how subjects see themselves and 
others to be, thereby changing their sense regarding what and to whom they see themselves 
being held accountable. The expression of such sense materialises in the accounts 
provided, which in turn attunes the subjects’ tellability to what is taken to be truth. 
Accountability, as a concept sustained upon belief, reveals the power of truth.  
 
In this chapter, a literature review over the importance of the act of giving an account 
in the process of constitution of subjectivity was undertaken. Rendering an account about 
oneself is claimed here to be essential to understand the link subjects have to truth and the 
way their subjectivity can emerge. With subjects characterised as inherently social, such 
bond is possible due to the relationship subjects must have with each other in order to 
acquire meaningfulness. They are meaningful only if being visible, and how they are seen 
to be depends on the accounts they are allowed to render about themselves. But only 
through subjects being visible can truth emerge as truth. Therefore, truth needs the subject 
in as much the subject needs truth for the enactment of meaning. The importance of 
account-giving is then considered to be fundamental for the establishment of the link 
between subjects and truth, which sets the departure point for the following chapter, where 
the research methodology is presented so as to draw the frame guiding the empirical study. 
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3. Research Methodology 
In this chapter, the methodology adopted is laid out and the corresponding research 
perspective and method are defined together with the presentation of the theoretical 
framework sustaining the attempt to provide answers to the departure questions. 
 
3.1. Methodological and epistemological perspectives 
Whilst recent studies have focused upon the (un)ethical side of accountability and the 
pressure put upon the subject to account (Shearer, 2002; Roberts, 2009; Messner, 2009; 
Joannides, 2012), the role of truth within the act of giving an account of oneself in order to 
enact the subject’s meaningfulness has generally been disregarded, and only brought to the 
fore in a (very) indirect way, mainly through the studies about the constitutive role of 
narrative. This dissertation represents an attempt to deepen our understanding about the 
relationship accounts allow truth and subjectivity with, as well as how the perception 
subjects have about accountability is affected by the way such bond ensues. In order to 
pursue the proposed objectives, this study purports to provide an answer to the following 
research questions: 
a) What is the importance of accounts in enabling the link between the subject and 
truth? 
b) In what way is accountability expressive of and defined by the connection 
between subjectivity and truth? 
These questions encompass processes of self-constitution, which are considered to 
bear on the role narrative has in the organisation of living experience (Bruner, 1991, p. 4). 
As an essentially communicative process, narrative needs a structure of language to ensue. 
For no account can happen outside a structure of language defining how communication is 
to follow. Such structure is shaped upon what both the teller and listener hold as true, 
refractive of what society as a whole holds as true (Roberts, 1996). This exposes narrative 
to a regime capable of shaping its form, and in turn shaping that of the subject’s. Foucault 
(2001a) has addressed these regimes as regimes of truth. 
Because of the limitations of these regimes to tellability and the nature of narrative, 
giving an account of the subject’s conduct has been studied as essentially a political act 
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where persuasion and confession are part of the process of achieving the meaningfulness, 
or rather, the true meaning of the subject. Meaning is thus constructed (Boland, 1993) and 
subject to the activity of interpretation of both tellers and listeners.  
When studying the portrayal of actions by narrative, researchers must then undertake 
an interpretative effort in order to know what is being analysed. Schweiker (1993), quoting 
Habermas (1990), argues that when trying to understand a phenomenon the researcher 
cannot ignore that he is the one intending to comprehend what he is investigating. Because 
he can only recognise the phenomenon through his interpretation, the researcher 
unavoidably puts himself inside the process aiming for the understanding of the reality 
being scrutinised. Thence, what Schweiker (1993, p. 233) considers to be a “true 
interpretation” is rather a befitting one, reflective of the researcher’s identity and interests 
(Llewellyn, 1999). What is intended is an interpretation that has the potential of giving an 
explanation over the meaning of the reality being analysed, which justifies that “the truth 
of an interpretation entails the interpreter” (Schweiker, 1993, p. 233). 
These prerogatives are essential and characteristic of qualitative investigation, 
according to which social systems are phenomena socially constructed, thereby dependent 
upon the actions of social subjects (Major & Vieira, 2009). The methods concerning such 
investigation have been developed by social sciences’ investigators when seeking to 
explain how (social) phenomena are “interpreted, understood, produced and constituted” 
(Major & Vieira, 2009, p. 132, own translation). Contrary to quantitative research, which 
purports to adopt an objective perspective over a reality taken to be natural and therefore 
observable in a neutral fashion, qualitative studies consider the complexity and context 
inherent to the reality being focused, for they are dealing with social reality. 
Major & Vieira (2009, p. 132, own translation) argue that the “choice between the 
different methods employed within investigation (...) should be subject to the objective of 
the study being performed”. They define research methods as “the techniques of research 
that allow specific analysis according to the methodology being followed in the study” 
(Major & Vieira, 2009, p. 134, own translation), with methodology being an expression of 
the epistemology
13
 (i.e., how the knowledge over the phenomenon being researched is 
                                        
13
 The term epistemology derives from episteme (which means knowledge), epistemology being conceived as 
the theorization or the art of knowledge.  
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obtained) employed upon the reality being studied. Thus, epistemology concerns the 
presuppositions behind the research. 
Major & Vieira (2009) stress that interpretative studies do not necessarily concern 
qualitative ones, as they are dependent on the inherent philosophical assumptions. 
Qualitative investigation can thereby be either positivistic, interpretative or critic. 
 
3.2. Research method and data collection 
Within the field of accountability research and its link to the practice of accounting, 
case studies consist of a recurrent approach in exploring the ways in which distinct forces 
are able to mould the specific framework within which accounts are rendered. According 
to Yin (2003, p. 4), “the case study is the method of choice when the phenomenon under 
study is not readily distinguishable from its context”, with the shape of the research being 
followed dependent upon the richness of that context. 
Among the array of case studies, the one that seems to better accomplish the 
objectives of this research is the explanatory case study. Being subject to interpretation, 
explanatory case studies cannot purport to supply proof over the reality being scrutinised. 
They can, however, provide “important clues to possible cause-and-effect relationships” 
(Yin, 2003, p. 69). One must bear in mind that explanatory case studies seek “to explain 
how and why some event(s) occurred” (Yin, 2003, p. 69), which justifies the importance of 
verisimilitude, rather than verifiability, in this kind of research. Yin argues that, regarding 
the complexity of explanatory case studies, “the more complex and multivariate the 
explanatory theory, the better” (2003, p. 20). Also according to Major & Vieira (2009), 
these studies, within the field of accounting, have as their purpose the study and 
explanation of the existence of certain practices, being that the theory formulated is 
dependent on the researcher in order to explain his results. “Emphasis is on the particular, 
not on the general.” (Major & Vieira, 2009, p. 145) 
Portugal’s water sector has been experiencing a wide reorganisation ever since it was 
divided in 1993 into two areas concerning different management competences. Whilst 
being performed in successive steps, the current environment around the sector’s problems 
has favoured the rise of new discursive stance of sustainability. As this essay searches to 
understand how truth, in this case conceived as sustainability, and subjects are linked 
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through the accounts given by the latter, it focuses on the array of forces exerted over the 
leading actor in this process, Águas de Portugal (AdP). This corporation represents the 
central focus of this case study, as it is liable to the full exposure to normative discourse’s 
enabling and constraining powers concerning its accounts and the consequent visibility 
they allow. Exploring the way these forces are capable of disclosing the way AdP links to 
the concept of sustainability, with both their meaning arising. The shifts that have been 
experienced by Águas de Portugal in the discourse conveyed through its accounts show 
themselves to be of particular importance in understanding this process. 
To support the ensuing claims, research will occur mainly through consultation of 
written documents such as company’s annual reports, regulators publications, bills, reports 
from public offices and private sector organisations and social media reports. The recourse 
to audio records is also relevant due to the wide use made by those concerned with the 
corporate subject’s activity, as well as the sector’s. The adoption of a new strategic plan for 
the water sector set by the Portuguese government for the period comprising 2007 to 2013 
serves both as stepladder and background for developing this research. Albeit narrowed to 
a sample of one, as it expresses the inevitability of conducting an analysis within a 
regulated, practically monopolised public sector, this case study has the potential of 
enabling a better understanding of how the discourse conveyed through accounts 
reflects/affects the deploy of forces acting upon a corporate subject’s accountability within 
processes intending for major social change. 
 
3.3. Theoretical framework 
As a hermeneutical study over published texts, this work follows the participant’s 
perspective of a qualitative and interpretative approach, as the investigator considers both 
the complexity and context of the reality being studied. Thereby the notion of the 
investigator as a neutral bystander is denied. What is intended is not a verifiability of facts, 
but an understanding of how and why the social phenomenon being researched takes place. 
But contrary to what was above referred to regarding Yin, the focus here is not on the 
causes behind the phenomenon, but rather on the reasons concerning how and why the 
social reality being studied holds sway. As this is a study over the narrative stance of the 
accounts given by the subject, such caveat draws on Bruner’s arguments (1991) about the 
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loose link between intentional states and actions, which prevent causal explanations. And 
because it adopts a critical approach to what discursive stance is both articulated and 
adopted by the practice of accounting for the corporate subject throughout time, it is by 
investigating the way discourse in accounting information acts and reacts to the exertion of 
forces comprised within a set framework that this research attempts to grasp a better 
understanding of how accounts, far from being the result of a neutral bystander, express a 
wide range of forces acting upon what subjectivity is allowed to the corporate subject. 
Whilst not equal to persons as moral agents, the accountant’s agency rendered by the 
accounts it gives of the agent endow corporate subjects with moral agency, and thereby 
provides them with accountability (see Schweiker, 1993). 
Whilst the question of how accounts are reflective of the power of truth has not been 
directly focused within contemporary research, there are yet several cases where the 
question of the impact of accounting as a practice of attuning conducts to emerging 
normative discourses has been studied. Espeland & Hirsch (1990) focus on the persuasive 
effects accounts have upon the redefinition of the concept of corporation to justify the 
power of prevailing discourse. Ahrens’ (1996) clearly shows how the perception of what is 
taken to be valid regarding what subjects are being held accountable for changes among 
cultures as the expression of different normative discourses. This shows that the meaning 
of accountability changes according to which regime of truth accounts are given. Odgen & 
Clarke’s paper (2005) depicts how truth is dependent on the persuasion accounts can exert 
upon others so as to endow the subject with legitimacy. Regarding negotiation of meaning, 
Hänninen (1995) has explored how failing to account within the unclear limits normative 
discourses impose is tantamount to the loss of legitimacy. Ezzamel, Willmott & 
Worthington (2004) explore the role accounting has in re-conceptualising and reorganising 
manufacturing processes and how what is taken to be truth is subject to processes of 
acceptability. But the force of accounting as a practice capable of (re)constructing meaning 
has been most present among studies concerning privatisations (Andrew, 2010; Craig & 
Amernic, 2006; 2008; Odgen, 1995a; 1995b; 1997; Puxty, 1997; Shaoul, 1997). 
Because the following case study bears a direct link to privatisation concerns and 
their emergence within particular context boosted by the way accounting shapes meaning 
raises the curtain on the next chapter, where the development of the empirical research 
sustaining this dissertation ensues. 
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4. Case Study 
This chapter is organised into four sections. The first section comprises a survey over 
the period prior to the enactment of the strategy known as PEAASAR II in order to 
interpret the discursive stance that followed its publication. The role of such strategy 
within the structuring of a new discursive regime of sustainability is the focus of the 
second section. In the following section, the process of reshuffling Portugal’s water sector 
from 2007 until 2012 is analysed, as well as the role performed by Águas de Portugal 
(AdP) therein through the accounts it rendered of itself. This will enable the discussion 
taking place in the fourth section to ensue in order to understand how AdP’s accounts 
allowed the discourse of sustainability to become a regime of truth and, in turn, caused this 
corporate subject to necessarily emerge as unsustainable. 
 
4.1 Setting up the scene 
“The need for promoting a true water and solid waste disposal industry presupposes 
the definition of a rigorous strategy that cautions national interests, enables the 
increase of the degree of corporatisation in the sector, including private capital, and 
allows the acceleration of investment rhythm. This strategy is, overall, a fundamental 
piece in order to warrant temporal stability to the abstraction, treatment and 
distribution of water directed for public consumption, to the collection, treatment and 
disposal of resulting wastewater and the collection and treatment of solid waste. It 
makes therefore sense to allow for private firms intervening within these sectors to 
participate therein, albeit under concession agreements.” (Law-Decree (Decreto-Lei) 
nº 372/93, foreword, emphasis added, own translation) 
The above quote reflects the trend prevailing during what is described in extant 
literature as a landmark within the history of Portuguese water sector, with the constitution 
of Águas de Portugal (AdP) dating back to that period. Indeed, 1993 is considered by 
many to be a turning point regarding the sector’s hitherto adopted strategy, one sustained 
upon the principle of exclusive management by local power, with every municipality being 
owner of and responsible for the whole infrastructure and services within its venue. Such 
push towards the adoption of business-oriented management discloses the rise of a new 
discourse within the water sector, in contrast with the framework sustaining public sector’s 
provision of what were deemed to be fundamental goods and services. The introduction of 
new expressions and denominations became the mark of an intended shift in the strategy 
being followed, moving towards one capable of conciliating new European challenges with 
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limitations arising from a still rigid context for change. Still, the aforementioned “need” for 
promoting a true water industry
14
 arises not only due to the government’s belief on the 
benefits business-style management could bring; it was rather a (first) political answer 
against some legal and ideological obstacles existing among the sector’s framework in 
order to somehow circumvent them. And whilst the discourse was seemingly new, the 
options being followed can be traced back to the ones envisaged during the Portuguese 
dictatorship’s final years in the early seventies, when the first attempts to restructure the 
sector from top to bottom were carried out. What differs from them bears on the historical 
context and the consequent discursive stance surrounding both strategies, with a resulting 
framework not at all similar. This makes imperative a brief survey over the situation of the 
water sector in the pre-democratic period in order to somehow try to clarify the sense of 
the discourse enacted in the 1993’s sector’s restructuring, with its impacts prevailing even 
today. 
Whilst water supply and treatment were responsibilities attributed by law to local 
governments even before the dictatorial regime rose to power, in practice the State directed 
the strategy being envisaged for the sector, not only by promoting regional studies or 
enacting ordinances, but and especially by orienting the structure of the investment being 
performed. Because mayors were not elected but appointed by the single-party 
administration, this withdrew autonomy from municipalities by subjecting the 
materialisation of a vast number of decisions to the previous authorisation of central 
government, in line with the political and administrative control that was in force (Pato, 
2011). This subjected both investment planning and capability regarding water supply and 
sewerage facilities to the strategic vision prevailing among the cabinet, which was 
essentially based upon an infrastructural view of which public health and environmental 
concerns were not part. This implied that what was seen as important was the amount of 
water being supplied, which directed the State’s financial effort into merely tackling water 
supply problems (Pato, 2013). Also, what political options were taken focused on solving 
the issues arising within great urban centres, disregarding the majority of the population 
                                        
14
 Albeit the then government’s strategy focused not only on one, but on two sectors, the restructuring of the 
one dealing with solid waste management is referred to in this paper only when complementing the common 
thread guiding this thesis, which is sustained upon the water sector. This bears not only on the purposes 
grounding the research here developed but also on the importance given to water issues among the general 
discourses sustaining the thrust for restructuring both sectors. The very name of the corporate subject being 
focused (which literally means “Waters of Portugal”) reflects the importance of water in establishing it as a 
going concern, even if also dealing with solid waste. 
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living in rural areas (Pato, 2011). Therefore, and until 1970, the State’s water-related 
infrastructure policy was essentially a project lacking a strategic framework as it gave 
priority to solving technical issues, resulting in the design of isolated solutions without any 
degree of system integration, neither regarding territorial association nor coordination with 
sanitary concerns.  
The problems related to countryside water supply systems started to be addressed 
only around 1960 and within a very restricted framework of access to financing by local 
governments. This was again in line with the lack of political will in providing such funds, 
together with the priorities given to other kinds of investments in detriment of water supply 
infrastructure (Pato, 2011). However, this was not an isolated view of the ruling elite, but 
one also shared by many county administrations owing to the greater priority they awarded 
to other investments plans, more in line with the Regime’s propaganda of progress, than 
those consisting of water supply infrastructures. And financing here had a conditioning 
role. Whilst the action of central government relating investment policies was seemingly 
indirect via credit concession to local governments’ proposals, the context where such 
support was endowed was directly dependent on the image the State purported to internally 
diffuse about what was believed to reveal the nation’s development. Therefore, the options 
of both local governments asking for financial assistance and central government granting 
it were to a great extent turned to projects covering, i.e., educational facilities or road and 
transport infrastructure, these last absorbing the lion’s share of the State’s financial support 
(Pato, 2011). Thus, whilst the State seemingly provided financial assistance to the 
investment being undertaken by municipalities regarding water facilities, not only such 
assistance proved to be insufficient, but the conditions required were unbearable to many 
local governments, especially those in the countryside lacking the financial capability to 
reimburse the loans being made available. In order to apply for credit concession, local 
governments had to assume all the planning stage, for which they normally did not have 
the necessary skills or knowledge, and assure that the tariffs being charged were capable of 
providing the reimbursement of those loans (Pato, 2011); this was to be asked from a 
population where water was hardly to be considered as having any economical value, since 
it was and had always been consumed free of any charge whatsoever. 
Due to the infrastructural paradigm being followed, which treated public health and 
sanitary issues as minor ones, the primacy given to water supply infrastructures was not 
accompanied by proper processes and facilities of water treatment and sewage drainage. 
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Consequently, the deficiencies regarding water infrastructure planning and management 
resulted merely from political options (Pato, 2013), thereby contradicting the putative lack 
of financial means the State alluded to have concerning water supply and sewerage 
investment (Pato, 2011). This lack of integration among water distribution and sanitary 
concerns started to emerge as a pressing issue during 1970, to which greatly contributed 
the migrations from the countryside to major urban centres where a wave of 
industrialisation was taking place. This provoked an uncoordinated urban growth not 
accompanied by proper water supply or sewage drainage systems, which culminated in 
severe public health problems, with outbreaks of cholera around Lisbon and other coastal 
areas around that same year (Schmidt, 2008). 
Investments on sewerage systems were only then given considerable attention, which 
resulted in them being included within the central government’s water resources 
management policy. This would allow financial assistance to local governments regarding 
the sewerage and wastewater treatment investments eventually being proposed. Together, 
there was an intention of articulating this investment with that directed to water supply 
networks (ERSAR, 2010a). To this shift of attitude contributed government officials’ self-
awareness of their hitherto lack of concern regarding sewerage issues, something that 
became clear when the first studies aiming for the sector’s restructuring on an integrated 
basis were published in 1972, disclosing just 17% of the population with access to proper 
sewerage facilities, in comparison to the 40% being served by water supply systems (Pato, 
2013). And among these, the water monitoring and treatment levels were very low, 
resulting from the technical and infrastructural paradigm presiding over their design, 
focused merely on supplying water to populations and not on improving the quality of the 
water being distributed. 
The first attempts to restructure the sector involved a new concept of basic sanitation, 
an expression referring to the integration of water supply systems with those concerning 
wastewater drainage and treatment as well as urban waste (Pato, 2011). According to the 
proposal grounding the inquiries and studies that were to follow, the sector would be 
organised around the implementation of what was termed as basic sanitation regions, ones 
that would comprise enough territory so as to enable a rational management of inherent 
technical, economical and financial issues. For that purpose, each would be supervised by a 
State-owned-enterprise in charge of running both water and sewerage services (Pato, 
2011). Within such strategy, sustained upon a seemingly interaction between the State and 
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local governments, the former would assume the conduction of the investment in water 
treatment and sewerage by retaining responsibility for structuring and administrating water 
supply and sewerage networks, allowing the latter to circumvent their difficulties in 
tackling technical and financial issues regarding this kind of investment (ERSAR, 2010a). 
These problems that municipalities faced were mainly related to low levels of technical 
skills and lack of financial capability, together with a huge scattering of the population 
around small towns and villages in the countryside, with low income. Such project of 
integrating not only water supply and sewerage, but also solid waste management, was 
deemed to promote scale economies and the formation and share of technology, and even a 
compensation system between better off and poorer regions was envisaged (Pato, 2011). 
This disclosed an integrated technical and economical logic prevailing over political 
decision, contrary to mere infrastructural concerns that had presided hitherto. 
With the democratic revolution in 1974, such trend was however reversed, with the 
role performed by the State considerably diminished for more than a decade and a half. 
Commensurate to the ostensible democratic discourse being institutionalised among 
society, local governments were again attributed the full scope of responsibilities over the 
infrastructure and administration of water- and sewerage-related services, this time without 
any compulsory guidance being “provided” by the Sate; this meant that municipalities 
were now able to decide for themselves. Such concentration of decision powers upon local 
governments bore on the aforementioned democratic rhetoric behind the political 
reorganisation the country was being subjected to, which proclaimed that political power 
should be exerted on a local basis so as to enhance democracy, empowering citizens with a 
greater degree of self-management of their own local interests (ERSAR, 2010a). Indeed, 
such principles were reflected in the newly enacted Constitution (Mozzicafreddo, Guerra, 
Quintela & Fernandes, 1988) and were (and still are) thoroughly claimed to be the 
revolution’s greatest conquest (Campos, 1988). Regarding the water sector, this implied 
that the basic sanitation regions project was no longer commensurate to the exclusive 
management of the sector by local governments because such project was seen to force 
municipalities to relinquish their rights of operating in the sector in favour of the State. 
This was believed to be tantamount to depriving them of the income provided by water 
consumption tariffs, something that was claimed to be theirs by right. This motivated a 
whole assemblage of arguments against the proposal (Pato, 2011; 2013), culminating in the 
project’s rejection by the parliament, which clearly shared among decentralisation 
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arguments. Paradoxically enough, these same politicians defended that structuring the 
nation around basic sanitation regions was technically necessary for tackling public health 
concerns (Pato, 2011), which could have motivated an alternative plan (Pato, 2011). But 
due to the belief that local governments would better serve their citizens’ interests than 
central government would, such was not brought to the fore. For what was seen as right 
was enabling municipalities with technical skills and financial capability in order for them 
to carry out their responsibilities. Such decision stripped the newly formed General Office 
of Basic Sanitation (DGSB
15) of its coordinating role regarding the sector’s investment 
strategy, emptying it of the purpose that inspired its establishment. Together with the 
restrictions imposed upon the financial intervention central government could perform 
regarding investment in water supply and sewerage facilities, the State’s role within the 
sector was, rather than being reduced, subject to a lack of definition due to the lack of a 
general strategy for the sector. Thus, whilst the need to tackle some pressing issues 
concerning public health maintained sewerage and wastewater treatment within local 
governments’ priorities (due to the outbreaks of cholera still at large when democracy was 
proclaimed), the approach being adopted commonly suffered from a lack of coordination 
due to political reasons, with individualised solutions for almost each county. This was 
also in a great extension due to the legacy left by the policies followed during the 
dictatorship, which promoted solutions very much focused on local issues, with water 
systems being designed in order to solve local needs, without any significant level of 
integration between municipalities.  
Altogether, this originated a strategic void among the water sector, reflected by its 
high degree of fragmentation, which was unable to cope with the implementation of “a 
unique and effective model capable of responding to the sector’s multidisciplinary nature” 
(ERSAR, 2010a, p. 18, own translation). This culminated in the constitution of many 
operators, typically one for each county, multiplying the effort of investment in building 
and renewing water facilities. In some cases, some of those responsibilities were even 
awarded to town councils, which increased the number of operators within the sector. 
Apart from the State-owned-enterprise responsible for providing both water supply and 
wastewater drainage and disposal to the region of Lisbon (EPAL
16
), water related services 
became a disintegrated monopoly within the hands of local governments from top to 
                                        
15
 This refers to the abbreviation of Direcção Geral do Saneamento Básico. 
16
 These are the initials for Empresa Portuguesa de Águas Livres. 
65 
 
bottom, where private participation in whatever form was forbidden. Indeed, private 
management of water-related infrastructures was never truly considered as an option, even 
if allowed by law during the authoritarian regime. This is exemplified by the fact that only 
once was a private enterprise allowed into managing water and sewerage related assets, in 
this case those comprising EPAL. However, this enterprise returned to the public 
management model even before the overthrown of the dictatorship.  
Within such a context, the sector experienced nevertheless a substantial increase 
regarding water supply and sewerage networks, with these rising from levels of 
respectively 40% and 17% in 1975 to those of 80% and 62% in 1990 and 84% and 63% in 
1993 (MAOTDR, 2007), which discloses the effort developed by municipalities in 
providing their citizens with access in quantity to drinking water and sewerage facilities. 
Yet, such growth was neither consistent nor organised throughout municipalities, with the 
infrastructural view that prevailed during the dictatorship still holding sway, mainly due to 
the lack of association and will to do so among county governments. This resulted in 
individualised solutions being implemented, to which contributed an assemblage of 
problems ranging from dissimilar local policies regarding several kinds of investment and 
sharp differences relating the number of their inhabitants to poor quality of the systems 
being implemented or planned and lack of internal organisation (Pato, 2011). Indeed, 
whilst mayors of small towns showed a greater concern for economical issues, local 
governments of large cities praised infrastructure development and social and cultural 
aspects, which can be linked to their financial capability (Mozzicafreddo et al, 1988). 
Together with the unclear role of central government, especially over the investment being 
performed, what information was provided about the sector and its operators proved to be 
scarce and somewhat unreliable (Pato, 2011). Finally, local governments also experienced 
difficulties in assuring financing for their investment programmes in order to accomplish 
their responsibilities regarding proper water supply and sewerage. As the main concern of 
local governments was to supply citizens with water and sewerage facilities in quantity, 
issues around the treatment of wastewater and related environmental concerns, less visible 
to the public gaze, were somehow pushed into a second plan, with only 32% of wastewater 
being subjected to treatment before being returned to the environment.  
Whilst the efforts of many municipalities resulted in a considerable increase in the 
quantity of population being attended by water supply and sewerage systems, the high 
level of disintegration prevailing over the sector called for a different approach in order to 
66 
 
improve both the levels of coverage and quality of water and sewerage services being 
provided to the citizens. It was with her entry in the EEC in 1986 that the nation was 
provided with the necessary financial means in order to carry on with what was to be the 
first major restructuring of the sector. The availability of fresh European funding for 
investing in the sector and pursuing the intended objectives brought with it the subjection 
to European legislation over water quality and environmental requirements, which were by 
far more demanding than those existing in Portuguese law. This would entail a great deal 
of effort by Portuguese authorities, for the still prevailing infrastructural concerns resulted 
in the expansion of water and wastewater networks not being followed by proper quality or 
monitoring of those same systems, with wastewater being frequently disposed of without 
any kind of treatment. This owes much to the concern given to short term political agenda 
guiding local governments’ decisions and the inability of several municipalities to assure 
proper technical skills and financing for carrying out their responsibilities around basic 
sanitation, which reinforced the prevalence political power gave to the activity of 
delivering water in quantity; dealing with quality concerns required a long term effort, 
something municipalities could not or found themselves unable to cope with. Most of them 
were very much dependent on monetary transfers provided by the central administration 
through a newly set fund that intended to correct the financial imbalance existing between 
municipalities, but whose rules of funding distribution were considered to be unfair to 
many small counties (Campos, 1988). Local governments also lacked the means to apply 
to EEC’s funding schemes which privileged investment programmes only above a certain 
dimension (Campos, 1988). And together with these financial obstacles, the lack of 
definition of the State’s role and concomitant weak will in addressing them contributed to a 
loose law enforcement concerning environmental and water quality issues (Pato, 2011). 
Even if the successive governments had continuously claimed that basic sanitation (as it 
was above defined) was within their priorities (Schmidt, 2008), such was then barely the 
case.  
The process of elaborating a new and nationwide strategy for the sector was therefore 
slow, with the reformulation only ensuing in 1993. However, the legislative move 
translated in the enactment of two fundamental Law-Decrees (nº 372/93 above-quoted and 
nº 379/93) that would mould the sector into its present framework, with the introduction of 
a new format of systems arising from what is seen as a fresh model of organisation and 
management, in contrast to the established model of public stewardship. The sector would 
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be structured into two kinds of systems: those labelled as multimunicipal, of which the 
State was now directly responsible, and those termed as municipal
17
, remaining under 
exclusive management of local governments. Regarding the former, they represent an 
innovation introduced in the sector and became the hub of the entire strategy being 
adopted. Every system not fulfilling the requisites for being multimunicipal was to be then 
classified as municipal. Multimunicipal systems comprise at least the territory of two 
municipalities and are related to what would be denominated as “bulk” activities, namely 
those comprising all the processes of water abstraction, treatment and conveying to 
reservoirs where it is kept for later distribution to consumers, as well as all the sewerage 
not dealing with direct, individual drainage of wastewater from consumers. Those 
activities concerning direct contact with end-users (direct distribution of water and 
domestic drainage of wastewater) were included within the scope of “retail” activities, 
these associated to the systems known as municipal. This distinction allows multimunicipal 
systems to be generally known as “bulk” systems, whilst municipal systems are usually 
labelled as “retail” systems18, corresponding to the strategic alignment networks were to 
experience within the sector, which resulted in the sector being partitioned in two: the State 
being responsible for “bulk” activities and local governments for “retail” ones. Following a 
market perspective, “bulk” would refer to the wholesale commerce of water whilst “retail”, 
like the noun suggests, comprises the retail activity of the business. Returning to the Law-
Decree nº 372/93’s quotation in the beginning of the chapter, the sector was intended to 
become an industry, with water being turned into an economic good.  
Focusing on multimunicipal systems, what grounded their establishment were mainly 
reasons of strategic importance linked to the pursuit of national interest, so it was claimed. 
This justified, rather called for, the direct intervention of the State by taking charge of the 
respective investment, something local governments found themselves unable to warrant as 
this exceeded their capabilities not only of assuring badly needed investment in order to 
cope with European legislation, but also of handling the demanding requirements vesting 
European funding programmes (see ERSAR, 2010a; Pato, 2011; Canotilho, 2013). 
                                        
17
 Whilst he term municipal exists both in Portuguese and in English, whenever it is here highlighted it refers 
to the Portuguese use of the word, i.e., it is used in order to distinguish municipal systems from 
multimunicipal. When not emphasised, it bears on its English meaning, that is, it concerns county 
governments’ issues. 
18
 Regarding the management of the systems’ assets, reservoirs can either be considered as part of 
multimunicipal or municipal systems, depending on what would be agreed between the parties concerned. 
They thus consist of the link between “bulk” and “retail” systems.  
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Sustained upon the same reasons, to the responsibility of investment was adjoined the 
management of these systems, which allowed the State to perform once again an active 
role within the sector. 
Because “bulk” systems were considered as complementary to municipal ones, the 
State is allowed to assume control under the extant legal frame, for such control is 
maintained in a subsidiary way, i.e., there subsisted a general belief about local 
governments’ inability to invest into and manage “bulk” activities. Due to the high levels 
of investment water abstraction and conveying activities required and the surpassing of 
territorial boundaries that the multimunicipal formula necessarily implied, the State was 
believed to be capable of better accomplishing the responsibilities being demanded. 
However, the constitution of a multimunicipal system was of an exclusive decision of the 
central government, shielded by the promotion of national interest. This could put 
municipalities into a position of forced cooperation with the State, even if these systems 
could only be structured within the principle of complementing “retail” activities 
(Canotilho, 2013). And it goes without saying that by assuming entirely the investment 
responsibilities regarding multimunicipal systems, the corresponding asset ownership was 
to be transferred to the State (which indeed was the case), with local governments 
maintaining their exclusive rights regarding municipal ones.  
Altogether still, the proposed strategy enabled the parties concerned – e.g., the State 
and municipalities, both in the name of public interest – into circumventing the 
constitutional requirements that enforced local governments’ exclusive management of the 
sector, resulting in its division according to management responsibilities: the State being in 
charge of “bulk” activities through the figure of multimunicipal systems, and “retail” 
activities remaining under the exclusive control of local governments. Why “bulk” 
activities were in general handed down to the State bears also upon two additional reasons 
to the ones previously argued. First, the inobservance of whatever degree of association 
between county governments into running these activities, in part due to what were 
classified as poor habits of politically working together (Faria, 1990, in Pato, 2011), 
prompted their rendering to the State, even if the possibility for municipalities to associate 
themselves into running “bulk” activities was stipulated by the same set of laws that 
introduced multimunicipal systems. But such safeguard allowed the State to assume the 
investment and management of “bulk” activities, for it did not subtract from municipalities 
these competences; were they willing to and capable of warranting their fulfilment, there 
69 
 
were no legal obstacles preventing such option. But second and more important, moving 
“bulk” activities to the State’s sphere of responsibility was tantamount to releasing local 
governments from performing the investments therein, putting them in a better position to 
manage “retail” systems; this seemingly motivates their constitution (Canotilho, 2013). 
The main objective behind the institution of multimunicipal systems was the 
implementation of integrated solutions requiring complex and costly investment and 
comprising several municipalities, which justified the focus on “bulk” activities. This 
would promote scale economies both concerning investment and management, benefiting 
water fares (ERSAR, 2010a). Sustaining such purpose was the increasing belief in the 
advantages enterprise-style management would bring to the sector, which was reflected by 
the discursive stance employed in the two mentioned Law-Decrees, as well as others 
dealing with water issues. This was part of a set of three assumptions sustaining the 
proposed strategy, where the corporatisation of the sector, system integration and 
institution of the principle of user-payer would provide a new economic and financial 
framework to the sector, under which “tax payers” were now “consumers-users” and 
“public works” were referred to as “investments”. This implied a rupture with what was 
described as the simplistic logic of merely concentrating on quantity issues such as water 
supply so as to focus on managing a resource under the principle that every 
consumption/usage has an associated cost, therefore requiring that its usage should be 
regulated and valued in economic terms (Law-Decree nº 47/94, foreword; see also Pato, 
2011). Water consumption had to be given a value, a price, in order to “restore the dignity 
and morality of the public concept of water” (Law-Decree nº 47/94, foreword, emphasis 
added, own translation). 
This kind of management model was not restricted to multimunicipal systems, for 
such possibility was extended by law to every operator within the sector. In order to boost 
government’s belief upon the values of business-style management, systems should now be 
administered by what were termed “managing entities”19, being those responsible for 
                                        
19
 This is the direct translation of entidades gestoras, in practice having the same meaning as “operators”, i.e., 
the entities operating water and sewerage systems, as well as those dealing with solid waste. However, such 
assemblage of words can be seen as resulting from the intention of making the sector more business focused. 
The very word “operator” is also available within Portuguese lexicon as operador, with operators within 
other sectors where local governments were not involved being labelled operador instead of entidade 
gestora. This reinforces what is here being claimed about the motives sustaining the strategic shift towards a 
more business-style management. During this dissertation, “managing entities” will nevertheless be referred 
to as operators, being this the word generally used in literature, even in the reports issued in English by the 
Portuguese regulator for water and waste sectors. 
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planning, constructing and running their systems. This included warranting proper drinking 
water. Focusing on the way systems are/should be managed helped reducing the scope of 
the sector’s problems to this only issue (Pato, 2011), which provided the arguments for 
making management in the sector more business oriented a solid stepladder, necessary for 
the implementation of multimunicipal systems. In fact, such goal was inscribed into the 
Law-Decree nº 379/93 as a principle guiding systems’ management, together with the 
pursuit of efficiency, public interest and that systems should be integrated regarding their 
structure. According to Zenha (2007), this attraction to the features of business-style 
management by authorities is something virtuous, as associating public interest with the 
logic of business success generated a sane conflict of interests benefiting the sector. This 
implied that operators, under the guise of “managing entities”, necessarily had to be similar 
to enterprises, had to be corporate entities, whether public or private, reflecting the efforts 
of developing a market-inspired solution to the sector. Indeed, corporatising the sector is 
considered to be fundamental in order to warrant the efficiency and quality of management 
regarding the services being provided (Pato, 2011); management’s efficiency as a principle 
therefore depends upon operators constituting themselves as corporate subjects. 
Because asset ownership remained within the hands of the State and local 
governments concerning multimunicipal and municipal systems respectively, directly 
managing water and sewerage networks was perceived by the government as contrary to 
the principles of business oriented management and efficiency being forwarded. In order to 
break apart with the administrative logic behind traditional models of politically motivated 
management and buttress the mentioned principles, the possibility of entering into service 
concession arrangements was introduced within the legal framework. This was favoured by 
the abolishment of the interdiction endowed upon private corporations from entering the 
sector. Indeed, opening the sector to private participation would boost levels of 
corporatisation and reinforce investment pace due to the entrepreneurship they were likely 
to bring into the sector (see Pato, 2011), thereby motivating the need to promote the sector 
as a true water industry (Canotilho, 2013). 
With the constitution in 1993 of AdP, government’s corporate holding responsible 
for the development and management of multimunicipal systems, corporatisation becomes 
subjacent to the rationale behind the State’s action within the sector. This reflects the kind 
of approach being envisaged by the government, for AdP would represent a public-to-
public service concession agreement where the State entrusted upon one (public) enterprise 
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the responsibilities of investing in and managing the systems under its control, with each 
system being directed by an operator necessarily constituted as a corporate subject. Whilst 
multimunicipal systems’ constitution was an exclusive government decision, municipalities 
had however to be persuaded into connecting their “retail” systems to the “bulk” systems 
being structured. By increasing the availability of financing mechanisms and enabling 
reductions of operation costs through scale economies, constituting AdP was presented as a 
strong political argument into persuading local governments to back the strategy put 
forward (Pato, 2011), for legally they were entitled in exclusive to the management of 
water and sewerage systems. In order to circumvent this issue and maintain intact local 
governments’ competences, these would be treated as shareholders of the new 
multimunicipal systems they were served by, into which they had transferred the 
responsibilities of managing “bulk” activities. But because they were not only shareholders 
but sole clients of the respective multimunicipal systems, allowing municipalities’ control 
over them would undermine the very notion of enterprise. The majority of the capital of 
each “bulk” operator had then to be subscribed by the State in order to ensure their 
direction by AdP. Additionally, having the State in control of multimunicipal systems 
would warrant proper European financing to the strategy being championed. Thus, it is by 
persuading municipalities to signing up to these agreements that the State is endowed its 
legitimacy to manage “bulk” activities. In turn, this model permits multimunicipal 
management to be (legally) recognised as a partnership between the State and 
municipalities. 
Regarding private participation within the sector, the model being proposed with the 
constitution of AdP reflected the State’s decision of in practice restricting their access to 
“bulk” activities, even if AdP symbolised the clear adoption of a business-style approach 
via indirect management, intending a rupture with the old model focused on local 
governments directly running operators. This may explain why, contrary to the “bulk” 
sector, municipalities were provided with the option of transferring the management of 
their “retail” systems to private companies via service concession agreements, which 
assured that infrastructure ownership remained within public hands and that corporatisation 
objectives were accomplished. In fact, municipalities were left with a wide set of options 
regarding how the “retail” operators they control could become, which included 
corporatising them. Thus, whilst legally opening systems’ management to private 
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guidance, such openness was channelled to the “retail” sector, wherein the State was not 
allowed for it remained an exclusive prerogative of local governments. 
Concomitant to the foundation of AdP arises what is generally referred to as the first 
generation of multimunicipal systems, consisting initially of five networks set up mainly 
on coastal, densely populated areas or subject to high seasonal pressure from tourism. 
Created by the same Law-Decree (nº 379/93) that prescribes the features of multimunicipal 
systems, they were integrated in AdP as subsidiaries. Together with them, the already 
existent EPAL, whilst structured under a different legal framework, was incorporated into 
AdP so as to provide the holding with both financial and technical skills (MAOTDR, 
2007), thus confirming the corporate nature of AdP. But because EPAL was already a fully 
operating going concern involved in both “bulk” and “retail” activities (the latter deriving 
from the fact that this company was endowed with the management of Lisbon’s domestic 
water and sewerage network long before the dictatorship rose to power), its legal 
framework was maintained
20
. Such option turns this company into an exception regarding 
the way operations are conducted and constrained in the other multimunicipal systems, not 
subject to the same requirements. 
Overall, first generation multimunicipal systems were considered to be a success 
case, with the credits reverting to the contributions corporatisation rendered to the sector. 
These were mirrored by the business activity of AdP and the resulting scale economies and 
“bulk” system integration it provided. With its scope being stretched after 1996, the 
enterprise also became able to enter the management of “retail” water supply and sewerage 
activities through the creation of a sub-holding, Aquapor, a business approach capable of 
buttressing corporate objectives for the sector and thereby “answering the increasing 
demands of that market” (Lino, 2007, p. 102, own translation). Compared to the monopoly 
structure which prevailed in “bulk” activities, this remained a very fragmented sector 
where little was going to change. Indeed, talking of a “retail” market would prove to be 
somehow difficult as there was a very low receptivity of the new possibilities for 
transferring “retail” systems’ management to private companies via service concession 
                                        
20
 Contrary to all multimunicipal systems, where management is transferred via a service concession 
agreement, EPAL consists of the only case of delegation of management to an enterprise (even if being state-
owned) where no temporal limit was set when it was constituted. According to Portuguese law, what makes 
this kind of management distinct from that behind service concession agreements bears on the former not 
consisting of a partnership between the State and a third party, something forcefully required to the latter as 
municipalities share in the operators’ capital. The operators constituted under these service concession 
agreements are also subject to a wider set of restrictions than EPAL when conducting their business activity. 
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arrangements or making operators into corporate subjects. Among the four models being 
proposed regarding municipal operators’ management, the two concerning their indirect 
management by embedding a business approach never represented more than 10% from 
1993 onward. This might question the notion of success being forwarded, but success was 
restricted in its meaning to what ensued in the “bulk” activity and the resulting 
multimunicipal systems, the focus of all the strategy being implemented and therefore 
channelizing the lion share of the investment. Indeed, such focus is reinforced in 
PEAASAR I, the government’s strategy for the sector between 2000 and 2006, where 
multimunicipal logic was extended to the countryside.  
Whilst PEAASAR I purports to be a nationwide concerted effort for improving the 
sector, the focus of the entire strategy was bestowed upon the broadening of the model of 
multimunicipal systems to the entire mainland country
21
 in order to achieve, on a 
nationwide scale, the levels of 95% of the population being served with water supply and 
90% with wastewater drainage and treatment. To achieve such goals and promote their 
optimal construction and management, the number of systems would increase to thirty two, 
albeit some not comprising the integration of water supply with sewerage (ERSAR, 
2010a). By centring on “bulk” systems, promoting the aims of PEASAAR I was 
tantamount to stretching to less well-off countryside regions – although representing the 
majority of the territory – the envisaged sector corporatisation objectives and the inherent 
market logic, their success being highly praised regarding first generation multimunicipal 
experiences. This maintained the principles buttressing the 1993’s strategy intact (Pato, 
2011). Whilst adopting a system integration approach towards the sector was seen as being 
the most advantageous option (MAOT, 2000), the importance of such integration was 
stressed concerning “bulk” activities. Thereby, market logic was to operate fundamentally 
around these activities, with the management models prevailing in “retail” systems 
remaining almost unaddressed. Indeed, when PEAASAR I was enacted only three 
municipalities (out of around three hundred) had entered into service concession 
agreements with private companies. More than an integrated strategy, PEAASAR I was 
essentially a plan defining the priorities being given to the funds attributed to Portugal via 
the third Community Support Framework. In other words, it bolstered the government’s 
policy focused on widening the integration of “bulk” activities nationwide by favouring the 
                                        
21
 Due to their autonomy, the insular regions of Azores and Madeira were not subject to both PEASAAR I 
and II requirements, each region having its own strategy for water and sewerage service. 
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access to the necessary funding (rather by restricting that same access) to projects 
intending the development of multimunicipal systems, something clearly stipulated therein 
when addressing the financing wherewithal being made available. Therefore, PEAASAR I 
can be labelled as the framework where AdP should conduct its business activity, not only 
regarding indoor but also overseas expansion. In fact, with PEAASAR I a strategy of 
internationalising the water business was envisaged, as the perspectives championed 
therein purported to demonstrate 
“the excellence of the quality existing around the conception, planning, construction 
and management of water and sewerage systems, with these relevant factors enabling 
the country, more than solving with quality her own problems, to invest, in a broad 
sense, her own capabilities in foreign markets” (MAOT, 2000, p. 9, own translation). 
Being AdP the State’s hand for acting in the sector, when there is a reference to the 
country in the above quote, such must be forcefully regarding AdP. Indeed, such was the 
view of the government in the General Assembly following the enactment of PEAASAR I, 
culminating in its entry into other markets as a private operator. Such venture would 
however involve the exposure to a degree of risk far greater than that associated with its 
main activities (Pato, 2011). 
PEAASAR I’s role is in general extolled in the literature. As an example, PEAASAR 
II’s foreword refers to the remarkable progresses hitherto achieved as confirming the 
justness of the objectives being forwarded therein. However, they were underachieved, 
especially when some of the problems concerning the strategy itself started coming to the 
fore. Among these, the focus on “bulk” systems had disregarded their interaction with 
“retail” systems, which were unable to absorb, due to demographic, structural and 
economic reasons, the quantity of water supplied by “bulk” systems, with the former 
remaining highly fragmented into a few hundreds of local systems when compared to the 
latter’s seemingly high degree of integration into some dozens. This was potentiated by 
many municipalities lacking the financial means or political will to invest in their “retail” 
water and sewerage infrastructures. Also, the business plans serving as background for the 
service concession agreements of multimunicipal systems were elaborated under the 
premises of undervalued investment needs and overvalued water tariffs. It is within this 
setting that the need for a new strategy arises, as pursuing the former was seen as unable to 
solve the lingering problems, leading to the enactment of the second PEAASAR and 
concomitantly to the emerging of a new discursive framework. 
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4.2 The circular regime of “sustainability” 
One of the purposes behind the design of the 1993 strategy was to bring temporal 
stability to the sector, which implied shifting into what was promoted as a true water 
industry, something bolstered by the benefits corporatisation and integration were believed 
to entail. The reshuffle that ensued resulted however in the sector being divided into two 
distinct areas of intervention (“bulk” and “retail”), each following a different approach 
regarding the principles that were championed. To this contributed greatly the introduction 
of two new parties – the State and privates – into what had been hitherto an exclusive 
municipal domain. Even if enabling significant progresses regarding public health 
indicators, especially in the field of drinking water quality, both the 1993 strategy and its 
successor, PEAASAR I, focused on enhancing national coverage levels and quality of the 
product known as water (ERSAR, 2010a). However, the lack of articulation between the 
State’s intervention and that of local governments’ favoured a duality of action ensuing 
within public water policies, mainly due to the sector being organised in two distinct areas, 
“bulk” and “retail” activities. The notion of system integration which prevailed during the 
period comprising both strategies plays here a considerable role. Indeed, the mentioned 
duality of policies prompted a focus on the horizontal assimilation of systems, especially 
multimunicipal, i.e., it concerned their territorial integration, preventing them from 
merging or coping with municipal ones, and vice-versa. Together with this, integration was 
stressed mainly around the organisation of multimunicipal systems, with no specific model 
being prescribed neither in 1993 nor in PEAASAR I concerning municipal networks, 
allowing for operators to choose from a wide range of options legally available and where 
system integration was not at all encouraged. Regarding the latter, it focused almost 
entirely on structuring the investment and respective financing requirements for widening 
the “bulk” network. Thus, the significance given to integration bears directly on the 
sector’s design implemented in 1993, which privileges not only a separation of activities 
according to who manages them – the State or local governments – but also and especially 
the establishment of different priorities regarding the problems needing to be tackled, as if 
“bulk” sector problems were not related to the ones arising within “retail” activities. This is 
tantamount to affirming that solving the difficulties weighing over the water “bulk” sector 
is more pressing that addressing to those affecting “retail” systems. This is reflected in the 
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financing mechanisms in place, as later discussed. Such duality of policies constraints the 
strategy being employed, as it prevents an understanding between parties by allowing, 
rather promoting, different paths to be followed, resulting in the water sector being 
composed of two almost independent sides forced into “coexistence” with each other in a 
tense, non-integrated, relationship between the State and municipalities, especially over the 
conception of the sector as a market.  
Indeed, the constitution of Aquapor by AdP reflects not only this tension but also the 
fact that, by dividing the sector according to management competences, two distinct 
markets and two clashing perspectives are able to operate independently within a space 
purporting to be a single water market. This opposition between parties is potentiated by 
the mistrust among municipalities over the corporate model and the fear of the subsequent 
privatisation of AdP to where much of the rights around “bulk” infrastructure construction 
and management had been transferred through many municipalities signing up to 
multimunicipal systems. For there was an opening prescribed by law and still in force that 
allows public-public partnerships into becoming public-private partnerships. And there was 
in fact one attempt in 2002 of restructuring the sector around nine great operators and 
combining “bulk” systems with the associated “retail” networks. In order to achieve such 
objectives, the State, through AdP, would undertake the necessary investment. And once 
that process was completed, the full privatisation of the nine operators would ensue and 
AdP would be extinct (Pato, 2011). Thus, allowing private corporations into the sector is 
tantamount to introducing a third party into the sector’s framework, inaugurating a new 
kind of relationship, one between public and private sectors, which in turn widens the 
scope of tensions between the State and municipalities (Pato, 2011). All this is claimed to 
have prevented the sector from advancing into a so-called desired “excellence phase”, one 
where, more than broadening service coverage levels, greater service quality survey and 
higher efficiency and effectiveness standards are required in order to assure sustainability 
(ERSAR, 2010a). This goes in line with what is expressed in the newly elected 
government’s programme, in 2005, i.e., with the need to “qualify [Portugal’s] 
environmental infrastructures and their respective management in order to achieve the 
service levels typical of developed countries” (own translation).  
After a “profound diagnosis of the sector’s situation and [re]definition of the 
strategic framework” (MAOTDR, 2007, foreword, own translation), and because there was 
the need to adjust its implementation to the following Community Support Framework, the 
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enactment of PEAASAR II ensued. Whilst the title may suggest the continuity of the 
former plan, this new approach drove the same principles that had buttressed its 
predecessors, namely corporatisation and integration, into a new framework, one where 
strategic issues were comprised into and dominated by a single concept: sustainability. 
Alluding to the sector’s sustainability was not something new, as already in PEAASAR I 
this was mentioned. What was new here was the stress being endowed to this idea and the 
structuring role it was bound to assume. The problems were no longer related to merely 
providing access to proper water and sewerage systems, but bore on the sector needing to 
be sustainable. PEAASAR II purported to be the answer warranting that intended 
sustainability. What forms or shapes the concept of sustainability may seem to be the 
pivotal question around which all the strategy is to be structured, but within PEAASAR 
II’s writing the emphasis is set rather on how sustainability is to be conceived regarding 
the sector’s complexity. Whilst it may not seem so, focusing on how sustainability is 
formed enables a completely different set of forces to emerge and act among the definition 
of its meaning. Studying how sustainability is formed necessarily departs from the sector 
being reified as unsustainable, which is exactly what gives PEAASAR II its starting point 
for defining how should such problem be tackled. Eventually, it is by knowing how 
sustainability is construed that the question “what is (un)sustainability” can be provided 
with a befitting answer. 
The strategy envisaged within PEAASAR II is sustained upon three major 
objectives, each subdivided into three others: Universality, continuity and quality of the 
service being provided, sector sustainability and protection of environmental values. The 
first of these purposes was in a way a direct heritage from the previous PEAASAR, where 
the intended levels of service coverage being there prescribed were not achieved, i.e., 
serving 95% of the population with public water supply systems and 90% with sewerage. 
Representing the intention of reaching the widest possible level of people in a regular way, 
they therefore remained in general unchanged, as part of the objective of rendering a 
constant quality service to every citizen. Nevertheless, there was now a thrust for 
articulating them with the other two strategic objectives, which called for a reorganisation 
of the sector. As already mentioned, one of the reasons leading to the enactment of 
PEAASAR II was the widespread belief that merely pursuing the above service levels 
without any ensuing restructure of the sector’s framework could not solve the actual 
problems; in turn, these are what endow sustainability with the leading role over the entire 
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strategy, withdrawing from the other two strategic objectives whatever equal importance 
they could purport to have with this concept; they are now under its domain. This is so 
because reducing the full gamut of problems to sustainability concerns bears on the idea 
that all the issues emerging or lingering within the sector, whether of structural, 
operational, economical, financial or environmental nature, circle round the issue of water 
and sewerage tariffs and the impact this has among investment and financing policies. 
According to what was claimed, this was necessarily related to the assumption that all 
service costs must be entirely covered in order to “warrant the sustainability of the sector 
as an imperative obligation regarding future generations” (MAOTDR, 2007, p. 24, p. 78, 
own translation). Within such perspective, revenue associated to water supply and 
sewerage is considered to have a fundamental role in the coverage of those inherent costs 
and in the design of the financing policies, suggesting that sustainability must be warranted 
by that revenue, i.e., by tariffs (MAOTDR, 2007). The answer PEAASAR II purported to 
render thus extols such idea as its leitmotif, consisting in an unquestionable principle 
(MAOTDR, 2007) from where all action should depart. And indeed the very notion of fair 
water price that was there prescribed makes service cost recovery a premise of 
sustainability, implying that the necessary conditions for their full coverage have to be 
ensured.  
However, and according to the same PEAASAR II, there are two caveats to whatever 
solution(s) eventually being proposed: there is a) the need to make tariffs compatible with 
populations’ social and economical conditions; and b) the need to conclude the required 
investments so as to assure coverage levels with proper quality and in line with all 
obligations bearing on legislation and environmental respect. Whilst being referred to as 
caveats, rather than conditioning them, they potentiate the new solutions being proposed, 
as they purport to consolidate the sector’s sustainability. They are thus shaped into bolsters 
of what are seemingly the best options to take within the framework sustaining the 
sustainability perspective, which will help revealing its meaning. Solving the tariff 
question is then stated as essential for the sector’s sustainability to start emerging, but 
within an economical and financial focused perspective to where the other two objectives 
linked to environmental and social issues will converge, even if sometimes divergent. This 
is something that will become clearer later on in this dissertation. 
When addressing to the tariff policies being implemented, a distinction is made in 
PEAASAR II between the situation in the “bulk” systems and the state of the “retail” 
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sector. Due to the programmatic lines defined in PEAASAR I, the tariffs being established 
for the generality of multimunicipal systems warrant a policy of cost recovery, which 
allows this area to be characterised as sustainable, even if occurring several dysfunctions. 
Still, these are claimed to derive from the “very demanding financial premises stipulated in 
the contracts sustaining service concession agreements [and] not applying the same type of 
premises to all systems” (MAOTDR, 2007, p. 50, own translation). These problems, and 
others referred to ahead, are all characterised as exogenous to the sustainability of the tariff 
model applied to multimunicipal systems, as they do not emerge via the choices those 
acting within the “bulk” sector take (namely, AdP), but result from legal or contractual 
obligations they were forced into agreeing. However, some of the problems classified as 
exogenous are in fact inherent to the premises and forecasts sustaining investment plans, 
which affect the establishment of “bulk” tariffs. Nevertheless, they tend to be overlooked 
in PEAASAR II because the sustainability problem is seen as being rather related to the 
“retail” systems. 
And indeed the picture being described is completely different when portraying 
“retail” networks. Focusing on the tariff question reveals a daunting image of a sector 
where the viability of its sustainability is surrounded by question marks. Determining the 
price being charged to the end-user is described as particularly a delicate issue. When 
structuring the tariff, the operator must conciliate service costs with “the nature of the good 
water” (MAOTDR, 2007, p. 51), which implies that the economical capacity of the 
populations and the availability of the resource must be taken into consideration. This 
enabled many municipalities, and consequently the operators controlled by them, into 
adopting political tariffs wherein a vast share of the costs relating to investment, operation 
and maintenance of the systems were (and are) subsidised via local budgets, with end-users 
paying but a small fraction of those costs. According to PEAASAR II, the indicators being 
available suggest that the real cost of managing water systems is around € 1/m3, the same 
being valid for sewerage. However, the average tariff applied within the “retail” sector is 
of € 0.77/m3 concerning water supply and of € 0.29/m3 for sewerage. Half of the level 
needed for covering the effective cost, the tariffs being charged are described as hindering 
an economically sustainable management (MAOTDR, 2007), with the premises sustaining 
pricing models being significantly different among operators and frequently lacking a 
logical or measurable criterion, allowing for a gap between tariffs ranging from € 0.15/m3 
to € 1.56/m3 in water supply and € 0.00/m3 to € 1.83/m3 in the case of sewerage 
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(MAOTDR, 2007). This situation is particularly emphasised concerning sewerage, where 
63 local governments chose to provide the respective service without any associated 
charge, something the Law is said to promote by differing water tariffs as prices and 
sewerage tariffs as tributes, discharging the latter from the obligation of having a value 
capable of covering the associated cost. 
Strongly criticised, such situation allows only for operating costs to be (partially) 
covered via the generated income, with all other expenses related to investment or renewal 
left unaddressed. Shielded behind the principles backed by OECD and the European 
Union, which are said to champion service full-cost recovery and arouse consumers’ 
awareness to the “price/cost” of water, the criticism towards “retail” policies of 
establishing service tariffs widens. It ranges from the waste of a scarce good being 
stimulated, which hinders the awareness of water having a scarcity cost and also damages 
the environment, to being socially unfair as not only the disrespect for the principles of 
consumer-payer and polluter-payer is allowed but also tax payers in general are penalised, 
from whom a greater financial effort is demanded concerning something from which many 
of them, as tax payers, are not benefiting. This financial backlog is extended to future 
generation so as to ensure the rehabilitation of badly managed and maintained systems 
(MAOTDR, 2007). All this forms a vicious circle where tariffs do not enable for 
sustainability to ensue. In turn, it is damaging to the “bulk” sector’s stability due to the 
income resulting from “retail” tariffs being unable to warrant the necessary affordability in 
order to ensure the payment to multimunicipal operators of the services they provide to 
municipal systems. As an example, in more than 85% of multimunicipal sewerage systems 
the average of the tariffs being charged is claimed to be inferior to that applied in the 
provision of the respective “bulk” system (MAOTDR, 2007). 
Failing to address investment and renewal needs of “retail” systems, tariffs are seen 
as the hub from where all problems derive, whether structural, operational, economical or 
environmental, to which regulatory issues must be attached. Even if a regulator was set in 
1997, IRAR’s22 scope only comprehended those operators that had entered into service 
concession agreements, and thus subjecting only a minor fraction of them to regulation. 
But because within this group fell all multimunicipal operators, which were controlled by 
AdP, this had as a practical effect the subjection of the “bulk” sector to regulation, leaving 
                                        
22
 This is the abbreviation for Instituto Regulador de Águas e Resíduos, which literally can be translated into 
“Water and Residue Regulating Institute”. 
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“retail” activities unaddressed. Setting up the regulator’s powers was always a difficult 
matter. Indeed, whilst the establishment of multimunicipal systems ensued in 1993, only in 
1997 was the sector’s watchdog constituted, and through a reduction of the initially 
prescribed regulatory authority. But with the rise of sustainability, the regulator will play a 
decisive role within the strategic moves being performed in order to grant the sector the 
intended temporal stability, inclusively causing its name to be changed. 
Stressing the problematic of tariffs thus shifts the focus of the strategy hitherto 
followed to solving the problems arising within the “retail” sector. Like mentioned in 
PEAASAR II, the reasons presented above justify that, after putatively having solved the 
problems of “bulk” systems, the new strategy, by centring on tariff policies, must 
inevitably address all the issues emerging within “retail” activities, where a great many 
questions remain unsolved. These are referred to as mainly concerning the fixation of 
tariffs, the access to financing and the organisation of systems’ structures and management 
models, with financing difficulties arising from the low income provided by tariffs. But 
tariffs are also what prompt the projects intending to reorganise this part of the water 
sector, in turn allowing investment issues to be attuned to the new sustainability concept. 
This shapes the sustainability equation into a segment of issues sequentially linked. 
According to what is claimed in PEASAAR II 
“Solving the outstanding problems in the field of “retail” is an indispensable condition 
in order to allow consumers to effectively benefit from the investments completed and 
in progress in the “bulk” area, but also a necessary condition for the success and 
viability of those investments, given the present difficulty of a great number of 
municipalities in obtaining the necessary tariff revenue so as to satisfy their financial 
compromises with the plurimunicipal
23
 systems’ operators of which they are users. 
Also the environmental, public health and coverage objectives will not be achieved 
without the resolution of these problems.” (MAOTDR, 2007, p. 72, emphasis added, 
own translation) 
This statement is essential for understanding how the policies being proposed 
contribute towards building up the sustainability ideal. Addressing the first highlighted 
sentence will not only disclose the common thread guiding PEAASAR II’s strategy but 
also explain and reinforce the previous arguments over sustainability being essentially an 
economical and financial issue. Making the problematic of tariffs the origin of the sector’s 
                                        
23
 Plurimunicipal systems refer to a group comprising all those systems that aggregate more than one 
municipality, and generally operating within the “bulk” sector. Due to the panorama of the water sector, this 
expression is tantamount to, in practice, mention multimunicipal systems, that is to say, those that are 
controlled by AdP. 
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problems turns whatever other meaning given to sustainability dependent of such 
perspective. 
Even if setting the tone of speech around tariffs, PEAASAR II clearly sets as its main 
challenge the resolution of the assemblage of problems displayed within the “retail” sector 
(MAOTDR, 2007). The main issue concerns the lack of articulation between “bulk” and 
“retail” systems, with the latter suffering from a high fragmentation level incapable of 
absorbing the output of the “bulk” side, with many operators lacking the necessary scale. 
As already argued, investment was generally performed by municipalities so as to solve 
their own individual needs, which permitted infrastructures to grow in an uncoordinated 
effort between counties, thus preventing systems from being integrated. To this contributed 
the political option of giving primacy to solving “bulk” activities’ needs, without 
coordinating their investment with that intended to occur in the “retail” side. This left local 
governments with restricted access to financing, such problem deriving from and 
simultaneously sharpening the inadequacy of many of the tariffs being charged by “retail” 
operators. Due to the fact that investment in water and sewerage infrastructure has a late 
return rate and, in the Portuguese case, traditionally depends greatly on external financing, 
the required availability of proper funding was unfit for most municipalities, resulting in 
investment being unsystematic and uncoordinated, contrary to what followed in the “bulk” 
sector (MAOTDR, 2007). Thus, and despite the investment effort occurring within the 
“retail” sector, this was clearly insufficient so as to complement “bulk” systems and assure 
their effectiveness (MAOTDR, 2007).  
In order to take full advantage of the capacity set up in the “bulk” sector, and in line 
with the principle of full-cost recovery, it is prescribed that solving the downward 
problems of the “retail” systems necessarily entails articulating the latter both in an 
horizontal vein by integrating neighbouring networks and, most importantly, by subjecting 
them to a “verticalization” process comprising fusions with the upper “bulk” systems. 
These fusions were believed to allow sustainability into the water sector as they purported 
to ensure tariff and management optimisation, resulting in the recovery of service costs. 
Sustainability then asks for the sector to be restructured, but such reorganisation implies a 
great investment effort ensuing mainly in the “retail” sector.  
Regarding plurimunicipal systems, and in order to warrant the envisaged 
sustainability, such plan required that the ensuing reorganisation had to generate either 
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scale or range or process economies or contribute for a common environmental problem to 
be better resolved. Scale economies referred to the integration of neighbouring systems, 
whilst with range or process ones the integration of water with sewerage systems was 
proposed
24
. Merging them should obey the following criteria: a) generate at least one of the 
above mentioned economies; b) positively contribute to either the “bulk” tariff or to the 
economical and financial sustainability of the resulting system; c) not delay the investment 
in course; and d) be accepted by the municipalities concerned.  
Shifting to the “retail” sector, the tone is then set on integrating scattered 
infrastructure in order to ensure the optimal usage of the “bulk” capacity and consequently 
allow those systems that were established through PEAASAR I with viability. Whilst 
benefiting the “bulk” investment already completed or in progress, local governments are 
said to be an interested party in the benefits being achieved because “retail” operators are 
given the means to spill over end-users the operation costs of both areas; in other words, 
attune tariffs to the logic of the sustainability ideal (see MAOTDR, 2007). But due to the 
high fragmentation and deriving scale issues this field of the water sector suffered from 
and to the uncoordinated investment that had ensued, the effort of reorganising “retail” 
activities and adjust them to “bulk” ones is said to require vast amounts of funding and 
great financing needs, something many municipalities alone were believed, rather claimed, 
not to be able to ensure. But the responsibility of conducting the infrastructure process in 
the “retail” sector was a competence of municipalities alone and an area where the State 
could not intervene, hindering the projects for the intended reshuffle. And again the 
question of disparate tariffs plays here a substantial role, as the circumstances their 
structure bears on are claimed to be able to undermine the necessary efforts for 
restructuring the “retail” activity, and in turn the sector as a whole. Traditionally, the tariffs 
charged in Portugal by “bulk” operators to “retail” systems are low in densely populated, 
coastal areas, and high within the countryside, where income is lower and water scarcity 
costs are higher due to geographical and climate characteristics. Together with this, 
historically there has prevailed a lack of understanding between local governments in what 
concerns combined efforts, resulting in the establishment of different tariffs for each 
municipality. 
                                        
24
 Within the organisation of multimunicipal systems, there are some where water supply services are not 
combined with sewerage’s, which resulted in some municipalities choosing to retain within their 
management competences either “bulk” water or “bulk” sewerage activities.  
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Due to the reasons presented, all the parties concerned are called to engage in what is 
described as a necessary solidarity movement ensuing both at a national and regional level 
so as to make the system sustainable. National solidarity implies that the State and local 
governments agree to the constitution of a new kind of partnerships so as to allow the 
former’s intervention in the “retail” sector. Regional solidarity refers to the agreements 
municipalities must achieve regarding their systems’ integration in order for scale 
economies to ensue, and consequently allowing for tariffs to be uniformed within each 
systems’ intervention area. This is tantamount to asking some municipalities to accept a 
rise in the tariffs they charge to consumers so as to benefit less well-off ones subject to 
higher “bulk” tariffs with a reduction in their bills. This, it is claimed, conjugates the 
principle of covering the service costs with the economic capability of population, assuring 
the universal access to the service. But it may also represent a political difficulty local 
governments may not feel ready or willing to tackle.  
Considering solidarity a national imperative due to the objective of achieving 
territorial cohesion, such move is said to establish an equalitarian treatment between all 
citizens and all regions (MAOTDR, 2007). But the problem is set more on local 
governments’ side than the State’s, as the focus is shed upon the areas remaining under 
exclusive municipal domain, the “retail” sector. The several allusions to the voluntary 
participation of municipalities within PEAASAR II’s text denote such tendency. Being 
isolated from each other, municipalities are described as lacking the necessary means to 
move towards sustainability unless they choose the integration path. The strategy can only 
be successful if they are willing to participate (see MAOTDR, 2007). This lack of 
capability opens the way for the proposed reorganisation, where “retail” problems are to be 
solved through the enactment of new kinds of partnership between the State and 
municipalities, thus requiring the extant management models to be widened. They 
comprise two models, the first aiming for the integration of the scattered municipal 
systems and the second on articulating “retail” systems within “bulk” systems. In either of 
them, the State assumes the conduction of the investment and system management through 
AdP, assuring the required financing. This is very much similar to the logic operating 
around multimunicipal systems, allowing for the corporatisation of “retail” operators and 
the professionalization of their management to ensue, something considered as essential for 
investment to be executed and therefore assuring the sector’s sustainability (MAOTDR, 
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2007). On the other hand, AdP again assumes the leading role in conducting the envisaged 
strategy and allowing its objectives to be accomplished. 
There is however the constitutional prerogative of endowing municipalities with 
exclusive competence over “retail” issues, something that, together with the importance 
given to “bulk” infrastructural concerns, had previously motivated the separation of the 
sector into two distinct management areas. Due to pressing reasons of defending public 
interest and consumers, it is stressed that such matters cannot be “irreversibly integrated 
within the untouchable field of municipal autonomy” (MAOTDR, 2007, p. 166, own 
translation). There is also a constitutional imperative of the State to assure the safeguard of 
certain national interests, which can interfere with, but cannot be hindered by, exclusive 
competences of local governments (Canotilho, 2013). This is tantamount to affirm that the 
State, provided certain conditions are kept, should be allowed the conduction of 
management activities due to national imperatives, in turn justifying the solidarity move 
alluded to in PEAASAR II. Solidarity, here national solidarity, necessarily requires that 
municipalities accept the assistance the State can provide them with, even if that means 
relinquishing some of their power over “retail” activities, similar to what happened with 
multimunicipal systems. And through solidarity the proposed model is said to be 
compatible with the principle of municipal autonomy. 
In order to warrant the success of the strategy, it is prescribed in PEAASAR II that 
the access to financing is to be conditioned through the establishment of eligibility criteria, 
forcing operators to demonstrate the contribution the proposed investments have 
concerning the fulfilment of the strategic objectives set in PEAASAR II. Among these, 
priority is to be given to those intending to maximise the viability of already completed 
investments by completing the connections between “bulk” and “retail” systems, as well as 
those implementing adequate integration levels of technical solutions which allow for the 
generation of scale economies to ensue. This has the practical effect of limiting the kind of 
management models at the operator’s disposal due to the huge investment needs forecasted 
in PEAASAR II. And with the majority of financing being provided by European funding 
through the fourth Community Support Framework, management alternatives are in 
practice reduced when widening the range of possible options. 
One of the purposes of PEAASAR II is also to increase private participation within 
the sector as a way of boosting national and local business activity. In fact, increasing the 
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contribution private entities can bring to the sector is said to constitute a positive factor in 
solving the challenges posed therein, not only due to their technical capability but also 
concerning their [business orientated] management skills. It is believed that “the efficiency 
private management seeks to achieve regarding their own interest can contribute to the 
global effectiveness of systems, providing there is an adequate regulatory framework” 
(MAOTDR, 2007, p. 73, own translation). However, municipal systems continued being 
directly managed by municipalities, with only a few cases of service concession 
agreements being signed up between private companies and local governments. Among 
several reasons being suggested, resistance to change by municipalities, low levels of 
population in many counties, high business risk due to huge investment needs and low 
tariffs are said to have hindered private interest or ability to enter the sector. Regarding 
tariffs, maintaining them low is believed to send both investors and consumers a wrong 
sign, thus penalising investment (ERSAR, 2010a). Reorganising the sector under the 
common thread of integration not only tries to attract private enterprises to the sector but is 
also a condition for implementing a “modern and professional management outside public 
entities and therefore more disseminated in society [and] warranting technological progress 
and the introduction of better practices through competitiveness and competition” 
(MAOTDR, 2007, p. 154, own translation). And changing management models helps to 
ensure such intention, in turn allowing investment rhythm to be accelerated through the 
contributions private participation is believed to bring into the sector, as new service 
concession agreements are intended to comprise only the management of operations, and 
not of investment plans, thereby reducing the associated financing needs (MAOTDR, 
2007). With private participation, the objective of corporatising the sector can be better 
achieved through breaking apart with traditional public management models which are 
believed to hinder sustainability. Indeed, increasing private investment is a prerequisite for 
the sector, as a market, to be sustainable. 
Increasing the number of operators following a business orientated management 
requires higher levels of survey in order to protect end-users interests within what is 
considered and desired to be a true water industry. Therefore, the increase of the number of 
management options and actors within the sector prompts a reorganisation of the 
regulatory model itself. As stated in PEAASAR II (MAOTDR, 2007), the new supervisory 
framework should be accompanied by a reinforcement of the regulator’s powers regarding 
economic regulation and quality levels of the service, which implies extending its scope to 
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all operators, not just those operating under service concession agreements. This is claimed 
to better protect consumers’ interests because their rights are warranted independently of 
who provides them with water or sewerage services. Such protection is assured by 
optimising the relationship between prices being charged and services quality levels, i.e., 
by subjecting tariffs to the scrutiny of the regulator, especially “retail” tariffs, as they 
remain out of its reach and thereby suffer a number of fragilities not arising within “bulk” 
tariffs; this is due to the latter already being subject to regulation (ERSAR, 2010a). 
“Retail” tariffs, like their “bulk” siblings, should reflect the principles of service cost 
recovery and universality of access by taking in consideration the economical capability of 
populations. But they must also allow for the economical viability of operators and the 
safeguard of their legitimate interests by ensuring a suitable return on the investment 
performed; as this is necessary for maintaining the continuity of the service within the 
specified quality levels. And due to the articulation efforts being proposed, the focus of the 
regulator should then be widened in order to supervise all tariff policies, being this the hub 
around which both consumers and operators’ interests circle.  
With the regulator’s focus on how tariffs are constituted, the sustainability question 
is brought back to its starting point, confirming the importance of the tariff question in 
structuring all the ensuing reorganisation the sector is required to undergo to be 
sustainable. Being subject to an effective separation between “bulk” and “retail” activities 
due to management competences, up until the enactment of PEAASAR II the sector 
experienced an uncoordinated development, prompting the emergence of two seemingly 
distinct markets which eventually went on drifting from each other, something former 
strategies favoured. This is reflected by the disparity of tariffs being charged, which are a 
direct result of the priorities given to the required investment and consequent financing. 
Within such setting, the notion of sustainability emerges and is enabled to gain its 
momentum through the sector, especially the “retail” activity, being characterised as 
unsustainable; it is the beginning of a new discursive stance. But being focused on tariffs, 
sustainability qua Sustainability is to become, rather must be, an economical and financial 
issue from which all others derive. This is confirmed by the loop the question “why or how 
is the sector unsustainable?” performs, ending exactly where it started. This explains why 
the importance is set on how sustainability is to be achieved and not on what sustainability 
is.  
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In order to warrant the sector’s temporal stability, sustainability is made into the link 
capable of bringing the sector together by promoting the integration of systems, something 
necessary to its “survival”. And it does so by unleashing a chain reaction connecting tariffs 
to integration needs, which call for new and significant investment and consequent access 
to proper financing. In order to ensure the success of such investment, management models 
should change to a more market-orientated logic, something the seemingly “sanity” 
presiding over “bulk” systems shows when compared to the “awkward” “retail” activity. 
Allowing for greater private participation is thus a sine qua non condition for the strategy’s 
success, as coupling their interests and skills to public welfare is believed to enhance the 
intended strategic objectives, especially the sector’s corporatisation, something old public 
management practices are seen as unable of. To ensure a proper balance between (new) 
operators and consumers, the reinforcement of the regulator’s powers regarding tariffs is 
required, as these are what sustain the connection between all the parties concerned and in 
turn are the means to accomplish sustainability. This closes the sequential circle around 
one essential issue: tariff sustainability. This brings with it an inversion of roles, with the 
complementary purpose motivating the constitution of multimunicipal systems being 
disregarded, as it is now asked from “retail” systems to adjust to the demands of “bulk” 
activities in the name of sustainability. 
Within this “sustainable” sequence, the idea of solidarity emerges because the 
agreement between parties is essential for sustaining the claims around sustainability. This 
makes the two ideas interdependent, as solidarity helps to bring environmental and social 
sustainability under the hat of the problematic of tariffs, thus confirming its primordial 
economical and financial nature. More importantly, it is by the sector being portrayed as 
unsustainable that sustainability is endowed its power, its regimental power of conditioning 
choices around its discursive regime; for it rendered the sector into being known as 
unsustainable. But such ruling ensues only if capable of beckoning actors to its regime and 
subjecting them to its exertion, something dependent on the power of belief and 
interpretation of what is told and listened to by subjects. 
 
4.3 “In the name of sustainability.... I am meant to be unsustainable” 
The enactment of PEAASAR II in 2007 represented at first a cleansing opportunity 
for AdP, something considered to be necessary so as to ensure the pursuit of the strategy 
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that was laid out. In its 2007 annual report, and in line with government guidelines for 
refocusing the group back on its core business, i.e., managing multimunicipal systems, it is 
stated that a process of divestment on what were termed “financially uninteresting 
operations, with no relationship to the core business” (AdP annual report 2008, p. 6) was 
taking place, with the conclusion occurring in 2008. Having as its primary goal the sale of 
some of the operations composing the International Business Unit and Aquapor, AdP’s 
subgroup dedicated to the management of domestic “retail” systems, this process was seen 
as compulsory in order to prepare AdP for the coming sector’s reshuffle, one where it 
would be called to take the leading role. But this also permitted a change in the group’s 
policies to start emerging through the critics addressed to both units, especially the one 
dealing with foreign operations. 
Regarding this latter, the decision to carry out with AdP’s overseas expansion was 
considered to be exclusively politic, with the group being presented as an instrument of the 
Portuguese government’s foreign policy. This is clearly perceived through the countries 
that were selected for investment purposes, mainly Portuguese speaking countries with 
which there is a historical relationship of cooperation. Whilst claiming in its several annual 
reports from 2007 onward that these businesses are managed in an “economically 
sustainable manner, [acting] as a showcase of the group’s capabilities and skills at an 
international level
25”, they also disclose AdP’s political side, with the group  
“playing an important role in the field of international cooperation, given that some of 
the actions it promotes or is engaged in on an ongoing basis are geared towards 
cooperate and social responsibility, rather than being of an exclusively commercial 
nature. However, the principle (sic) driver of the unit’s operations is economic 
sustainability
26”. 
Being somewhat contradictory, the above quote, so often employed by AdP in its 
annual reports, allows for the importance of economic sustainability to be perceived within 
its actions. Nevertheless, expanding its operations overseas is frequently described as 
exclusively a political option, one involving areas with a degree of risk far greater than that 
associated to the activities composing its core business (Pato, 2011), demanding great 
                                        
25
 This quotation is recurrent in the annual reports issued from 2007 to 2012. Due to this reason, there is not 
here any reference to a specific report and the respective page(s) where the expression is located. Similar 
quotations in this thesis follow the same rationale and are always accompanied by an indication of their 
frequent usage in the several annual reports.    
26
 In the Portuguese version, “rather than being” is instead written as “in detriment of”, which shows a 
stronger overlap of the economic perspective by cooperation.  
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investment levels but yielding severe losses to the public holding. In an audit conducted by 
Tribunal de Contas, Portugal’s Ombudsman, the bad performance shown by the negative 
outcome of this unit was considered to be most damaging to the whole group, with losses 
of € 61.4 million between 2005 and 2006. This resulted mainly from a systematic financing 
effort and cumulative and extremely negative earnings, especially in the Brazilian 
operations and the investment performed in Cape Verde; these were the ones elected for 
divestment. In the Chairman’s Message in the 2008 annual report, and in consonance with 
what was highlighted by the Ombudsman, they were considered to be “chronically loss-
making operations that had been weighing heavily on the group’s balance sheet for several 
years, [...] for which there was no viable solution other than to dispose of them and absorb 
the corresponding losses” (AdP, 2008 annual report, p. 6). The first part of the sentence is 
even highlighted within the remaining document, as if stressing the importance such move 
represented for reinforcing AdP’s identity of a “strong and highly competent Portuguese 
Industrial Group (...) in the environment sector,” something stressed in its annual reports.   
The sale of Aquapor was seemingly motivated by the same presuppositions. 
According to the Ombudsman’s audit, this operational unit revealed a weak growth and a 
significant deterioration of operational and net earnings, with a decrease in equity of 54% 
in 2006 resulting from the registered loss of € 380 thousand and a negative variation of € 
2.6 million in retained earnings. But this sale was also performed for a less obvious reason, 
yet one in line with the common thread guiding the sustainability strategy now in place. By 
selling this business unit to private buyers, the number of players within the water sector 
would then increase, and in the way of the intended corporatisation and the accompanying 
management efficiency. Together with this, AdP would relinquish its operative role in the 
“retail” sector in order to assume itself as a structural entity, something envisaged in 
PEAASAR II. 
The reflexes in AdP’s earnings of these sales would ensue in 2008. There are some 
interesting, yet contradictory remarks in the corresponding annual report about the capital 
gains being achieved and their respective nature. 2008 is described as being the best year 
ever for the company, with net earnings totalling € 63 million, compared to the € 7.9 
million in 2007, when the group went back to positive earnings, and the loss of € 33 
million in 2006. This outcome was only possible because of the cleansing AdP was said to 
have carried out within its business portfolio, with the resulting disposal yielding the total 
of € 43 million in capital gain, which clearly inflated net earnings. Nevertheless, and 
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according to what was stated in the Chairman’s message, “the fact that a substantial part of 
these earnings were of an extraordinary, non-recurring nature, (...) does not detract from 
the business success that the figures reflect” (AdP, 2008 annual report, p. 6, emphasis 
added). The justification given to how were these capital gains achieved is however rather 
curious. Whilst stating that the disposed operations were chronically weighing on the 
group’s balance sheet for several years, achieving such non-recurring earnings was “only 
possible because in due time did the previous management launch the group in projects 
outside its core business
27” (AdP, 2008 annual report, p. 6). The decisions of investing in 
the generally criticised “chronically loss-making operations” (AdP, 2008 annual report, p. 
6) are then praised as enabling the group with a very profiting result, something apparently 
nonsensical. But it helps to disclose the focus given to the achievement of positive earnings 
in a determined period in detriment of the negative effects such investments had 
throughout previous periods, as if past options were being excused due to the benefits they 
yielded to 2008’s earnings. For what matters is to present positive earnings, something the 
Chairman’s message in the 2009 annual report clearly shows to be one of AdP’s concerns. 
When referring to the 2009 earnings, it is stated that 
“contrarily to what we often hear stated, companies, whether public or private, need to 
generate profits, especially when they rely heavily on bank financing, otherwise they 
will never achieve growth. If we were to operate at a loss in terms of operations and 
net profit, that is, if we were unable to show that our operations are paid for by the 
revenue they generate, we would not be able to advance with the important investment 
projects that are currently underway. The €752 million contract which we signed with 
the European Investment Bank, at the beginning of November for financing 
investment projects would not have been possible if we did not produce a profit or 
demonstrate that we can do so on a sustainable basis. Maintaining jobs also depends 
on this.” (AdP, 2009 annual report, p. 7, emphasis added) 
There is here an attempt to heighten the importance of the earnings AdP displays 
within the several periods, as they are considered to be a mark of its sustainability. This is 
strengthened with the rhetoric endowed by AdP around two indicators: EBITDA and net 
earnings, especially the latter. For AdP, stressing positive earnings is important in face of 
the challenges lying ahead, for they enable the company with the necessary means. This is 
                                        
27 This is my own translation, for the English version is somewhat different from the Portuguese. In the 
former, it is stated that such non-recurring earnings “would not have been possible if, at a certain period, the 
previous management had not involved the group in projects outside its core business” (AdP, 2009 annual 
report, p.7), which fails to capture the praiseworthy sense that the expression “in due time” being mentioned 
in the Portuguese version instead of “at a certain period” renders to the previous managements decisions over 
investing in these assets. 
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something that can be observed in the previous quote regarding the relationship earnings 
are said to have with investment and warranting proper financing, especially when 
investment is very much dependent on foreign funding. And with the strategic divestments 
ensuing in 2008, AdP is considered to be better prepared for assuring that the objectives 
prescribed in the several strategic plans where it plays a leading role are fulfilled; in 
particular those concerning PEAASAR II, where the focus is set, among other issues, on 
the articulation between “bulk” and “retail” systems, which calls for huge investments. 
Thus, divesting in high resource consumption projects is essential for ensuring such 
purposes, i.e., achieving good, sustainable results in order to assure that the required 
investment is carried out.  
Hitherto the importance earnings play in constituting the identity of AdP as a solid, 
sustainable group reveals in what way does AdP feel accountable towards them. For AdP, 
good results are what warrants its sustainability, are that for what the group is being held 
accountable for, for what is being called to account, as they ensure that the strategic 
objectives the company is committed to are fulfilled. Being sustainable is tantamount to 
showing itself as profitable. However, referring to the importance of earnings brings forth 
what has been referred to as the primordial question buttressing sustainability, this 
according to what is championed in PEAASAR II: the role of tariffs and the related deficit 
they originate. This is so due to the link both earnings and tariffs show to have with 
investment. And as discussed below, tariffs help to compose the good picture portrayed by 
positive earnings. However, they will work as a broadsword regarding the claims around 
AdP’s (un)sustainability. 
Tariff problems, whilst affecting most of the group’s controlled multimunicipal 
operators, are particularly serious regarding second generation systems covering mainly 
regions with lesser population density and lower income, where geographical constraints 
force higher investment levels, in turn making “bulk” tariffs significantly more expensive 
than those practiced in densely populated, coastal areas. Also water scarcity tends to be 
higher in some of these regions, affecting even more tariff calculation.  
Whilst the problems regarding tariffs were hitherto described as essentially deriving 
from the problems disclosed by “retail” systems, some of these problems result however 
from the design of second generation multimunicipal systems and the premises and 
forecasts they were sustained on. First, the technical solutions adopted for first generation 
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systems were completely replicated when structuring their second generation siblings. This 
failed to take into consideration some of the above mentioned constraints, which implied 
that the service cost of providing “bulk” services would be much higher than that applied 
to coastal areas. According to a European Investment Bank (EIB) representative for water 
issues, replicating such structures intended to provide these systems with scale economies 
“not always justifiable” (CAOTPL, 2011). There were also cases where the original 
contractual premises sustaining the enacted service concession agreements were 
overoptimistic, particularly regarding demand levels, resulting in oversized systems in 
comparison to effective “retail” needs. Coupling the establishment of minimum 
consumption levels frequently unattained by municipal clients (and often not being paid 
for) to the above mentioned issues results in the execution of the projected/agreed 
investment suffering from delays, thereby conditioning the concession’s success (Pato, 
2011). Nevertheless, this does not relieve the “retail” sector from being considered the 
main culprit of the differential existing among tariffs being charged to consumers, 
especially due to the inadequacy of their pricing models, like the reasons previously 
referred to suggest. And because the problems of “retail” systems and their tariff models 
are greater in those regions where second generation multimunicipal systems were 
implemented, the problems affecting AdP’s sustainability are believed to derive directly 
from these systems being (regarded as) unsustainable by not being able to generate enough 
revenue in order to pay for their obligations, among these the “bulk” tariff. 
However, one of the main characteristics of service concession agreements relating 
to multimunicipal services bears on the invested capital having a guaranteed return. In 
these contracts, and in accordance with the regulatory system in force and the terms of the 
concession agreements, so AdP claims, differences may arise between the amount of 
revenue required in order to assure full-cost recovery by operators as well as an adequate 
return to shareholders and the amount of revenue generated annually. These differences, or 
discrepancies, are classified as tariff differences, and are shortfalls when the revenue 
generated is less than required and surpluses when otherwise. Whilst the latter imposes on 
AdP a regulatory liability, the former gives the right to recognise those shortfalls, 
otherwise known as tariff deficits, as a regulatory asset. In the case of most of the systems 
managed by AdP, particularly those in rural, less densely populated areas, the resulting 
values bear on the tariffs charged being under those necessary to balance the economic 
models sustaining concession contracts and therefore allowing costs and other charges to 
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be fully recovered, causing accounts to continuously disclose a growing tariff deficit. This, 
as it is suggested throughout the several annual reports and other public communications 
performed by AdP, is considered to be the biggest threat to the company’s sustainability. In 
order to reinforce the claims being made, these deficits are frequently named in the annual 
reports as “cost recovery shortfalls”, which depicts the close link between these values and 
the respective costs and the fact that the latter are not being recovered. However, how AdP 
sees such problem reveals an intention of rubbing itself out from what responsibility the 
company could be endowed with, being its conviction that whilst menacing its 
sustainability, they are not at all its problem; it cannot be blamed for that, held accountable 
for them, for tariffs are not defined by AdP, but by the State after (a non-binding) 
recommendation issued by the regulator. This is clear in the 2008 annual report, where it is 
stated that 
“the recognition of the tariff deficits accumulated by some of the multi-municipal (sic) 
system concessionary companies is no more than the recognition of the right of 
shareholders to the remuneration of the equity capital they have invested, as stipulated 
in the concession contracts agreed with the state concession granting authority. For 
this right to be explicitly recognised, the government will approve legislation that 
clarifies that the amounts owed will be recovered by means of tariffs charged in future 
years. To a certain degree, this issue is linked to the economic and financial recovery 
of some concessions, given that it is today possible to see that, unless significant 
increases are made in the balancing tariffs envisaged in these contracts, which were 
determined on assumptions (regarding populations, investments and consumption) 
which were not fulfilled, it will not be possible to recover these deficits without 
creating serious social tensions and that if they continue to accumulate they will put 
the sustainability of these projects at risk” (AdP, 2008 annual report, p. 127, emphasis 
added). 
Regarding the assumptions being mentioned, in the Chairman’s message in the 2007 
annual report there is a declaration sustaining that the development some systems had in 
their revenues and the deriving deficit was perhaps unpredictable, with the consequences 
arising only belatedly in that year. But seeing it from another angle, such statement 
discloses the apparent weakness of what are classified as overoptimistic assumptions, in 
the calculation of which AdP did perform its role. Nevertheless, there are continuous 
appeals for the State to accept being liable for something considered to be its obligation, 
such calls being constant throughout all the annual reports from 2007 onward.  
However, another side of the problem bears on an unclear definition on concession 
agreement about the risks and responsibilities belonging to AdP and those belonging to the 
State, leading to the parties concerned engaging in conflicts and reinstatement requests 
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(Pato, 2011). The Ombudsman audit clearly addresses to such issue, when stressing that 
part of the values recognised as tariff deficits may result from management inefficiencies 
and business risks belonging to AdP, and thereby should not be recognised as assets. And 
neither the values disclosed by AdP nor the concession contracts were hitherto subjected to 
(re)negotiation with the State, with the latter not recognising itself as being fully liable for 
them. According to the Ombudsman, the group is then recognising something without fully 
warranting that such value is to be received, in turn “presenting more balanced and 
appealing accounts, but not mirroring with exactitude the reality of facts” (Tribunal de 
Contas, 2008, p. 12). In fact, when answering back to the Ombudsman conclusion, the 
government highlighted that  
“it is important to clarify that the amount of tariff deficits should not be understood in 
an excessively linear way as a debt of the State to concessionaries. In effect, 
reinstating the balance of a concession agreement should be considered, and 
understood, when one of the parties (...) has the obligation of compensating the other 
(...) due to an ensuing risk which, according to the concession agreement, remained in 
the sphere of financial responsibility of the State” (Tribunal de Contas, 2008, p. 82, 
own translation, emphasis added). 
This statement contradicts the expectations being forwarded by AdP on the 2008 
annual report, when stating that the “government will approve legislation that clarifies that 
the amounts owed will be recovered by means of tariffs charged in future years” (AdP, 
2008 annual report, p. 127). And up until 2012, the amounts being recognised in AdP’s 
accounts relating to tariff deficits were not validated by the State, thereby not being 
reinstated. But this also allows for the importance tariff deficits have upon the constitution 
of net earnings to be revealed, something AdP considers to be a mark of its sustainability.  
Recognising tariff deficits is essential for securing the necessary financing, 
disclosing the relationship that exists between these two issues and the implications that 
are posed upon investment projects. In fact, whilst being of utmost importance for AdP’s 
sustainability to find a solution to this problem, it is accepted, even by the Ombudsman, 
that regulatory assets bearing on these deficits have buttressed the access to proper 
financing by AdP, necessary to undertake all the investment necessary to achieve 
PEAASAR II’s objectives, and therefore the sector’s sustainability. And investment 
forcefully occurs in areas where there are already serious unsustainability problems, like 
second generation “bulk” systems or, in a greater degree, “retail” activities with defective 
pricing models where costs are not being recovered, especially regarding sewerage where 
in many cases services are not charged by local governments and “bulk” prices are higher 
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than those referring to water supply. This eventually increases the amount of the deficit if 
nothing is done, but makes even more difficult to conciliate a proper solution to the 
interests at issue. Investment made in order to assure sustainability purposes can in fact 
reinforce the company’s lack of sustainability, and in turn that of the sector. This makes 
the tariff question even more pressing. And choosing not to undertake these investments is 
not an option for AdP. In fact, there are in the annual reports regular references and 
disclosure of its high degree of commitment towards maintaining a good investment 
rhythm, with even the entire completed or in-progress infrastructure being thoroughly 
detailed. For AdP and other parties such as the government, investment is clearly seen as 
one of its raison d’être, among a strong belief that this is the way towards sustainability. 
One example of this is the exemption granted to AdP in 2010 by the government regarding 
the general imposition of limits to public investment being undertaken. 
The relationship between the “trichotomy” tariffs – earnings – investment and 
sustainability can be demonstrated by an announcement made by AdP in 2011 against the 
comments made by the Portuguese Environment Sector Enterprises Association (AEPSA) 
regarding the alarming problems affecting the former, ranging from service breakdown to 
financial collapse, which would forcefully conduct to a general and substantial tariff 
increase. This followed a series of news social media were publishing about the need to 
raise tariffs, with the regulator issuing a press release in the following year saying that 
tariff harmonisation does not necessarily mean a general rise due to the growing efficiency 
they must be sustained by.  
On the reply to AEPSA’s comments, AdP portraits itself as a success case recognised 
worldwide by international financial entities such as the EIB or the World Bank. And this 
is especially due to the enormous investments hitherto performed being backed by a solid 
debt structure, allowing the costs of operating assets with long useful lives to be recovered 
through tariffs during the concession length. This is referred to by AdP as the desirable and 
widespread practice around enterprise of this nature, whether public or private.  
It continues by referring to the continuous flow of positive net earnings, reaching in 
2010 the amount of € 79.5 million, “the best ever and surely the best among all the sector’s 
operators, whether public or private” (AdP, 2011, p. 2), thereby confirming the group’s 
robustness. And when touching the sustainability issue, such is reduced to being a 
momentary problem of some of the group’s system operators, not affecting the general 
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stability AdP is claiming itself to enjoy. In fact, the value relating to tariff deficit (of € 
175.5 million in 2010) is highlighted as a proof of that stability, disclosing the conviction 
that these amounts are to be received, as they represent a contractual right. Thus, because 
tariffs sustain the investment through warranting proper financing, the group is able to 
continue its successful operation, generating positive earnings from exploring healthy 
assets generating high turnovers (of € 724.5 million in 2010) and confirming the group’s 
sustainability.  
The only worrying issue disturbing AdP’s sustainability is claimed to be the debts 
municipalities have to the group, with the figures reaching € 380 million. This represents 
an unsustainable situation if the amount is not paid. However, such is not believed to 
occur. But due to this situation, several million Euros intended for investment are said to 
having been redirected towards solving treasury difficulties some operators under AdP’s 
control were (and are) facing, delaying the execution of those projects already underway 
and the access to the respective European funding. Such rhetoric is similar to that 
employed in the statements published on the annual reports when addressing to this issue. 
Municipal debt represents the other side of tariffs. Whilst AdP’s tariff deficit arises 
due to tariffs established by concession agreements being considered too low so as to 
permit cost recovery and an adequate return to the invested capital, concerning many 
municipalities they are considered to be too high due to being supported on overoptimistic 
presuppositions of demand and growth. Also, the oversize of some systems and the cost of 
maintaining them are said to contribute to the problem. The roll of arguments can be great, 
but what is generally stressed as the major issue among the tariff question is the disparity 
of values charged by many municipalities to their consumers regarding water and sewerage 
services and the fragmented nature of “retail” systems, with low investment levels. This is 
seen as a direct cause of “retail” activities not being subject to almost any kind of 
regulation, contrary to the majority of “bulk” operators28. Because of this lack of 
regulation, such situation is claimed by AdP to cause distortions on the market and affect 
the economic and financial sustainability of “bulk” systems, for “retail” tariffs are not 
obliged to follow the principle of cost recovery to which “bulk” tariffs must abide. 
                                        
28
 The exception to this inexistence of regulation in the “retail” sector comprises all those (few) 
municipalities choosing to attribute the management of their systems to private companies by signing up 
service concession agreements, these falling under the regulator’s scope.  
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With the objective of promoting service quality and efficiency to end-users and the 
economic and financial sustainability of those services, the enacted Law-Decree nº 
277/2009, which changes the regulator’s denomination from IRAR to ERSAR29, widens 
the sphere of influence of the regulator in order to comprise all water and sewerage 
systems and not just those sustained on service concession agreements. Motivating this 
makeover in the regulator’s regime is the conviction that “without regulation, there are no 
incentives for a rise of efficiency and effectiveness by operators, (...) with the consequent 
possibility of end-users receiving lower quality services at a higher price” (Law-Decree nº 
277/2009, foreword, own translation). This also allows an improvement to monitoring and 
planning of public water policies and the related investment, with the new scope of powers 
comprising the responsibility to verify the tariff models being implemented both by 
multimunicipal and municipal operators. This is believed to enable them to be attuned to 
the principle of cost recovery, implying the progressive harmonisation of tariffs nationwide 
over technical and economical premises (see ERSAR, 2010b). Thereby, not only is the 
sustainability of operators warranted but transparency is also introduced over price 
calculation and equality among citizens, something lacking in the disparity of “retail” 
tariffs. However, the regulator is only endowed with the power to scrutinise, not decide, 
the tariffs being applied. Decisions about their value remain in the hands of the State or 
municipalities, as the opinions issued by ERSAR are non-binding. Nevertheless, such 
change is seen by AdP as a welcoming step in its 2009 annual report. Optimising tariff 
levels by orientating them alongside cost recovery is expected to have a positive impact on 
“bulk” activities. 
Alongside this reshuffle, the reorganisation of the sector sustained upon the principle 
of integrated, cost recovering management of “bulk” and “retail” activities is expected to 
begin. But according to the 2010 annual report, many municipalities have not shown their 
interest in the proposed new partnerships with the State, even after several conversations 
being held. Also, a significant part of the applications subjected to appreciation by the 
national entity responsible for administering the Cohesion Fund’s transferences did not go 
ahead. Due to several reasons not clearly specified by AdP but that are suggested to be 
connected to difficulties in accessing proper financing, the required conditions were not 
gathered. These new partnerships ended up comprising only 30 municipalities organised 
round two new integrated systems, one in the region of Aveiro and the other covering most 
                                        
29
 This is the acronym for Entidade Reguladora dos Serviços de Águas e Resíduos.  
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of Alentejo. Compared to the 193 local governments involved in the studies developed by 
AdP between 2007 and 2008 regarding the establishment of these new integrated systems, 
this number discloses the difficulties the implementation of this new managing model 
could be seen as facing. However, the operations relating the new enacted agreements are 
described by AdP as a success where both parties show a sense of mutual and good 
understanding.  
This panorama motivates a contrasting set of declaration by AdP. In the 2010 annual 
report, it is stated that “many management models, especially in the state sector, remain 
inefficient due to a lack of market competition and stimuli for efficiency (that ERSAR 
benchmarking in itself cannot overcome)” (AdP, 2010 annual report, p. 113), thereby 
remaining unsustainable. In 2011, regarding the proposed integration, it is mentioned that  
“the advantages of greater integration were foreseen by a broad group of 
municipalities and by the AdP Group, which (…) signed protocols for the integration 
of the respective municipal systems. This spirit of mutual cooperation between 
municipalities and AdP, subsequently strengthened on several occasions, as well as 
(…) signs of a better understanding among the different stakeholders of the real cost 
of the services provided, has strengthened our conviction that the necessary conditions 
are in place to grow and to overcome the severe current restraints” (AdP, 2011 annual 
report, p. 64). 
However, such mutual cooperation that is said to arise among a general consensus 
around the proposed solutions is then put at issue when stating that the relationships with 
municipalities were increasingly tense, especially over the issue of their debt to AdP. 
Moreover, in a news article published in 2013 some mayors of Alentejo region manifested 
the intention of breaking up with the agreements tying their municipalities to AdP, 
claiming that the prices being charged were unsustainable and, more than willingly 
accepting to take part in those contracts, they were forced to do so due to the restrictions 
and constraints placed by the government in the access to European funding unless they 
chose to side with AdP. In an opposite sense, AdP’s CEO Pedro Serra affirmed in a public 
hearing held in 2011 that if cost recovery was not performed by each municipal system, 
municipalities would not achieve to pay their debt to AdP, which is tantamount to affirm 
that the group would then be unsustainable. Indeed, local governments’ debt is considered 
by Serra to be the problem endangering AdP’s sustainability, as it involves all of the 
group’s controlled enterprises and may force the company to resort to the General Budget. 
Strangely enough, tariff deficits, frequently addressed to on annual reports as the biggest 
threat to sustainability, are referred to as being a specific problem of only some of AdP’s 
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controlled systems, therefore not impacting the group’s general sustainability. However, 
this somehow reveals that, contrary to prior periods and to AdP’s belief, it is being asked to 
account not for its sustainability, but rather for its unsustainability, as what is brought to 
discussion are those elements that are seen as capable of exposing such quality. AdP is 
then being exposed not to queries about its sustainability, but to calls demanding for it to 
show itself as unsustainable. This becomes even more evident after the general elections of 
2011. Meanwhile, local governments’ debt to AdP, composing most of its receivables, and 
tariff deficit continue their increasing trajectory. However, the value of bank debt is also 
alluded to, as it serves as argument for reinforcing AdP’s unsustainability.  
With the election of a new centre-right government in 2011, the discourse around 
sustainability radicalises even more, with the reorganisation in course being either 
deepened or subject to new guidance. This put the privatisation of AdP in the centre of the 
debate, which favoured even more the idea that solving the sector’s problems is tantamount 
to solving AdP’s.  
According to the new government’s arguments, the sector is said to suffer from great 
imbalance both financially and economically. But such is justified by alluding to the tariff 
deficits and municipal debt values AdP discloses on its accounts, which reveal the threat 
looming over the company by preventing the investments still lacking to proceed. This, as 
the newly appointed environment minister mentioned in a public hearing being held in 
2011, helps to materialise what is at issue regarding the sector, in turn reinforcing the view 
that, like the EIB representative for water issues put it, “AdP is the sector’s engine” 
(CAOTPL, 2011). A new element is also introduced into the discussion so as to reinforce 
the claims about the unsustainable nature of AdP. There are now references to the bank 
debt value being extremely high, raising doubts about the group’s capability of securing 
the required financing still necessary for concluding the investment projects, on the impact 
those levels can have on consumer tariffs or even regarding the “survival” of some of 
AdP’s controlled operators, which are described as being on the verge of collapse by the 
press. All this is alleged in a requirement previously subject to the Parliament’s 
Environment Commission, where even EBITDA, whose positive values and variation are 
continuously referred to by AdP in the company’s annual reports as displaying its 
sustainability, is now used against AdP (or in other words in favour of its unsustainability) 
when it is argued that bank debt overrides in more than ten times the ratio EBITDA/cash 
flow. It does not matter if the rising debt is the one related to long-term loans, in opposition 
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to the reduction short-term debt is experiencing; what counts is the total amount. All this 
sets the tone of discourse around three issues: bank debt, municipal debt and tariff deficit, 
all claimed to disclose the vicious circle that is dragging AdP into unsustainability, so it is 
claimed in the mentioned requirement. But in fact, such setting shows that AdP is already 
being described as unsustainable, that such is what is being asked from it; indeed, AdP is 
being called into giving an account of it as unsustainable, with the opposite not holding 
sway. For only by being unsustainable can the sector also be characterised as 
unsustainable, which is essential for giving sustainability its discursive force. The 
declaration made by the CEO Pedro Serra in another public hearing in 2011 heightens this 
quality, when stating that AdP’s sustainability is not only the sector’s sustainability, but 
that of the country. In other words, AdP’s unsustainability represents the country being 
unsustainable, and this becomes even truer when Portugal is facing a deep austerity 
programme. And the allusions made by Serra over AdP’s capability of distributing 
dividends being a proof of its sustainability cannot lower the tone of the discourse around 
the company being unsustainable; it is exactly for this AdP is being called to account, is 
being held accountable. Revealing AdP as unsustainable is tantamount to expose the truth 
about AdP, one being reduced to the single figures of debt and tariff deficit. 
At first, there was an unclear intention by the government of moving towards the 
privatisation of AdP in order to solve the lingering problems, in line with the option being 
taken regarding the solid waste sector, in which AdP has a significant participation through 
its business unit Empresa Geral de Fomento (EGF). According to the project still on the 
table, this company is to be sold to private capital. However, and in order for the 
government not to compromise itself with a likely solution for AdP, a debate around the 
meaning of “privatisation” rose, with the environment minister saying that there are many 
ways of privatising, but so far with none being chosen
30
. Eventually, privatisation is 
replaced by the opening of multimunicipal systems to private management through service 
sub-concession agreements being signed between privates and AdP. What matters here is 
that AdP’s unsustainability prompts an array of options considered to be within the scope 
of sustainability, with the wider opening of the sector to private capital being an example.  
                                        
30
 This blurriness around the government’s option, which eventually withdrew its intention of selling AdP, is 
said to be sustained upon the tariff and integration problems the sector has, contrary to the solid waste sector. 
These and other issues are believed to hinder privatisation, which gives those against it a stepladder for 
asserting that privatisation has only been delayed in order to arrange the sector. However, these arguments 
cannot be furthered here. 
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Indeed, the proposals presented by the government in 2012 in order to solve the 
sector’s problems have as their stepladder the issues causing AdP to be unsustainable: 
namely, tariff deficit and municipal debt. The first, comprising Bill (Proposta de Lei) nº 
123/XII, centres round the limits that current legislation imposes upon private companies 
willing to manage “bulk” activities, being allowed to share in their equity only in a 
minority position. In fact, hitherto the political trend was to prevent private access to the 
management of these systems, even if allowed by law. But according to the reasons being 
supplied, and shielded behind PEAASAR II’s objectives, the necessity to increase 
competition and efficiency in the sector, as well as allowing the economy to regain 
international trust and financial credibility, justifies enabling privates with managing 
“bulk” activities or the new integrated systems through sub-concession agreements. 
Regarding these, the new CEO of AdP, Afonso Lobato de Faria, appointed in the end of 
2011, states that AdP is used to running such contracts, suggesting the backing of the 
strategy. And according to the regulator, “public-private partnerships and scale economies 
will be fundamental instruments for operating this [PEAASAR II] strategy” (ERSAR, 
2010a, p. 91, own translation). However, such move is seen as preparing the enterprise for 
privatisation. 
The second proposal reinforces the ensuing system integration by merging all “bulk” 
systems into four great systems. This new mapping is based on integrating well-off coastal 
regions with rural areas, in order to proceed with the harmonisation of tariffs according to 
the principle of full cost recovery and assuring the generation of scale economies, which 
allow tariffs to be reduced, thereby warranting the sector’s economical and financial 
sustainability and concomitantly promoting equality among consumers. With this model, 
the problem of tariff deficit is said to be solved in 25 years by charging part of the 
accumulated deficit together with the current cost. In order to sustain them, a mechanism 
of subsidising lower tariffs in order to gradually move them closer to more efficient ones 
was envisaged; this consisted of a fund (Fundo de Equilíbrio Tarifário) being supported by 
richer municipalities in favour of those with financial problems. Whilst both government 
and municipalities agree that there is the need for systems to achieve scale and that 
artificial tariffs should end, the latter claim that such integration must have their 
agreement, with municipalities being free to choose whether they want to attribute their 
“bulk” responsibilities to these new systems. However, in an interview given by the new 
environment minister appointed in 2013, it is suggested that only those municipalities 
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accepting the proposed aggregations or integrating their systems with other “retail” 
systems so as to enable scale economies will have access to financing. Integrating “retail” 
systems within vast rural areas with low population density may prove to be hard, which 
may be the reason many municipalities contest such proposal. This justifies the appeals 
from government and AdP that aggregating systems is part of the solidarity movement in 
which municipalities ought to take part so as to ensure sustainability. Yet, and according to 
EIB’s representative for water issues, “there are limits to solidarity, as it may promote 
inefficiency through subsidisation from the fund intended to balance tariffs” (CAOTPL, 
2011). Also there were fears that such aggregations were only being performed so as to 
make systems more attractive to private capital.  
The third and most controversial measure is related to another increase in the 
regulator’s powers in order to include in its scope the establishment of every charged tariff, 
whether concerning multimunicipal or municipal systems. This proposal is sustained on 
two bills where it is claimed that the extant regulation framework is still inadequate 
regarding actual needs. Awarding the regulator a wider scope of powers is considered to be 
essential in order to solve both the insufficiency of some municipal tariffs in covering their 
associated cost and the debts municipalities have to multimunicipal systems, which 
“assume a critical importance on AdP’s sustainability, whose robustness is fundamental for 
successfully conducting the restructuration effort and the important environmental 
challenges placed to the water and residue sectors” (Bill nº 140/XII, 2013, foreword, own 
translation). By setting the focus on tariffs and municipal debt, the government intends to 
grant the regulator enough authority so as to define tariffs formation criteria and making 
both “bulk” and (especially) “retail” operators subject to such ruling, with their 
inobservance being sanctioned and tariffs administratively established by ERSAR. 
Alongside such purpose, the mechanism of detailed invoice should follow, consisting in 
invoices disclosing what part of the tariff charged to consumers is owed to multimunicipal 
systems and what is owed to municipal systems, making citizens also debtors of the 
former, which breaks the logic that only municipal operators can be considered as clients 
of multimunicipal systems. And in order to reinforce this compensation mechanism, 
municipalities are in a way changed into tariff collectors of multimunicipal systems due to 
the tariff component owed to them. 
This prompts bitter criticism from local governments, stating that such proposal is 
abusive and against their legal and exclusive prerogative of managing water and sewerage 
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activities. Enabling the regulator with these powers is tantamount to put municipalities 
under the control of the State, something they claim is entirely unconstitutional. But the 
government persists in reinforcing the regulator’s action, which causes municipalities to 
threat resourcing to court in order to defend their rights, which would turn this question 
into a fierce legal battle between them. And many mayors also sustain that this project is fit 
to solve AdP’s problems, leaving municipalities with the full weight of the tariff burden. In 
response to these accusations, AdP’s CEO states that if municipal tariffs had been 
harmonised in order to recover their costs, there would have been no need to increase the 
regulator’s scope, and suggesting that this is being done in order to solve AdP’s problems 
“is the same as not knowing the problems making the sector unsustainable” (CAOTPL, 
2013). 
 
4.4 Discussion: the visible pawn and the invisible king 
As previously argued, narrative needs a body of normativeness as its necessary 
background in order to be told. But whilst being a sine qua non condition, narrative is only 
worth telling when a breach occurs within the conventional expectations that have been 
culturally determined by norms (Bruner, 1991). Such a breach can be likened to a moment 
of crisis endured both by the subject and by norms, allowing for truth to emerge and 
manifest itself as power. Indeed, it is inherent to crisis the existence of a body of norms 
that sustain the structure of every regime of truth. But crisis also discloses the ever-
changing nature of truth as it connects truth, and thereby norms, to belief. One must not 
forget that “a crisis (...) is never a crisis in itself. It is defined as a particular type of crisis in 
relation to a specific set of beliefs about what characterises the world.” (McSweeney, 1996, 
p. 206) 
Throughout the development of this case study, the idea of crisis was always evident. 
And indeed it had to be so, for only then could the identity of AdP be attuned to the 
prevailing discourses of truth. This relates to the idea that subjects are mainly known 
according to what they (can) tell about themselves rather than to what they do, especially 
when distance plays a decisive role. Due to a still widespread idea that accountability is 
related to the “the giving and demanding of reasons for conduct” (Roberts & Scapens, 
1985, p. 447), accounts are turned into the primordial means of enabling the other with 
what knowledge it can obtain from the accountable subject, making him thereby visible. 
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Thus, actions are rendered visible not by themselves, but by some form of accounting that 
the subject, as his self-accountant, makes use of. Even in its simplicity, the above 
mentioned definition conceives accountability as a relation of answerability between self 
and the other through the accounts given. This makes identity dependent, above all, of 
communication, which is equivalent to state that “identity is a sort of saidness” (Roberts, 
2012, p. 151), one that concomitantly and necessarily displays truth through the accounts 
being rendered. Telling who one is needs not be similar to who one is seen to be because 
truth, as power, conditions the knowledge that can be delivered from accounts. After all, 
regimes of truth are regimes of knowledge. It goes without saying that subjects are known 
only within specific bodies of knowledge deemed to be true (Miller, 1990, p. 318), which 
limits their tellability, and thereby their self-constitution. Because “accountability 
contributes to the construction of the moral self” (Joannides, 2012, p. 250), accounts, in 
order to enable the subject with the capability to constitute himself, are performed so as to 
reflect righteousness, and this is only possible if they are perceived as true. 
Regarding AdP, the establishment of a new strategic framework (PEAASAR II) 
provides an important background for studying the way accounts are shaped and attuned to 
what prevails as truth, as the right path to follow. But with accounts disclosing a prima 
facie relationship of answerability, the existing interdependence between the subject’s 
accountability and truth is simultaneously disclosed by the role audiences play regarding 
the accounts they are given. The importance of audiences bears directly on the power that 
belief has in the endowment of significance to both subjectivity and truth, and this is valid 
even when self makes itself its primary listener. Believing that accounts are true is 
fundamental to the act of giving an account in order to make truth true, i.e., to render it 
meaningful. In this case study, allowing significance to the paramount concept of 
sustainability is not only central to the activity of account-giving by AdP but reveals a 
strategic game where the meaning of truth, vested as sustainability, emerges and is enabled 
to exert its constitutive power through the rendering of those same accounts. On the other 
hand, sustainability is only able to emerge as truth because of and due to AdP accounting 
for itself as unsustainable, even if reluctantly. This reluctance of publishing one’s truthful 
nature is typical of truth-extracting processes basilar to Christian technologies of the self as 
argued by Foucault (1997c; 2007b), where the subject’s truth emerges through the 
confession he is mandatorily led into. Confession is here always difficult to perform, since 
the subject is obliged to bear witness against himself. However, what this study reveals is 
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that modern reifications of confession may result in the subject bearing witness for himself 
due to modern practices of examination and the resulting anxiety the subject is endowed 
with is due to the need he is led to feel of publishing himself as successful.  
When AdP accounts for the sale of its Brazilian and Cape Verde operations, as well 
as Aquapor, these activities were at first classified as something revealing of an infirmity 
AdP wished to get itself rid of. They were damaging to its own identity of strength and 
competence in the environment sector because they hindered what was perceived to be 
representative of such qualities: net earnings. But by coupling a successful identity to the 
achievement of solid net earnings another side of AdP’s accounts is also disclosed. The 
proceeds resulting from the sale of these operations provided AdP with a stepladder for 
reinforcing the importance of net earnings in its accounts, disclosing in turn a set of 
conflicting statements regarding the divested operations. Whilst presented as an illness 
AdP had healed itself from, they are subsequently described as a set of wise investments 
performed by previous administrations since they allowed the company with sounding net 
earnings. Even when disclosing these ill investments, AdP disclosed them in a way capable 
of contributing to the maintenance of the intended image of robustness net earnings were 
believed to convey. AdP’s sense of accountability can thereby be associated to the 
presentation of good net earnings, but this importance reveals a sense of alienation towards 
what audiences were gradually perceiving as truth: net earnings are good only if they can 
be told as such. And the regime of sustainability that was gaining momentum somehow 
denied net earnings meaningfulness. In a way, exhaustingly focusing on net earnings 
reveals a lack of accountability by AdP towards the audiences, due to its self-belief in the 
quality of net earnings as reflective of its sustainability. Failing to communicate with the 
audiences is tantamount to an effective loss of accountability (Hänninen, 1995). In this 
research, AdP can initially be said to lack accountability in the sense of failing to give a 
proper account to the demanding others, the audiences. This is so because AdP is 
simultaneously its accountant and its listener, and what this excessive focus on net earnings 
reveals is an attempt by AdP to constitute itself as its primary listener due to a reluctance in 
publishing itself according to what truth requires from it, such appeal refracted by the call 
the audiences address to the company for an account. Representing the embodiment of 
truth in the Portuguese environmental context, sustainability needs AdP’s accounts to be 
attuned to its rule in order to successfully acquire its nature and power of truth. But, and 
following Butler (2005), it is because AdP publishes itself through the accounts it gives 
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that the company is prevented from failing to render a suitable account. This is related to 
the fact of the subject being dispossessed of his accounts precisely because he has given 
them. Whilst believed to be true, AdP’s accounts are not true in the sense AdP felt them to 
be, but in the way the audiences perceive them to be true, as accounts have been given to 
them. This giving is what puts accounts in the service of truth.  
Making oneself into its primary listener blurs the moral responsibility of the 
accountable subjects towards others demanding for an account. There is in this relationship 
what McKernan (2012, p. 264) terms as “responsibility of speech”, something constitutive 
of the force accountability exerts upon the subject to account for himself. And it is because 
accounts result from an appeal the other (whether singular or plural) has previously 
addressed to the subject that giving an account forces us into publishing ourselves towards 
others by exposing us to their gaze. In short, they make us visible. But visibility is not 
merely meant for our subjectivity to achieve meaning within community. Quite differently, 
our meaningfulness arises only because, and due to the fact that, truth needs us to be 
visible so as to acquire its regimental power. We, as subjects, even if corporate ones, are 
shaped by the powerful perspective of truth that limits what we can tell about ourselves. 
Giving an account of ourselves will in turn be meaningful if the accounts resonate within 
audiences, and this is so only if they are perceived to be true. We are then made into tellers 
of truth. That is why the mesmerising effect net earnings have in the way AdP sees itself as 
accountable may in fact harm its awareness of moral responsibility regarding the appeal of 
others for a proper account. Quoting Roberts, “the imperative of defending the self 
obliterates responsibility” (2012, p. 156). And this is exactly what ensues with AdP when it 
sticks to its beloved net earnings so as to reveal itself as sustainable. Yet, and because 
truth, as sustainability, needs AdP to be seen as unsustainable, the accounts are gradually 
attuned to what the regimental canons of sustainability require from the enterprise: in this 
case, what resonates among audiences are not good net earnings, but water tariffs and the 
related deficit. In a later stage, the rule of sustainability widens the focus onto the amount 
owed by municipalities to AdP and the level of banking debt, as they sharpen the crisis 
necessary for sustainability to hold sway. This is followed by the introduction of new 
notions of solidarity and system scale in order to buttress previous ideas of sector 
corporatisation and wider private investment. All these terms are part of the strategic game 
where the discursive regime of sustainability searches for sovereignty. 
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In order to deepen the explanation of how the accounts AdP renders of itself are 
performed for the sake of truth, here vested as sustainability, a parallel must needs be made 
with the work of Miller (1990), which focused on the discourse of order to which 
accounting and commerce were subject to during the Colbert period. Such parallel serves 
to reinforce the initial claims that were forwarded regarding the ambiguous character of the 
concept of order. 
Miller (1990) refers to the specific discourse of “order” that the very word called 
forth regarding accounting and commerce, which binds its meaning to the historical 
context of late seventeenth century France. Whilst not at all claiming that this word, as any 
other, can have a meaning out of its context, what is important here is to evaluate the force 
that order has in framing accounts into the regime of truth. According to Miller (1990), 
order, as a practice of government, was a rationale behind a public discourse whose aim 
was to promote the very notion of order as “an end to be sought in all spheres of 
commerce” (1990, p. 323). This is somewhat similar to make order into a principle of life, 
of life linked to commercial activity. The following quote depicts such idea. 
“The order to be achieved in commerce was viewed as equivalent to and an aspect of the 
order to be sought in the polity. Commerce could be valued for the order to be found 
within it (...), whilst the role of accounting became that of rendering such order visible for 
all to see. A way of representing commerce, and within it accounting, was thus elaborated 
that was not subordinate to an incessant quest for gain (...). Instead, it was argued, 
benefits would accrue naturally to those who carried the pursuit of order through into all 
the detailed practices entailed in carrying on trade.” (Miller, 1990, p. 324)  
Attaining order may seem here as a result of persuading and converting merchants 
and other parties to the legitimacy of its virtues. But Miller (1990) also refers to the 
Ordinance of 1673, where a legal framework for private enterprise accounting is provided, 
and to the several titles published during the Colbert period that reflected the discursive 
power of order. Coupling them to the practices Miller (1990) compiled as “government by 
inquiry”, more than voluntary, abiding to order was mandatory as it represented what was 
believed to be righteous in late seventeenth century, not only in France but around Europe. 
The several translations that works such as Savary’s Le Parfait Négociant (1676) were 
subject to are a strong example thereof. 
The specific significance of order Miller alludes to reveals the power the concept 
order can have regarding the act of giving an account because it ultimately symbolises 
what is regarded by society as the normative order. By claiming that accounting’s role is to 
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make order visible, Miller (1990) indirectly refers to the trap Foucault (1977) says that 
visibility is. By accounting for himself, the subject brings himself, even if unwillingly, 
under the order that the regime of truth imposes upon his speech. Truth commands the 
subject to account for himself in an orderly fashion, which is equivalent to state that his 
subjectivity, because it results from his narrative, is brought in line to what truth requires it 
to be. Otherwise the risk of loss of membership would be far too great, carrying with it the 
danger of meaninglessness. This alignment of the discourse of the subject to truth bears on 
Schweiker’s claim that “self and the other are, ultimately speaking, members of one 
created order” (1993, p. 245). 
When accounting for itself, AdP is exposed to the normative order of truth right from 
the very moment it gives an account. This bears on what Butler (2005) claims to be the 
dispossession of accounts the subject must endure if he is to be able to effectively give any 
account. This brings back AdP from the danger of lack of membership because 
dispossession allows the subject to be reconstituted and attuned to the limits of truth. AdP 
is then reshaped into an unsustainable subject, but it is simultaneously capable of 
successfully answering back to the call launched by the other(s). From the moment the act 
of giving an account is conceived as giving, no subject can call his accounts his own. This 
is of course true for AdP, which clarifies why the discourse around the importance net 
earnings were seen to have in maintaining a sustainable identity could not hold sway. Such 
discourse was not befitting to the regime of sustainability that required AdP to be revealed 
as unsustainable by the accounts being rendered, because it failed to abide to the 
regimental order that was in force. And the order was for AdP to be represented as 
unsustainable for the sake of sustainability itself.  
It is order that, as an expression of truthful significance, enables the regime with its 
constraining power regarding subjects’ tellability by weighing truth upon them. Such 
orderly force manifests through the resonation accounts must have within audiences. 
Therefore, order lets the pawn quality of the subject to emerge by subjecting its discourse 
to the power of truth. What subjectivity he can be endowed with is restricted to the 
boundaries of the regimental discourse. In this case, only those accounts that published 
AdP as unsustainable could gain momentum, and this was the case for water tariffs, 
municipal debt to AdP and banking liabilities, but not for net earnings. And the 
reconstructive power of truth is such that one of the financial indicators most praised by 
AdP in its accounts as mirroring its sustainability, EBITDA, is reshuffled into a mark of 
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AdP’s unsustainable nature by being coupled to banking liabilities. This is an example of 
how truth endows an appropriate significance to the terms capable of supporting its 
discourse, with others simply being obscured. Indeed, it is by bringing the elements 
composing the accounts being given under its rule that truth is expressive of the 
“normative order of the wider society” (Roberts, 1996, p. 43). Yet, this abiding to order, 
and thereby to truth, does not entirely explain why AdP needed to be shown as 
unsustainable. An exclusive focus on order can only reveal part of the complex circular 
relationship truth has with subjectivity. Truth, in order to be true, must be conceived as a 
game played by both the subject and truth for the sake of meaningfulness. 
Being ordered to account in an orderly fashion cannot be seen as integrally 
deterministic of the subject’s truthful identity, then. It would cease to be a subject were he 
to be specified in absolute by the orderly rule of truth. As hitherto argued, what is revealed 
through the exposure to truth is the subject’s uniqueness, his singularity regarding others, 
which prevents normative truth from reducing subjectivity to sameness. Indeed, truth needs 
it to be so if it is to be reified as power. Subjects must commit themselves to truth, not be 
fully determined by it. However, this implies that subjects are endowed with freedom of 
choice. As hitherto discussed, choice confirms the subject’s opaqueness because free 
agency contributes to hinder the accountant’s efforts of fully knowing and representing the 
agent. That is why accounting expresses a relationship of trust between parties, not only 
between self as agent and self as accountant, but between the accountant and the audiences 
receiving the accounts being given. Focusing on the latter allows trust to widen the scope 
of freedom the subject can enjoy because he is free not only to act, but to communicate, 
provided that the boundaries of truth are not surpassed. This is so because only the 
accountant, and never the agent, has the ability to give an account to someone; only he is 
able to communicate to others by means of an account.  
The freedom of the subject, as his self-accountant, opens the activity of giving an 
account to the negotiation of meaning. However, achieving a compromise over 
meaningfulness is traditionally taken to be easier when subjects are represented as a 
product of calculation, as figures able to be compared and examined. This bears on the way 
we learn how to learn and know others’ truthful subjectivity (Cooper & Puxty, 1994; 
Hoskins, 1996), which makes us believe in the visibility numbers purport to render of the 
subject. Subjects are then subject to calculation, with knowledge being very much 
dependent on the expression of subjectivity into single figures. Yet, and as previously 
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argued, numbers are subject to what meaning truth allows them with, which makes them 
able to seemingly speak for themselves only if they are endowed a place within the regime 
of truth. This ability to speak is only possible because numbers are always born out of 
narrative and thereby dependent on the relevant setting. Only then can they be capable of 
being communicated. 
Within this case study, AdP is reduced to three single figures capable of bolstering 
the discursive rule of sustainability. AdP is seen as unsustainable because of a) the 
continuous increase verified in the values recognised as tariff deficits, b) the growing 
amount of receivables owed by municipalities to AdP and c) the rising levels of banking 
debt. Reducing unsustainable problems to single balance-sheet figures constricts 
sustainability’s meaning to a financial-economical perspective. Yet, talking of them 
without linking them to trust and belief makes them meaningless. Indeed, they are brought 
to the fore because they are believed to be representative of AdP’s lack of sustainability, 
and thereby trusted to be true. Calculation cannot be disconnected from the narrative of 
lack of sustainability that is basic to the survival of sustainability as truth. It is by linking 
AdP’s numbers to context that the narrative of sustainability gains its momentum, but so 
does calculative subjectivity. And with calculation the sector itself is made into a 
calculable space. In order to render the discourse of sustainability its power, there is a 
strategic move of making AdP’s unsustainable identity that of the sector’s. This is achieved 
when AdP is represented as the leading actor within the sector’s strategic framework, and 
in such a way that AdP’s problems eventually but intentionally become those of the sector. 
This is disclosed in the several references made by government officials, county 
representatives, the Ombudsman and others to the unsustainable situation of AdP, where 
there is a consequent overlap, rather an integral fusion, of the sector’s panorama with that 
of AdP. The company is envisaged as having the noble function of structuring the sector 
(Correia, 2007), which makes the framework of the sector very much dependent on the 
situation of AdP. Therefore, and following Hoskins (1996) epistemological claims about 
the way we (are made to) know ourselves in truth, AdP’s numbers become those of the 
sector, making the latter unsustainable. And that is true even when some parties try to say 
it contrarywise, like a manager of one multimunicipal operator did when stating that AdP’s 
problems cannot be seen as those of the sector. But indeed they are under sustainability 
claims. Only by making AdP’s problems those of the sector can the notions of solidarity 
and corporatisation, essential for sustainability to hold sway, be empowered with meaning, 
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as they justify and are proof of the sector’s unsustainability. Representing AdP as 
unsustainable enables for the sector to be shown as such, for one of the purposes of the 
regime of sustainability is to make AdP’s truth that of the sector’s. It must be so in order to 
justify its own constitutive power. 
Making AdP’s truth that of the sector’s makes the latter also visible as unsustainable. 
Because audiences are refractive of the power of the regime of truth, in AdP’s case only a 
discourse of unsustainability could resonate within audiences if it were to be accepted. 
Whilst AdP describes itself in a way that attempts to disclose itself as sustainable, its 
accounts are attuned to truth due to the way they are heard by audiences. Thus, attuning the 
subject’s accounts to truth through audiences reveals accounting as a truth-extracting 
process for the sake of truth itself. Audiences look out for what can be deemed as true, not 
otherwise. Regarding AdP, its discursive stance of sustainability through earnings is 
reconstituted into an unsustainability circled by the figures of water tariff deficits, 
municipalities-related receivables and banking debt, as these convey the truth about AdP. 
Concerning banking debt, it does not matter the quality of that debt (a large amount of 
short-term debt was recently converted into long-term loans); what is to be seen is its huge 
numbers, believed to be proof of an unsustainable company making the sector 
unsustainable. What the regime demands from AdP’s accounts is that they do make the 
company’s unsustainability visible to all. AdP’s singularity thus relates almost exclusively 
to its unsustainable nature, because that is what can be seen. Were it otherwise, its 
uniqueness would not hold sway, as being subject to the regime of sustainability forcefully 
makes AdP depict itself as unsustainable, even if unwillingly. Only then can truth be 
extracted from what accounts it tells about itself. What meaning is given to the figures 
subjectivising AdP is necessarily one in line with truth, or rather with its regimental 
canons. What is unfit for truth is simply moved into obscurity, into meaninglessness. 
It is by conceiving accounting as a truth-extracting process that the pawn substance 
of the subject is visible. In other words, the subject is a pawn of truth because his discourse 
is attuned to its rule, even if reluctantly. This bears directly on what Butler (2005) claims to 
be the dispossession of accounts necessary for the enactment of subjectivity. Regarding 
AdP, the company is a pawn to the discourse of sustainability because its discourse is 
reshaped by the power of truth into showing the company as unsustainable. This reflects 
the meaning of subjects being subjected to truth. But more than that, AdP is made into a 
pawn of truth through its accounts because they are what can resonate within audiences by 
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making communication possible. And truth emerges as power when revealed by, and in, 
the accounts being given, for only then can audiences extract the truth of the subject. And 
in order to be true, subjectivity must necessarily be commensurate to truth.  
These truth-extracting processes that accounts allow are somehow similar to the 
confession practices developed in early Christianity as alluded to by Foucault (1997c; 
2007b). In this study, AdP unwillingly reveals itself as unsustainable due to the weight of 
truth upon its accounts, which is exactly what the act of confessing one’s sins is: difficult 
and embarrassing. One might say that this confession is indirect, but because it is 
something extracted from the accounts, it cannot cease to be a confession, one for the sake 
of truth. Being a pawn is tantamount to allow for the power of truth to flow through the 
accounts being rendered and emerge victoriously by confession. When accounting for 
itself, AdP allows for the rule of sustainability to emerge from its accounts because it has 
reached the audiences when the company became rendered as unsustainable. AdP visible 
as unsustainable is the expression of every subject’s pawn nature because only by being 
true to truth can accounts be accepted by others. Simultaneously, it reflects the victorious 
power of sustainability: AdP has been made into confessing itself according to the rule of 
truth. Thereby, the company may be said to have failed to give a proper account of itself if 
accountability is reified into a mere relationship of answerability where the subject replies 
back to the queries of others. This is equivalent to a lack of accountability. But truth-
extracting processes reveal a more complex side of accountability as “the endlessly 
repeated moment of subjection” (Roberts, 2009, p. 959). Within this perspective, AdP is 
pushed by the thrust of accountability into accounting for itself through confession, which 
brings the meaning of being held accountable to another stage, one where the subject is 
accountable to truth, and must consequently speak out the truth, his truth, even if against 
his will. Accountability gains meaning when the subject becomes subject to truth. 
Through confessing itself as unsustainable, AdP seemingly makes the regime of 
sustainability into a divine law by which it must forcefully abide. Yet, sustainability 
acquires meaning only if AdP is portrayed as unsustainable, and merely focusing on the 
extraction of AdP’s truth through accounts cannot suffice as an understanding about the 
need sustainability has concerning this unsustainable picture. Hitherto, AdP’s accounts 
were compared to an act of confession, but one must also refer to accounts as an act of 
persuasion if truth (in this case, sustainability) is to be rendered meaning. Being power, 
truth is productive of the subject and whatever knowledge that can be obtained out of him. 
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But such production is ultimately for truth’s sake as it produces itself through constantly 
reaffirming itself in the accounts of the subject. This is due to the fact that a regime of truth 
acquires its power when assimilated as true by subjects. And only when the knowledge 
being produced is accepted as true by audiences can truth assume itself as a regime 
conditioning and guiding agency. Accepting a specific knowledge as true is tantamount to 
accepting a specific kind of (true) self. Because of the weight of truth upon its accounts, 
AdP is known as unsustainable. Yet, this knowledge envisages others who see this 
corporate subject as unsustainable and believe it to be so. 
By accepting AdP as unsustainable, the actions of parties involved in the 
restructuring of the sector are opened to and infused in the logic of sustainability. Because 
AdP, and consequently the sector, are deemed as unsustainable, sustainability gains its 
momentum by shaping the strategic framework being structured for the sector. The 
alternatives being proposed and enacted must be attuned to sustainability, otherwise they 
will not even be considered as they are not true; they are meaningless in the face of 
sustainability. And because sustainability is conceived as essentially economical and 
financial due to the reduction of AdP’s sustainability into tariff deficit, municipal-related 
receivables and banking debt values, actions are orientated so as to solve these financial 
problems. Only then are the actions of others guided towards the purpose of truth, of 
sustainability. The government proposals of combining the extant multimunicipal systems 
into four large groups, widening the regulator’s powers and introducing the detailed 
invoice are a good example of how sustainability, in its predominant economical and 
financial perspective, shapes the alternatives that relevant parties choose. But this 
perspective only holds sway because it complies with the narrative that sustains all the 
disclosed figures. Whether tariff deficit, municipal-related receivables or banking debt, 
they all are in consonance with a narrative of unsustainability that shapes AdP’s 
subjectivity, because their meaning is one with truth and they are unable to be meaningful 
otherwise. This bears on what Bruner (1991) claims to be narrative’s feature of 
referentiality, where the truth of the elements intrinsic to a specific narrative is judged by 
their verisimilitude. And only because they are verbalised by accounts as signs of AdP’s 
unsustainable nature can they serve the purposes of truth, as they need to be 
communicated. We must bear in mind that, contrary to our belief, numbers are necessarily 
imprecise and uncertain (Hayes, 1983), their certainty resulting from the setting they are 
framed into. Calculation, being borne out of narrative, is thereby instrumental to truth.  
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Accounting, reified as the practice of giving an account, not only allows for truth to 
be extracted but it also permits truth to be assimilated by subjects, whether the one being 
held accountable or the ones demanding an account. For AdP to publish itself as 
unsustainable, it had to first absorb what sustainability could be, and the result was that 
being sustainable was tantamount to disclose good net earnings. In this case, AdP extracts 
its truthful self from its (own) account and assimilates that knowledge so as to shape its 
ensuing actions. This is possible because the accounts were never property of AdP, they 
never really belonged to it. They were given by self, as accountant, to the agent, as agent, 
and this one always trusts them to be true. This bears on the primordial fiduciary 
relationship self shares with itself as a result of its otherness (Schweiker, 1993). 
Yet, and because of the inventiveness of subjects and their freedom of choice, what 
is taken to be true by others is an identity of unsustainability that menaces the survival of 
the company; thereby, it endangers its subjectivity. Whilst in the case of net earnings AdP 
confesses itself willingly as sustainable, the force of the regime of sustainability reshapes 
the accounts so as to obtain a reluctant confession of the subject as unsustainable. This 
prevents net earnings from acquiring meaning in a community which already accepts 
sustainability as righteous. But this acceptance is only possible if the rule of sustainability 
is published by the accounts being given, which means that the regime of sustainability is 
dependent on what subjectivity is endowed to AdP. Whilst continuing to be a pawn of truth 
through the visibility prompted by its accounts, the need of sustainability, as truth, in 
portraying the company as unsustainable reveals AdP also as an hidden king that makes 
truth dependent on its subjectivity through the accounts being rendered. This is due to the 
process of truth-assimilation they allow. Were it not so, the regime of sustainability could 
not retain power. Only by making AdP unsustainable can the actions of others be 
orientated towards the true discourse of sustainability. Thereby, sustainability needs AdP 
to account for itself as unsustainable, which makes the former dependent on the latter 
giving an account of itself. Only by tying together the meaning of AdP’s subjectivity to 
unsustainability can sustainability itself acquire its status of power, and therefore be 
intelligible. Whilst seemingly superior, audiences make the accountable subject into a king 
when they shape their actions according to what was given to them as an account. 
Considering the previously mentioned Stoic techniques of the self Foucault (1997c; 2007a) 
refers to, AdP can be reified as a master because the accounts that were rendered have 
successfully brought the others’ actions under the rule of sustainability. This reinforces its 
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‘kingly’ nature, even if not perceived by community, by the layman, because it is not 
visible in the knowledge being conveyed. Subjects are then visible pawns by attuning their 
subjectivity to truth, but are invisible kings by making truth dependent on the accounts 
capable of defining that subjectivity. Truth is then dependent on the activity of giving an 
account for achieving power, which makes power exertion bilateral. In this case study, the 
government’s plans to restructure the sector are a proof thereof. 
 But for accounting to be revealed as a truth-extracting or truth-assimilating process, 
the supreme role of belief in rendering both truth and subjectivity their interdependent 
power is then essential. In this study, only by believing that the water sector’s problems 
were related to sustainability did subjects, such as the government or the Ombudsman, 
orientate their actions accordingly. And only through the belief that AdP was unsustainable 
could in fact the regime of sustainability be given its status of power. 
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5. Conclusion 
When discussing the link that subjectivity and truth had in Antiquity, Foucault 
(2007a) refers to the shower therapy used by Leuret in order to make his patient recognise 
himself as mad, even if unwillingly. Successive cold showers are turned on the patient until 
he finally admits his illness. Forcing the subject to talk about himself is here performed 
with the purpose of his own truth being extracted and exposed, the shower working as the 
force driving to such confession, but also restricting what can be told and accepted as being 
truth; in this case, truth is tantamount to the subject accepting, confessing himself as mad. 
What he can tell about himself under the shower is conditioned by the force the cold water 
being poured over him exerts upon his tellability; he can only tell the truth about himself, 
and can do so only if the other accepts his account as true; all the rest is prevented from 
being exposed for it is simply not true. 
In the case of AdP, making it subject to the regime of sustainability eventually 
reveals itself as unsustainable. Contrary to its conviction, AdP must answer a call, a query 
for it to be unsustainable, for only by revealing itself as such can the force of sustainability 
as a regime emerge. This is true even if concerning corporate subjects, as they are also 
moral agents (Schweiker, 1993). AdP is then being called to account for its unsustainable 
yet true nature. Within the discursive regime of sustainability, presenting good earnings is 
no longer valid (if it ever was). What matters are the single figures of debt (municipal debt, 
bank debt) and tariff deficit, to which AdP is reduced. In the case of bank debt, it does not 
matter what composes such amount, what the quality of the debt there included is. What 
counts is rather the fact that it is part of the subject needing to be accounted for, but only 
according to what is hold as being true, consequently allowing for its unsustainable truth to 
be exposed. For what counts is ensuring that sustainability is enthroned as being the truth 
guiding subjects actions, rendering the notion meaningful. That can only happen if AdP is 
made into accounting towards the tellability sustainability allows. Were AdP sustainable, 
what would the purpose, the meaning, of sustainability be? How could it be seen as truth? 
For Foucault (2001a, p. 132), battles “for truth” or “around truth” are not battles “on 
behalf” of truth, but “about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays.” 
But being a struggle over status necessarily turns such fight into a quest for meaning, for 
truth is true only if being meaningful; otherwise it cannot purport to be true. Quests for 
meaningfulness must involve two parties, even if physically the same, as it is related to 
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acceptance and persuasion. In the case of AdP, revealing itself as unsustainable, even if 
unwillingly or involuntarily, allows others to know it as such. And such knowledge is 
possible through the accounts subjects render of their conduct. Being subject to 
sustainability is tantamount to subjects feeling the need to account for sustainability. This 
is expressive of subjection to and exertion of power (see Schweiker, 1993). Therefore, 
when accounting for itself, AdP reveals the double quality of being a subject: being subject 
to truth through the gaze of others makes those others subject to what is being told to them. 
This will shape their action towards truth. Accounts, rather the acts of giving an account, 
are then what grant truth, and in this case sustainability, its activeness. 
In the case study here discussed, the figures portraying AdP as unsustainable are 
what the audience (the Portuguese government, society in general, the regulator, interested 
parties such as AEPSA, etc.) care for and consider to be true, with the rest not being taken 
into account. The fact that AdP was capable of achieving good net earnings was 
completely disregarded by practically all the parties intervening in the sector, except for 
AdP itself; they were out of the scope of what could or would be accepted as being true. 
Indeed, not being true is tantamount to be meaningless, which is actually what net earnings 
end up being; their putative meaning cannot hold sway within the sustainability discourse 
AdP must express itself in, and thereby fall into the obscurity of meaninglessness. They are 
not thus part of the unsustainable reality being built by accounts. The (un)sustainability 
rhetoric around AdP is indeed so strong that eventually the company’s problems are 
believed to be the sector’s, thereby overlapping, or rather fusing, both realities.  
However, all of the ensuing plans being proposed in order to tackle the lingering 
problems depart from the “unsustainable” tale AdP’s accounts render, with the ensuing 
efforts being developed focused on their resolution. For example, the increase of the 
regulator’s power forwarded in 2012, together with the detailed invoice project, is due to 
the amounts that are disclosed by the accounts rendered by AdP being judged as expressive 
of its truth. In fact, the discourse government employs is entirely supported on these 
figures. This means that more than accepting AdP’s accounts, subjects are lured by the 
accounts’ truthful appeal into acting according to what has been told. Because it is seen as 
true, the discourse of sustainability being refracted through the accounts being rendered is 
not contested, but assimilated by the audience, shaping its action. And this is potentiated 
by the legitimacy single figures are believed to have (Miller, 1992), like speaking for 
themselves (Kamuf, 2007). Indeed, their force remains uncontested throughout all the 
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period of analysis of this study. One can discuss the magnitude of the disclosed amounts, 
but their meaning remains unquestioned; otherwise the power of sustainability would itself 
be endangered. 
But the solutions presented between 2007 and 2012 can only emerge because they 
are now believed to be attuned to truth, truth being tantamount to “sustainability”. Going 
backwards, similar ones were rejected by society right after the dictatorship was 
overthrown, as they could not persuade the audience of their verisimilitude regarding what 
was considered to be right or true back then. And the respective historical stance was even 
hostile for the emergence of AdP, were it to be constituted at that time. This shows that 
subjectivity is conditioned by the prevailing regime of truth. 
Returning to our starting questions, accounts warrant truth as power by enabling 
subjects to both extract and assimilate what truth is told by accounts. In this study, what is 
extracted from AdP’s accounts concerns all that shows or is capable of showing it as 
unsustainable, for that is what is considered to be truth. This reduces the scope of what the 
subject can tell about himself, consecutively revealing the conditioning force the prevailing 
regime of truth (in this case, truth being sustainability) has upon tellability. The subject is 
here depicted in its condition of pawn. Accountability, being tantamount to answering back 
to the call of truth, reflects this condition of subjection of the individual (here AdP) to truth 
by holding himself accountable towards sustainability. Only then can he achieve 
meaningfulness; and in this case, it is to be one of unsustainable substance. 
But because what others listen to and take to be true will shape what actions they 
subsequently perform, truth can be true only when the accounts the subject renders about 
himself are interiorised by the respective audience. This subjects truth to the power of 
belief, for only when believed to be true can truth be given the power to shape conduct, 
both of the teller and of the audience. At first, the audience may seem superior to the 
subject. But when shaping its action to what the subject tells about himself, they are 
reduced to the condition of pupils assimilating the truth being verbalised and shaping their 
actions accordingly. This makes the subject into a king, putting truth dependent on 
something being told. And because truth needs trouble in order to emerge and renew itself 
as power, its meaning becomes even more dependent on the subject’s ability to account 
and persuade others into believing him. In this study, sustainability as truth gains its 
momentum only when the problems of the sector start arising. And the actions being taken 
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by the government and other parties towards solving them are guided towards achieving 
that sustainability. But those actions are possible only after AdP publishing itself as 
unsustainable, only after such discourse having reached the audience. This is similar to the 
process of assimilating truth inherent to the master-pupil relationships Stoics like Seneca 
maintained and were described by Foucault (1997c). Being accountable is also expressive 
of this subjection of truth to the subject’s tell-ability, because only by being believed and 
accepted as truth can, in this case, sustainability attune the subjects’ actions to its regime. 
Accountability, by disclosing this interdependence, is then tantamount to telling the truth.  
Revealing the importance of the act of giving an account in establishing the link 
between the subject and truth was the purpose guiding the common thread of this study. 
This enabled the role of accountability as expressive of both the subject’s and truth’s 
meaning to emerge. Regarding extant research, this dissertation purports to have rendered 
another perspective to the elusive meaning of accountability by disclosing its role in the 
constitution of meaning, in turn resulting on the definition of its own significance. This 
derives from the connection such concept has regarding the formation of subjectivity. 
Achieving a better understanding over this relationship can be thus considered the utmost 
contribution rendered by this study. The other contribution is linked to the former, as it 
concerns the role of accounting as being a process operating on the behalf of truth. By 
enabling subjects to extract and assimilate the regime of truth so as to define their identity 
and conduct, accounting is here construed as a practice that enables what Foucault claims 
to be the games of truth, i.e., the exertion of the perspective of truth by and upon subjects. 
However, such conclusions are subject to the natural limitations of exploring such 
theme. The elusiveness of accountability restricts the scope of this study to exploring a 
certain perspective in detriment of others. And exploring the link connecting accountability 
and subjectivity to truth is something still somewhat unaddressed by extant research, 
especially when applying Foucault’s ideas about the power technologies of the self have 
regarding accounting. And time was definitely another limitation. There was the need to 
depart from almost zero regarding previous knowledge over the mysticism of 
accountability, and undertaking such task requires a great deal of time consuming research.  
Regarding this case study, its main restriction concerns the scarce amount of 
information and studies regarding the water sector in Portugal, with many of those 
published referring essentially to engineering and infrastructural concerns. Those other 
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studies that relate to other academic areas, like historical or economical research, are 
scarce and frequently unavailable for consultation. Furthermore, the period comprising the 
development of this study prevented conducting interviews to some of the relevant actors 
within the sector. 
Nevertheless, introducing a new perspective about the significance of accountability 
and the importance of the practice of accounting on the constitution of meaning may allow 
further research on the power nature of the act of giving an account, especially when linked 
to strategy. Aspects linked to the resistance of subjects regarding the subjection to different 
regimes of truth are also constitutive of one other area worth researching, capable of 
complementing the perspectives here defended. This can contribute to explore in greater 
depth the ethical side of the activity of giving an account. Because giving an account, 
being the act expressing the subject’s accountability, and therefore where truth is told, is an 
act of power, whose exertion may reveal accounting’s unethical side. 
Here, however, the act of giving an account is reflective of the circular exertion of a 
certain act of power, one where meaning is (re)created: the meaning of the subject and 
consequently the meaning of truth. Accountability is expressive of this interdependent 
relationship of constructing meaning because it shares a likely interdependence to the 
activity of giving an account. Within the circular process of (re)constructing meaning, the 
role of the accountant is heightened. He is the link between the agent and the other, which 
makes him the possessor of the power of giving an account towards the construction of 
meaning, the meaning of reality, whether personal or social, a power so many despise yet 
able to bring so many to its subjection. For as the saying goes, in the land of the blind, the 
one-eyed man is king. And this is indeed the condition of what being an accountant of 
oneself is all about, a king where many cannot or will not see the crown. 
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